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Alejandro Quinteros. 
Syncretic practices between art and architecture. Towards a critical epistemic 




This thesis proceeds from an analysis and a critical assessment of socially engaged 
spatial practices that have arisen from the convergence, intersections and conflicts 
between public, social art, and architecture’s spatial practices; specifically, those 
situated within informal settlements of marginalized communities in Latin America.  
Through a literature review, the thesis identifies the persistence of a number of 
overarching misconceptions informing the design thinking of art and architecture’s 
spatial practices.  
This research is geographically framed in Latin America. The thesis develops within 
the contextual arena of informality as a vernacular practice in the informal 
settlements of marginalized communities at the borderlands of the Latin-American 
city. The thesis is informed by projects and interventions that artist and architects 
have developed and constructed within communities in these borderlands sites. 
The thesis contends that public and social art and architecture spatial practices in 
the site of poor marginalized communities perpetuate the colonizing attitudes and 
processes of extractivist capitalism. To substantiate this, claim the research has 
been informed by two case studies of art and architecture spatial practice. The 
projects this thesis focuses on are located in the informal settlements of La Perla in 
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San Juan, Puerto Rico, and in Ciudad Bolivár, Bogotá, Colombia. These are the 
sites where the impact and effect of artists’ and architects’ spatial practices were 
observed.  
The content of this research results from conversations and observations within 
these communities, thus weaving a communal narrative of epistemic injustices, 
resistance, appropriation and place-making.  
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the decolonization of the working 
paradigms of art and architecture’s spatial practices. It begins by outlining a 
methodology for identifying epistemic and hermeneutical injustices in the design 
thinking of artists and architects; this is followed by the proposal for a critical 
epistemology to guide the design thinking of art and architecture’s spatial practices 
away from their epistemic errors. 
The thesis provides a model for further practical exploration by uncovering the 
epistemological problems in the design thinking of artist and architects. This 
research speculates a design-thinking solution of a critical epistemic methodology 
for artists and architects to develop a socially sensible epistemology of justice and 
solidarity for a socio-spatial practice that promotes social engagement in 












Acknowledgements.        3 
Author’s declaration.        4 
Abstract.          5 
List of illustrations.        11 
Introduction.         13 
Chapter 1. Research methodology.      26 
 1.1. The methodological gap.      39 
 1.2. Measuring success.       43 
 1.3. Research methods.       46 
1.3.1 Self-reflexive approach.     47 
1.3.2 Grounded theory and critical analysis.   50 
1.3.3. Informal conversations.     54 
 1.4. A critical epistemic methodology.     56 
 1.5. A speculative hypothesis.      59 
 1.6. Author’s positioning.      62 
 
Chapter 2. Case studies.        74  
 2.1. La Perla Bowl.        78 
 2.2. El Potocine.        93 
 
 
   
 8 
Chapter 3. Framing the problem.       100 
3.1. Definitions.        103 
3.1.1. The socio-spatial agent.     108 
3.2.1. Intersectionality.      109 
3.3.2. Plasticity of words.      111 
3.4.3. Contrapuntal reading.     115 
3.5.4. Perception, the manifold problem.   116 
3.2. Socio-spatial structures.      120 
3.2.1. Space.        121 
 3.2.2. Place.        124 
 
Chapter 4. A crisis in art and architecture.     128 
4.0. A crisis of legitimacy in art and architecture.   129 
  4.0.1. The emancipatory function of art.    132 
  4.0.2. Art and architecture’s turn to the social practices. 133 
  4.0.3. Art and architecture’s “service” and “accessibility”. 141 
  4.0.4. Meaning and purpose.     143 
  4.0.5. Practising ‘otherwise’, critical feminist architecture. 146 
4.1. On the commodification of art.     165 
  4.1.1. Consumption.      167 
4.1.2. Demand and desire.      170 
4.1.3. Art process and the capital gain of the art object. 174 
 
 
   
 9 
 
Chapter 5. The site and its marginalization.     176 
5.0. On the site.        176 
  5.0.1. The city as site.      178 
 5.1. On community.        181 
  5.1.1. The romanticism of the pure community.   185 
5.1.2. The myth of community.     186 
5.2. The marginalized.       190 
5.2.1. Fashioning marginality.     194 
  5.2.2. The body of the marginalized.    198 
5.3. The monstrous.       202 
5.3.1. Naming the monstrous.     206 
5.4. Viveza criolla, the practice of informality.    211 
5.4.1. The disruptive tactics of the marginalized: el vivo. 213 
5.4.2. The inferiority of race.     216 
 
Chapter 6. The syncretic practice.      221 
6.0. Syncretism between art and architecture.     222 
  6.0.1. Syncretism in technology.     229 
6.1. The colonizer methodological gap.     232 
6.2. The colonizer.        235 
6.3. The artist as ethnographer.      239 
  6.3.1. Epistemic errors.      244 
6.4. The public as a hypothesis.      255 
   
 10 
  6.4.1. The fiction of public space.     259 
6.5. On participation.       262 
  6.5.1. Participation as token and placebo.    265 
  6.5.2. The market of art participation.    270 
  6.5.3. For a transformative participation.    273 
6.6. On place-making device.       275 
  6.6.1. Heidegger’s place-making device, the bridge.  280 
 
Chapter 7. Towards a critical epistemic practice.    283 
7.0. Epistemologies of interpretation.     284 
7.1. Epistemic practices.        290 
7.1.1. Epistemic injustice.      293 
7.1.2. Hermeneutical injustice.     297 
7.2. Epistemic extractivism.      299 
7.2.1. The rhetoric of the implementation gap.   303 
7.2.2. Epistemic prejudice/epistemic ignorance and excuse. 304 
7.3. A critical epistemic practice.       306 
7.3.1. Proactive participation.     311 
7.3.2. A socially sensible practice.     315 
 
8. Conclusions.         320 
8.1. Compressed summary of the theoretical narrative.  321 
8.2. Thesis contribution to knowledge.     329 
8.3. Critical reflection on thesis.      333 
   
 11 
8.3.1. Limitations and further research.     343 
 
Bibliography.         346 
 
List of Illustrations. 
 
Figure 1. Jennifer Allora and Guillermo Calzadilla. Tiza (1999–2003). 35 
Figure 2. Jennifer Allora and Guillermo Calzadilla. Land Mark (footprints). 35 
Figure 3. Francis Alÿs. When Faith Moves Mountains (2002).   36 
Figure 4. Francis Alÿs. When Faith Moves Mountains (2002).   36 
Figure 5. Arquitecture Expandida. Escalera como Protesis (2013).   37 
Figure 6. Arquitecture Expandida. La Casa del Viento (House of Wind). 37 
Figure 7. Chemi Rosado-Seigo and Boly Cortés. La Perla Bowl (2006). 38 
Figure 8. El Potocine. Potocí barrio, Ciudad Bolivár, Bogotá, Colombia. 38 
Figure 9. Ana Rivera Marrero. La Perla (2002). Abiertamente.   61 
Figure 10. La Perla (2020). Abiertamente.     62 
Figure 11. Stone House. Rancas, Huayhuaysh Range. Perú. 2007.  68 
Figure 12. Stone House. Rancas, Huayhuaysh Range. Perú. 2017.  68 
Figure 13. Artist’s studio forest cabin. Karso Range. Ciales.    69 
Figure 14. Casa Pukara. Karso Range. Ciales. Puerto Rico.1994.  69 
Figure 15. Skater/conversation bench. 2013.      70 
Figure 16. Prototype play box .2013.       70 
Figure 17. Swearing ball. Reactive record-play sound toy/sculpture.2008.  71 
Figure 18. La conversación / the conversation. Kinetic, sound and video  
interactive installation 2004.       71 
   
 12 
Figure 19. La conversación / the conversation. 2004.    72 
Figure 20. La conversación / the conversation. MAX/MSP patch. 2004. 72 
Figure 21. The Panopticon. Interactive video/sound installation. 2005. 73 
Figure 22. The Panopticon. Interactive video/sound installation. 2005. 73 
Figure 23. The Panopticon. MAX/MSP patch. 2005.    74 
 
Figure 24. La Perla Bowl community pool and skate bowl (2020).  78 
Figure 25. La Perla, (2020). Google Earth.     79 
Figure 26. La Perla and La Perla Bowl (2020). Google Earth.   85 
Figure 27. Intervention by Arquitecture Expandida (2013).   89 
Figure 28. Escalera como Protesis (Stairs as Prosthesis) (2013).  89 
Figure 29. El Potocine, community self-managed movie theatre.  92 
Figure 30. El Potocine, community self-managed movie theatre (2016). 95 
Figure 31. La Casa del Viento burns (2010).     97 
Figure 32. Lunar module (July 20th, 1969). The Moon.    276 
Figure 33. La Perla Bowl. La Perla, San Juan. Puerto Rico. 2016.  276 
 
   
 13 
Introduction. 
This introduction frames an enquiry into the function of art and architecture in 
today’s consumer capitalist society, discussed by a number of renowned spatial 
practitioners and theorists (Rendell, 2006; Mouffe, 2007; Bishop, 2009; Miessen, 
2010; Foster, 2011; Cruz, 2012; Van Heeswijk, 2012). The art critic Hal Foster 
reduced their function to “attract business and to brand cities” (Foster, 2011, p. vii). 
This enquiry arose from the sense of loss both disciplines seemed to convey in the 
early 90s and coalesced into an existential crisis after the global market crisis of 
2008. Many artists and architects took refuge from the crisis by turning away from 
the bankrupted professional market-driven sites of private architecture firms, 
commercial galleries, academic institutions, museums, international art fairs, and 
biennales, and towards the site of the social. The “social turn” (Bishop, 2009) of 
both disciplines was meant to regain a social legitimacy that art and architecture 
practices had lost during the past decades, accused of elitism and of being reflexive 
practices (Awan, Schneider, and Till, 2011). In particular this turn would also allow 
young artists and architects to develop their professional practice portfolios before 
trying to enter the private professional domain of their practices. Thus, artists and 
architects found themselves looking to each other’s disciplines for means to 
reinvent themselves in a new social spatial practice1 (Chapter 4).  
Architecture has always been attracted to art as a practice with subversive 
potential, and artists have valued architecture for its institutional credibility (Rendell, 
                                                
1 Social spatial practice comes from the combination of two separate but related terms. 
Spatial practice is “a loose and expandable set of approaches that embrace the political and 
the activist, the performative and the curatorial, the architecture and the urban.” (Dodd, 
2020). 
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2006). The artist’s practice is deemed “speculative” and “open-ended”; architecture 
practice, on the other hand, has a clear and “objective” function. While architecture 
is tasked with building courthouses, schools, community centres, shopping malls, 
parks and many other structures of public gathering, place-making, and urban 
renewal, art is relegated in the way described by artist Barbara Kruger in an 
interview with W. J. T. Mitchell: “if architecture is a slab of meat, then so-called 
public art is a piece of garnish lying next to it” (Mitchell, 1991). 
The intangibility of art’s social effects and functions is often seen by governments, 
social institutions, and society at large as masquerading a social importance 
beyond art’s autonomy and traditional purposes of decoration, entertainment, and 
pleasure. The art critic and historian Hal Foster (2002, p. 40) wrote that Freud once 
argued: “the artist is the only figure allowed to be freely expressive in the first place, 
the only one exempted from many of the instinctual renunciations that the rest of us 
undergo as a matter of course” (Freud, 1911). In contrast, the architect is seldom 
given the opportunity to have no function (Rendell, 2006). Therefore, to break away 
from these sets of traditional constraints, and the stigma of their own disciplines, 
artists and architects have been borrowing, appropriating, absorbing and 
processing methods, behaviours, techniques and actions from each other’s 
practices. The result has been a syncretic practice whereby art gains structure from 
architecture and architecture in turn gains informality from art. Furthermore, both 
disciplines have understood their social turn to be concomitant to spatial questions 
of justice, segregation, expulsion and informal urbanization. The urban theorist 
Edward W. Soja called the attention from many social disciplines towards these 
spatial questions the “spatial turn” (Soja, 2010). The syncretic practices between art 
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and architecture become instrumentalized in the nexus of the socio-spatial 
dialectics (Soja, 1989) between epistemologies of power and the social spatial site 
of the artist and architect’s practice. 
*** 
This thesis explores the conjunctions created between art and architecture’s 
syncretic processes and the socio-spatial practices generated with their 
interventions in the site of the social. Hal Foster has referred to these intersections 
as the art-architecture complex. This ominous title refers more to the large-scale 
architecture and public art projects funded by private and government institutions. 
Another perspective belongs to the architectural historian and critic Jane Rendell, 
who theorized “architecture’s curiosity about contemporary art” (Rendell, 2006, p. 3) 
into a new practice that she named critical spatial practice. She argued that this 
practice “allows us to describe work that transgresses the limits of art and 
architecture and engages with both the social and the aesthetic, the public and the 
private” (Rendell, 2006). However, this research investigated socially engaged 
spatial practices2 that have coalesced from the syncretic relations between public, 
                                                
2 Socially engaged art is the most recent term to be used in art criticism to refer to the 
artwork that is created to involve the social interaction of the public and community.  
“Socially engaged practice, also referred to as social practice or socially engaged art, can 
include any art form that involves people and communities in debate, collaboration or social 
interaction” (Tate Art Terms, 2020). 
 Other names have previously been used to describe similar social works and initiatives that 
engaged the public into the system of the artwork: maintenance art (Mierle Lademan 
Ukeles, 1969), social sculpture (Joseph Beuys, 1970s), relational aesthetics (Nicolas 
Burriaud, 1998), new genre art (Suzanne Lacy, 1995), dialogical art (Bruce Barber, 2000s), 
experimental geography (Trevor Paglen, 2002), littoral art (Grant H. Kester, 2004), social 
collaboration and socially co-operative art (Claire Bishop, 2006). 
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social art, and social architecture3 practices – specifically those situated within the 
socio-political sites of poor marginalized communities in Latin America (Chapter 3).   
*** 
The word practice denotes a very specific and disciplinary way of looking and 
working in the world. The colloquial sense of practice portrays a limited instrumental 
connotation; an image of a very specialized and repetitive timeless activity that has 
been perfected over time and tradition. Practice is thought of as the skill, or tacit 
knowledge and presuppositions, which underpin activities and actions without 
reflection. (Turner, 1994; Dreyfus, 1991). A recurrent disciplined action, towards the 
perfecting – mastering a specific goal. The value of a practice is contextualized 
within an epistemic hierarchy of a legitimizing agency. This agency is usually 
manifested in the forms of tradition, culture and its sedimented culturalized values4. 
This instrumentalized view of practice does not reveal any epistemic curiosity, nor 
any creative intentionality towards transformative new knowledge; instead it is 
construed only by the mastering of techne over episteme. In contrast, art practice is 
presented as speculative, experimental and open-ended (Ingold, 2013).  
This thesis posits the idea for a critical epistemic practice as a liberating informed 
socio-spatial practice for breaking with the hierarchical relations of the “politics of 
                                                
3 Social architecture is by design the instrumentation of space to procure a particular 
socially designed behaviour response. In my use of this term, the social relates more 
towards the architectural design that aims to disrupt socially ingrained heteronormative and 
patriarchal behaviour of social hierarchies, class hegemonies and somatic norms. The 
“social” in art and architecture refers in this case to the promotion of relationships of 
solidarity and community-building, and the effects on and between peoples. 
4 Sedimented culturalized values refers to “the way things are done here”. A defensive 
regimented posture of “local values” as timeless national truths, to be defended, cherished 
and maintained as symbols of “local” national identity. 
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interpretation” (Said, 1982) embedded in the traditional structure of art and 
architecture’s practice. Socio-spatial practices are social approaches to practice 
founded and guided by the socio-spatial dialectics (Soja, 1989) in the political 
structuring of liveable space (Dodd, 2020). Edward W. Soja (2010) defined critical 
thinking as driven “by strategic optimism and expectation, by a goal of making 
theoretical and practical-political sense of the world so that we can act more 
appropriately and effectively” (Soja, 2010, p. 199). A critical epistemic practice aims 
to create a socio-politically informed and decolonized context for artists’ and 
architects’ socio-spatial practices.  
The relation between the socially engaged artist and architect lies in their mutual 
recognition that the intertwined social and spatial processes that reproduce 
oppressive and unjust relations between people have transformed their traditional 
practices. As Edward Soja mentioned, “the recognition of a new spatial 
consciousness” is the first step towards a critical spatial perspective. This thesis 
argues that such a step will allow artists and architects working in marginalized 
communities in Latin America as socio-spatial agents5 to develop a socially sensible 
epistemology of justice and solidarity in their socio-spatial practices. 
*** 
The thesis argues that artist and architects have situated their socio-spatial 
practices in the informal settlements of poor marginalized communities in Latin 
                                                
5 Socio-spatial agents: for the purposes of this thesis, this term will be used to 
identify the particular kind of artists and architects who have chosen to intervene 
and work in marginalized communities in Latin America as site for their socio-spatial 
practices. Also see section 3.1.1. The socio-spatial agent. 
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America. The reason that artist and architects – especially those from Western 
developed cities, but also national artist and architects – have been driven from the 
urban centre to these sites is the diminishing public accessibility to tightly regulated 
use of space in the city. This lack of working space has prompted Western artists 
and architects from developed countries to explore the openness of informality in 
the poor marginalized settlements at the fringes of the Latin American city. The 
thesis argues that a prevailing colonialist design thinking guiding the development 
of artists’ and architects’ socio-spatial practices, projects and interventions in the 
sites of the marginalized community ended up reproducing the same extractivist 
strategies of colonizing capitalism. 
The thesis presents the locus of this problem in a series of cognitive gaps and 
errors in the artists and architects’ design-thinking methodology as socio-spatial 
agents.  
1-The implementation gap. 
There is a cognitive gap between how artists and architects describe their purposes 
and the function of their socio-spatial practices in the social realm of marginalized 
communities; and in how these practices are publicized in the rhetorical public 
discourse of museum exhibitions, reviews and catalogues. Art and architecture 
socio-spatial interventions are publicly characterized as de facto social “good”, 
without a clear understanding of what the actual results are for the communities 
where these practices took place (Chapter 1). 
2-Political blindness and epistemic ignorance. 
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The artist and architect’s prejudicial perspective about the community often affects 
their design thinking, aims, and the purpose of their work in the field of marginalized 
communities. Their epistemic ignorance of “white”6 privilege supersedes the need 
to know the local social and political conditions. This causes political and social 
blind spots in the artists’ and architects’ role as agents of epistemic and technical 
authority (Chapter 5). 
3. The experience error. 
The artists’ and architects’ social perspective is construed by the “experience error” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962) of their limited experience, centred on their own everyday 
life. Their limited life experience coalesces into epistemic errors in their social 
practice: the assumption of community, the presumption of the need for help, and 
in the purpose of the forum of art and architecture publicity (Chapter 6). 
The thesis posits the question, what does a decolonized paradigm of socio-spatially 
engaged art and architecture practice look like?  
The thesis proposes a methodology for a critical epistemic practice to counteract 
the traditional patriarchal design thinking that reproduces epistemic and 
hermeneutical injustices.  
This critical epistemic methodology starts with a critical reflection upon artists’ and 
architects’ socio-spatial practices with an intersectional contestation of its political, 
ethical and aesthetic values. Before assembling methods, experiences, and designs 
                                                
6 White and whiteness are defined in this thesis not as skin colour but instead as 
performative social categories of power and epistemic authority (Castro-Gomez, 2014; 
Segato, 2018b). 
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from social and public art, social architecture, critical spatial practices7, and 
decolonial feminism to forge a functional set of operations, tactics and a critical 
decolonial8 and epistemological perspective (Chapter 7). 
*** 
Summary. The next section of this introduction summarises the content of each 
chapter. 
Chapter 1. Research methodology. 
This research takes a critical view at the practices that guide the traditional art and 
architecture’s socio-spatial design practices. Following a self-reflexive and 
grounded theory with a critical analysis together with on-the-field experiences of 
many works of socio-spatial practice, the research presents a critical epistemic 
methodology and a speculative hypothesis to solve the methodological gaps in 
                                                
7 Jane Rendell introduced the term “critical spatial practice” in her article “A Place between 
Art, Architecture and Critical Theory”, Proceedings to Place and and later consolidated and 
developed the concept in her book Art and Architecture.  
“I suggest a new term, ‘critical spatial practice’, which allows us to describe work that 
transgresses the limits of art and architecture and engages with both the social and the 
aesthetic, the public and the private. This term draws attention not only to the importance of 
the critical, but also to the spatial, indicating the interest in exploring the specifically spatial 
aspects of interdisciplinary processes or practices that operate between art and 
architecture.’” (Rendell, 2006).  
For a further discussion of critical spatial practice in art and architecture see: 
Miassen, M. (2016). Crossbenching, Toward participation as Critical Spatial Practice. 
Sternberg Press, London. 
8 Decolonial thought challenges the matrix of colonial power, which perpetuates domination 
through totalizing forms of knowledge under global capitalism (Quijano, 2000). From 
different perspectives, black feminism, queer theory, indigenous universities and various 
other movements and practices open cross-disciplinary spaces beyond global epistemic 
hierarchies, mobilizing subaltern identities and geopolitical spaces to generate multiple 
varieties of situated knowledge that embodies other forms of imagination, action and being 
in the world (Grosfoguel, 2002). 
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socio-spatial art and architecture’s practices, decolonize traditional patriarchal 
pedagogy design thinking and ways to measure the success of socio-spatial 
practices. 
 
Chapter 2. Case Studies. 
This thesis has been informed by visits to two successful projects of social practice. 
The first project, La Perla Bowl (2006) by the artist Chemi Rosado-Seigo, is located 
in the neighbourhood of La Perla in San Juan, Puerto Rico. La Perla Bowl was built 
as an artist intervention in the form of a skate bowl/community pool. The second 
project, El Potocine (2016), was designed by the architecture collective Arquitectura 
Expandida and is situated in the neighbourhood of Potocí in Ciudad Bolivár, 
Bogotá, Colombia. El Potocine is a self-managed non-profit movie theatre. It was 
built co-operatively between the community organization Ojo al Sancocho and the 
members of Arquitectura Expandida. Both projects remain in use, and are 
maintained by the community. During my visits to the sites, many informal 
conversations took place with the artist and architects, and with the community 
organizers, residents of the neighbourhood, and visitors. It is from these 
conversations, and from the observations during the visits, that some key ideas 
arose for the development of a critical epistemic practice. These informal 
conversations have informed the beginning of the methodological approach for the 
thesis elaborated on in chapter 2 in the case studies.   
During conversations with the members of Arquitectura Expandida, two other 
projects came to attention as examples of failed social intervention by artists and 
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architects into marginalized communities. The project Escalera como Prótesis 
(2013) created in La Perla, Puerto Rico was poorly planned and ended up being 
neglected by the community and later eroding into the sea. The second project, La 
Casa del Viento (2010), built in San Cristobal, Bogotá became the centre of a 
communal dispute and was burned down. These two projects served to illustrate 
the epistemic ignorance of artists’ and architects’ socio-spatial practices. When 
artists and architects intervene in communities without the necessary local 
knowledge, sensitivity, and openness to other voices beyond their own, their 
projects become parachuting practices and the artists’ and architects’ social 
function becomes the colonizing agent (Chapter 4).  
 
Chapter 3. Framing the problem. 
This chapter explores the socio-spatial relationships that frame the sites of 
contention where art and architecture’s socio-spatial practices are nowadays 
entangled. Starting with a discussion on the marginalized as the site of practice for 
artists and architects and the issues that start to contextualize marginality within the 
framework of habitable space in the modern city. The chapter follows with a series 
of definitions that elucidate the research’s thinking from an intersectional and 
decolonial perspective. The chapter ends presenting the methodological gaps in art 
and architecture’s social practices and proposing a speculative hypothesis to be 
explored throughout the thesis,  
Chapter 4. A crisis in art and architecture. 
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This chapter highlights the social conditions that have contributed to the crisis in 
social legitimacy of art and architecture practice. It also shows how art and 
architecture’s practices reaction undertook a “social turn” (Thompson, 2004; 
Bishop, 2006) towards a socially conscious, participatory and collaborative design 
thinking in their individual professional practices. The chapter continues with an 
analysis on the commodification of art and architecture’s practices, as catalysts to 
the legitimacy crisis. The chapter closes with an overview of culture as the site of 
legitimization, and culturalism as the ontology of a recursive patriarchal design 
practice that has perpetuated the short-sighted social perspective of artist and 
architects. 
Chapter 5. The site and its marginalization. 
This chapter defines the informal settlements of poor migrants in the borderlands of 
the modern Latin American city as the site where artists and architects are 
implementing their socio-spatial practices. The site of practice is analysed from a 
socio-political economy of its main components: the city, the community, and the 
marginalized. The demystification of the romantic image of imagined community 
and the construction of the abject poor migrants as the marginalized are key 
elements on the critical deconstruction of the socio-spatial terrain of the site. The 
chapter presents the social tectonics of the site intertwined with prejudices towards 
the marginalized population. Their informal economy and dwellings are categorized 
as a monstrous threat to metropolitan society; while their vernacular behaviour of 
viveza is chastised as a form of resistance and a form of selfish individualism. 
Chapter 6. The syncretic practice. 
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This chapter explores a critical deconstruction of artists’ and architects’ socio-
spatial practices in the site of marginalized communities. The thesis posits that the 
methods and design thinking by which artists and architects intervene with their 
practices in the site of marginalized communities have arisen from a syncretic 
relationship between art and architecture’s theory and praxis. The syncretism 
between art and architecture inherited traditional disciplinary practices of 
authoritarian patriarchal design thinking from Western academic thought. The 
chapter analyses what these traditional authoritarian practices are and how they 
have been detrimental in the artists’ and architects’ development of their socio-
spatial practices. The thesis posits that these practices create a baleful relationship 
of colonialism between the artist/architect and the people who inhabit the site. This 
in turn creates epistemic errors that are carried throughout the practice into 
misguided and prejudicial definitions of the public, participation and the socio-
spatial function of practice.  
Chapter 7. Towards a critical epistemic practice for art and architecture. 
This chapter presents a theoretical framework for the development of a critical 
epistemic practice for art and architecture. The thesis posits that such a practice 
would bridge the methodological and cognitive gaps in the traditional social and 
participatory practices that have proven to be ineffective, unjust and prejudicial in 
the site of marginalized communities. The process towards a critical epistemic 
practice starts with an introspective critical contestation of the artists’ and 
architects’ ethics, aesthetic values, and epistemic ignorance. This process would 
coalesce into a socially sensible practice of solidarity and epistemic resistance for 
the community. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusions. 
This chapter closes the thesis with a summary of the theoretical narrative of the 
development of a critical epistemic practice for a decolonized paradigm of socio-
spatially engaged art and architecture practice, followed by a critical reflection on 
the thesis, the limitations of the research, and possibilities for further research. 
The thesis contribution to knowledge radiates beyond the instrumentation of a 
critical epistemic practice for decolonizing the individual working paradigm of artists 
and architects socio-spatial interventions. Through these processes the artist and 
the architect can liberate themselves from traditional misguided patriarchal design 
methodologies. This research is a theoretical foundation for a decolonizing 
pedagogy in design thinking and art making and more crucially, for the overall 
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Chapter 1. Research methodology. 
This research takes a critical view at the gamut of sedimented practices that guide 
the traditional design practices of artists and architects when working in the social 
realm of marginalized poor populations living in informal settlements. Sedimented 
practices are ways of doing things, guided by uncritical knowledge taken for 
granted as ever-existing norms and behaviours. These practices constitute the 
framework of influences and structure of ethical and moral judgments that shape 
our everyday behaviour. These are evident in the patriarchal-centred tradition of 
design pedagogy of art and architecture disciplines. Arturo Escobar argued the 
“cultural-philosophical armature from which design practice itself emerges (broadly 
patriarchal capitalist modernity).” (Escobar, 2018; 3) need to be questioned. The 
tradition of patriarchal pedagogy is founded on the certitude of Western patriarchal 
culture’s epistemic superiority. Its practices are guided by sedimented beliefs 
constructed to corroborate Western society’s knowledge, ethics, and morals as 
guiding universal ideals to be followed by the rest of the world. Patriarchal 
pedagogy positions the white heterosexual Western male as the locus of epistemic 
authority (Puwar, 2004; Segato, 2018). Western science biologized race and gender 
into inferior epistemic categories (Shiva, 1999; Quijano, 2000), thus fabricating the 
power asymmetries that would constitute modern society (Loomba, 1998; Bhabha, 
1994; Said, 1993). Hence, traditional patriarchal design pedagogy reproduces the 
epistemic asymmetries between race, gender, class and sexuality into an 
extractivist practice (Gago and Medrazza, 2017; Gómez-Barris, 2017), where 
knowledge from other voices is silenced as these voices become assimilated into 
Western academic’s official design practice discourse. At this particular point in 
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western academic thought, Lucy Lippard wrote “art can seem insignificant 
compared with the perils offered by life.” (Lippard, 2014).  Artists and architects 
need to outline new trajectories for ‘thinking otherwise’. (Petrescu, 2007; Escobar, 
2018). 
Western art and architecture dogma have been accused of epistemic 
righteousness, paternal colonialist attitudes of hermeneutical ignorance, and 
cognitive blindness in disregard to the actual social and political conditions of the 
“other” – the subjects of colonization, who are the audience and users of the social 
practices that artist and architects produce. (Gómez-Barris, 2017; Dornhof et al, 
2018; Davila, 2020). 
Art and architecture as disciplines have been the beacon of Western aesthetic and 
epistemic authority over the colonized Global South9. Globalized consumer 
capitalism has made Western art and architecture discourse and pedagogy the 
golden standard for true artistic knowledge and beauty. As capitalism’s incessant 
march over the globe engulfed the earth, so did its prime concepts of universal 
cognition: desire, freedom and happiness. The promises of universal capitalism 
reside on homogenizing aesthetics of fashion, art and architecture. Their social 
attributes and political services accompanied the levelling landscape of culture as 
the site for a universal menu of apparent choices for the new individualized persona 
of globalized consumer capitalism. Conformity by consumption of the appropriate 
                                                
9 This thesis utilizes the term Global South to refer to the so-called “third world” of 
underdeveloped nations and territories. 
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combinations of items of social recognition10 as the apparatus for manufacture and 
social camouflage for personal identity and pseudo-choice are the social norm of 
this individualized persona. 
In this global consumer capitalism’s paradigm of individualization by consumption, 
art and architecture had fallen behind in their ingenuity and creative ethos. Publicity 
and fashion had become the reigning influential epistemologies of capitalism in the 
21st century.  
In order to contextualize this thesis’s critique of arts and architecture’s socio-spatial 
practices and pedagogy, this research proposes the following principal questions: 
1-What are the cognitive gaps present in the design thinking and 
practices of many artists and architects working as socio-spatial agents in 
marginalized communities? 
2-Why does a number of socio-spatial projects in marginalized 
communities tend to reproduce capitalism’s colonizing extractivist 
practices? 
3- What are the reasons behind the success and failure of socio-spatial 
projects? 
The thesis developed through a critical reading and use of the literature, projects, 
interventions, and artefacts of public and socially engaged art and architecture, 
together with the analysis of the two case studies. The answers to the questions 
informed the development of a methodology for a critical epistemic practice to 
                                                
10 The production of objects, behaviours and events directed by the social economy of 
fashion to distinguish class affiliation and social-capital influence define the items of social 
recognition. 
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serve as a point of departure for a socially sensible, and just practice of solidarity for 
art and architecture socio-spatial practices in the site of marginalized communities. 
Following a critical grounded theory research together with on-the-field experiences 
of many works (through informal interviews and case studies methods of research) 
of socio-spatial practice, the objectives of the research emerged:  
 1- To influence the design thinking of the socio-spatial agent (artists 
and architects) away from academic patriarchal design thinking 
and practices. 
 2- To contribute to decolonize the working paradigms of art and 
architecture socio-spatial practices. 
 3- To propose a critical epistemic practice of solidarity and a sensible, 
socially responsible socio-spatial practice in art and architecture.  
Starting with a critical review of the social assemblages (Dovey, 2010) that are the 
site, the audience/user and the forum of museums, galleries, biennials and 
academic institutions that legitimize art and architecture practices as crucial cultural 
and social needs. This research utilizes decolonial feminist theory as a constitutive 
part in the formation of a critical epistemic practice that engages with the social 
function of socio-spatial art and architecture practices. The research uses 
intersectionality (Crenshaw,1981) as a theoretical framework to represent social 
heterogeneity as an assemblage of interactions of multiple categories of social 
difference: race, class, gender, etc.(Vogel, 2018). The thesis follows an 
intersectional approach to inquiry into the socio-political economy of the site of 
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marginalized communities in Latin America (Gago, 2017). Also, an intersectional 
perspective is followed into deconstructing the authoritarian patriarchal 
heteronormative and racialized condition of the artist and architect as agents of 
epistemic authority (Puwar, 2004; Fricker,2017 Lugones, 2010; Medina, 2013; 
Segato, 2018b; Valencia, 2018). 
The field of decolonial feminist theory and socio-spatial practice is virtually unknown 
in fine-arts pedagogy and was until very recently seldom referred in its practices. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that most arts-based research methodologies overlook 
socio-spatial aspects of transdisciplinary processes and practices that operate 
between art and architecture. Furthermore, as Jane Rendell points out, arts-based 
research methodologies lack the theoretical background necessary to “allow us to 
describe work that transgresses the limits of art and architecture and engages both 
the social and the aesthetic, the public and the private” (Rendell, 2006).  The critical 
and cunning insights of decolonial feminist theory and social practices are a 
necessary theoretical framework for understanding and resisting the contemporary 
models that globalized consumer capitalism relies on.  
The intent of the thesis is to promote critical thinking of the artist and architect’s 
practice. First, by questioning the universal values of our own Western art and 
architecture education; and second by critically deconstructing these universal 
values that have guided traditional artist and architects design practices. 
The site of this research is centred on the marginal informal settlements, so-called 
land invasions by government agencies. These are the sites that have attracted the 
attention of artists and architects in their own personal and professional quests. 
Artists and architects all aspire to do some good for mankind.  To leave a mark in 
   
 31 
society – hopefully by improving the lives of people who have been less privileged 
than them. This is why the sites of the disfranchised poor, the abject of society, are 
the places that attract artist and architects. 
In the social and political infrastructures of these sites – the “pueblos jovenes” 
(young towns), “barriadas” (shanty towns), and “asentamientos humanos” (the 
human settlements, or land invasions) of informal settlements – the regulatory 
formalities of the state are little to non-existent (Varlet, 2013; Yúdice, 1991; Roy, 
2005). The absence of the state has left these sites to be self-managed in an array 
of informal operations, from the provisions of water, power, sewage and education 
to new enclosures of informal economies (Gago, 2017; Federici, 2019). The 
informality of these sites is very attractive to artists and architects as they can take 
advantage of the structural informality for developing their own projects with very 
little to none of the bureaucracy and oversight that these projects would be 
subjected to if done in other localities. In the case of the projects that this research 
studied, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and in Bogotá, Colombia, the informality of these 
two communities provided the artists and architects with the freedom to develop 
their projects without being thwarted by zoning laws and the array of regulatory 
oversight by governmental institutions. 
In order to work within marginalized and disenfranchised communities in Latin 
America, it is paramount to understand the instrumental agency that genderized 
and racialized processes of bureaucracy and institutionalized segregation, racism 
and violence have in the everyday life of the people that inhabit these sites. Beyond 
the traditional Marxist short-sighted divisions of society into class and labour, the 
works of Edward Said (1993), Franz Fanon (1963), Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
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(2012), Homi Bhabha (1990,1994), Anibal Quijano (2000), Rita Segato (2018a), 
Veronica Gago (2017), Maria Lugones (2010), Sayak Valencia (2018), Nirmal Puwar 
(2004), José Medina (2013) and Miranda Fricker (2010) are very important key 
thinkers for understanding the present situation of these social, political and cultural 
asymmetric relationships of power.  
The other perspective that this research critically analysed was the amalgam of 
artworks, interventions, architectures, workshops and the like that many artists, 
architects, and activists have done in the past years in sites of marginalized and 
disfranchised communities. These works have informed this research with their 
failures and successes for the development of a methodology for what a critical 
epistemic practice can do for community building when synthesizing the 
complementary fields of socially engaged art and architecture, and decolonial 
theory.  
Many artists and architects launched their professional careers on the back of the 
publicity that their works gained because of the site of poor marginalized 
communities.  
The following projects have informed the research into socially engaged spatial 
practices: Tiza (1999–2003) in Lima, Perú (Fig.1), and Land Mark (footprints) (Fig.2), 
“Under Discussion” (2005), and Returning a Sound (2004) in Vieques, Puerto Rico, 
by artists Jennifer Allora and Guillermo Calzadilla. Whose socio-spatial practices 
have achieved international recognition as well as having been criticized as socio-
political opportunism in Puerto Rico and Peru. 
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When Faith Moves Mountains (2002) outside Lima, Perú, by Francis Alÿs (Fig.3 & 4). 
Hotel Fuentes De Hebro (1997) by artists Lara Almarcegui and Bergoña Movellan. 
Residuos Urbanos Solidos (Urban Solid Waste) (2008) by the architecture collective 
Basurama. Immigrant Movement International (2011) by artist Tania Bruguera. 
Revival Field (1991–ongoing) by artist Mel Chin. Casa Rompecabezas (Puzzle 
House) (2002–2004) by architect Santiago Cirugeda. Museo de la Calle (1999) by 
the Cambalache Collective (Carolina Caycedo, Adriana Garcia, Alonso Gil, and 
Federico Guzman). The School of Panamerican Unrest (2003–2006) by artist Pablo 
Helguera. Proyecto Casa Comedor San Martin (2007–present) in Lima, Perú, by the 
social-architecture collective Fitekantropus. These have been examples of well 
intentioned socio-spatial practices of artists. Nevertheless these works informed the 
research in what is latter developed as the artists and architects’ cognitive gaps and 
epistemic errors in chapter 6. 
 Escalera como Protesis (Stairs as Prosthesis) (2013) (Fig.5) in San Juan, Puerto 
Rico, and La Casa del Viento (House of Wind) (2010) (Fig.6), San Cristobal, Bogotá, 
Colombia by architecture collective Arquitecture Expandida. Where chosen as 
examples of fail architectural interventions, which illustrated the cognitive gaps and 
epistemic errors of socio-spatial practices.  
La Perla Bowl (2006) (Fig.7) in San Juan, Puerto Rico, by artist Chemi Rosado-Seigo 
and Boly Cortés, and  El Potocine (2013–present) (Fig.8) in Ciudad Bolivár, Bogotá, 
Colombia, by Ojo al Sancocho and the architecture collective Arquitecture 
Expandida were chosen as the case studies to inform this research because both 
have remained for many years in continuous use by the community. La Perla Bowl 
was a project built by an artist, and El Potocine was a project built by an 
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architecture collective in co-operation with a community organization. The ways in 
which these projects came to be designed and constructed revealed practices from 
both sides of a syncretic practice between art and architecture that this thesis 
posits as a methodology assembled between these two disciplines to reinvent their 
practices since art and architecture took the “social turn” (Bishop, 2006; Bourriaud, 
2002; Thompson, 2012) into the site of marginalized communities in the early 90s. In 
these two projects the artists’ and architects’ unique perspectives can be seen 
working in tandem with the communities’ vision. This makes these two projects 
unique cases where the necessary characteristics for what this thesis posits as a 
















Figure 2. Jennifer Allora and Guillermo Calzadilla. Land Mark (footprints) (2001–2004). Vieques, 
Puerto Rico. 
 










Figure 4. Francis Alÿs. When Faith Moves Mountains (2002). Outside Lima, Perú.  
 
 




Figure 5. Arquitecture Expandida. Escalera como Protesis (Stairs as Prosthesis) (2013). La Perla, San 




Figure 6. Arquitecture Expandida. La Casa del Viento (House of Wind) (2010). Community Library, 
San Cristobal, Bogotá, Colombia.  









Figure 8. El Potocine (April 17, 2018). Potocí barrio, Ciudad Bolivár, Bogotá, Colombia. 
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*** 
 1.1. The methodological gap. 
Stanley Cohen argued in 1985 “words are real sources of power for guiding and 
justifying policy changes and for insulating the system from criticism”. Here, he was 
talking about community control and the rhetorical quest for community. But his 
point on the importance of the words that are used to define, in this case policy 
parameters, are as important or even more than the actual social acts performed 
according to these same words. What this means is that there will always be a 
cognitive gap between things described by words and the thing acted upon, 
described by experience. This is what he called “the 'implementation gap' between 
rhetoric and reality, it is the rhetoric itself which becomes the problem” (Cohen, 
1985, p. 115). 
The rhetoric implied in this case refers to the usual socio-spatial practices of art and 
architecture when it comes to describe their purposes and function when dealing 
with works done in public and in the social realm of marginalized populations. As it 
is the case of the socially engaged art and architectural practices where their 
museum exhibitions, reviews and catalogues are full of the rhetoric of “the social” 
as the site where art and architecture do good. 
Language is like history in that both are determined and narrated by the reigning 
power and act as a tool to conserve and protect their hegemony. Thus, cognitive 
gaps are created in the interstices left on translation and the interpretation between 
the communication dialectics between subjected groups. All social groups create 
their own linguistic codes (Bernstein, 1960). From upper to lower classes, all 
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develop some form of exclusionary linguistic codes to restrict and protect their own 
social relations. Hence, in the realm of social art and architecture practices the first 
hurdle to overcome is language. That is why it is of great importance that we are 
working within the same definitions. I would return to specifically define a set of 
necessary terms for the acting upon the social arena.(see section. 3.1.Definitions.) 
Two of the most noted blind spots caused by cognitive gaps between artists and 
architects working on the field of marginalized communities, and thus affecting any 
social design methodology for their works, are political blindness and the claim of 
epistemic ignorance. 
Political blindness is not something new in art and architecture. Although art has 
had at times a fashionably radical political avant-garde in challenge to the political 
status quo, most of the time art and architecture end up as the publicity and 
propaganda services of the agreed politics of the state; and both produce works to 
legitimize the political and social visions of the state and its nationalisms. 
As in politics, the ideal of truth and rightfulness has been equally elusive to grasp in 
the social practices of art and architecture. We all want to aspire to be “the good 
guy”. The selfless individual that goes against the grain of the normative 
individualization and commodification of a life of convenience, the anti-
consumerism capitalist persona that renounces her privilege and gives herself 
whole to the community. There is always the elusive notion of truth of purpose that 
chases all artist and architects in the question of their intent, when working in 
marginalized communities.  
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Epistemic ignorance goes together with the claim of political blindness. They are 
both rhetorical stances where the author claims not to have known beforehand the 
history, politics, social circumstances, etc., of the field, and thus claim unwitting 
ignorance of the situation and hence unaccountability and guilt-free release. 
(Medina, 2013; Fricker, 2007)  
Ignorance and blindness in the context of epistemology are not to be taken in the 
context of a search for truth, as truth is such a relative concept. The search for truth 
becomes a forensic endeavour. 
Eyal Weizman posits that forensics is the practice on which people rely for the 
articulation and legitimization of “the contemporary notions of public truth” 
(Weizman, 2014). “Public truth” is in itself a cognitive mélange full of hermeneutical 
and epistemic traps (Fricker, 2007). A white unicorn hidden in a vast fantasy forest 
of democracy. 
Weizman continues to present that in forensics the “interrogation” in search for “a 
truth” is between “two constitute sites of forensics”, one being fields and the other 
forums. For the purposes of this research this determination between these two 
constitute sites is of value, as this research’s intentions are to identify the ways by 
which the practices of socially engaged art and architecture have had positive 
effects and where and how have they failed in their purpose on the site of 
marginalized and disfranchised communities. 
A forensics overview of socially engaged practice must be taken in detail on the 
field and forum. For this account the field is the social and geographic site, where 
these art and architecture interventions have taken place. The field in Bourdieu’s 
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sense (Bourdieu,1977) is not a neutral ground; on the contrary it is a dynamic and 
elastic territory, a highly politicized and historically fractured terrain. Socially and 
politically, a historical understanding of the interactions on the field is of key 
importance for the understanding of the social dynamics on the site. Because the 
field is not only a place of occurrence for these interactions; the field shapes these 
interactions, as a social and political site of confrontation.  Based upon these 
understandings, a more complete perspective of the social and political landscape 
of the field could be gained by the socio-spatial agents (artists and architects) who 
are performing a practice upon these sites. Hence avoiding the cognitive gaps 
represented by the epistemic ignorance and political blindness portrayed by such 
socio-spatial agents in many of their intervention and works.  
“One primary site of artistic intervention today is the gap itself that has been 
produced between cultural institutions and the public” (Cruz, 2012, p. 11).  
What or where are the methodological gaps in the design thinking of the practices 
of socially engaged art and architecture? By identifying such gaps, and a critical 
understanding of their ontological causes, it is possible to develop a counter-
hegemonic design and social practice for socially engaged spatial art and 
architecture projects that do not reproduce socio-economic and political 
stratification and disenfranchisement.  
The methodological gap lies in the hermeneutical gap left open by the plasticity of 
the words and the “experience error” in the socio-spatial agents’ perspective. Other 
methodological gaps appear in the social practice of artists and architects as 
epistemic errors in regard to the site of the community: the assumption of 
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community, the presumption of the need for help, and in the forum of art and 
architecture publicity. These epistemic errors are discussed in Chapter 6. 
*** 
1.2. Measuring success. 
A critical assessment of any project needs a prior clear definition of what success 
means in terms of the project and in terms of the institutions that legitimize art and 
architecture as valuable social and cultural practices. 
Such validations change from different places and cultures. Although the globalized 
hegemony of Euro-American universal values has been unquestionably imposed on 
the aesthetics and purposes of art and architecture practices worldwide, the 
universalism of value caveats the critical understanding of new inchoate socio-
spatial practices worldwide. To measure successful projects that this research has 
investigated it has been necessary to define what success means in terms of the 
particular social conditions of each project. A universal definition of success for 
socially engaged spatial art and architecture projects simplifies the specificity of 
place and reduces the whole social experience of the project to that of a site. 
Success, in terms of what it means for the institution of the international art world11 
and culture industry, is particularly collusive. Success is a relational definition, 
                                                
11 Howard S. Becker argued: “I have used the term [art world] in a more technical way, to 
denote the network of people whose cooperative activity, organized via their joint 
knowledge of conventional means of doing things, produces the kind of art works that the 
art world is noted for” (Becker, 1982, p. x). The art world comprises the networked 
conglomerate of worldwide art institutions: museums, biennials, art fairs, galleries, 
universities, academies, publications, and private individuals that legitimate and speculate 
with the value system of the work of art as an international market commodity. 
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because its meaning is shaped by the context from which this term is represented. 
In short terms, the question can be posed: Success is according to whom and for 
whom? 
Success according to the international art world comes with dialectical frictions 
between what the definition of success is within the institutional legitimized social 
definitions versus the vanguard of a pseudo avant-garde of contemporary art 
practices, especially when it comes to the socially engaged art definition. These 
currents are being named here as pseudo avant-garde, because only initially they 
appear to be insurgent practices as they appear – again – to be practices of 
interruption of the status-quo of the art-world institutions that legitimized what is 
good art and what is bad art. Thus, characterizing a particular aesthetic as what is 
success and what is not. Surely this legitimization by the institutionalized art world 
is shaped also by market forces and not only by the hegemony of taste, and the 
aesthetic value of the bourgeois. It is another dialectical context between 
commodity fetishization of the artwork versus pure aesthetic value that contributes 
to the shaping of what is the proper social and economic context for the proper 
value of the artwork. 
Aesthetic value understood as another dialectical construction that is shaped 
between the tensions of economic standing and class status. The back and forth of 
what is the primacy of value in the case of the art object; if it is first a commodity 
value or a class value. 
The issue at point will be to design a methodology for a critical epistemic practice to 
counteract the traditional practices that perpetuate epistemic and hermeneutical 
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injustices that plague the design thinking of socio-spatial art and architecture 
projects.  
Art and architecture share and dissent on many issues regarding their own research 
methods, creative processes, and social practices and their perceived social and 
individual purpose and responsibilities. At times these differences seem contrary 
and even antagonistic. Nevertheless, both share a common ancestry as they 
developed simultaneously in many cultures around the earth, not as distinct 
disciplines but as one and the same. The modern academic differentiation and 
professionalization into separate specialized disciplines has had the detrimental 
effect of fomenting closed, authoritative and individualized approaches when 
working in the social realm; the way in which art and architecture approach projects 
that deal directly with people, communities and social-political life. This has been 
their methodological gap; the modus operandi of art and architecture as hegemonic 
self-reflective practices. A socially detached form of practice restricted to only what 
the artist and architect experiences from their own privileged partial perspective 
(Haraway, 1988) as their own everyday life experience. This detachment from other 
perspectives of life has created a narcissistic and myopic design process in both art 
and architecture. It perpetuated and legitimized the aesthetics of class hierarchies 
and of taste cultures (Gans,1974). 
A more effective social practice can be formed from an assemblage of the distinct 
modes of operation from art and architecture together with social activism and 
community-building approaches to space and place-making. Using and adapting 
aspects of decolonial feminist theory and practices of resistance (Segato, 2018; 
Lugones, 2010; Gago, 2017; Creshaw, 1991), transgressive informal and vernacular 
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architecture and an attitude of contrapuntal reading (Said,1992) of urban design, a 
proper transdisciplinary perspective can be developed.  
*** 
 
1.3. Research methods. 
The research follows a qualitative social constructivist perspective with informal and 
flexible approach to interviews, open conversations and free dialogues with 
community members and artists and architects. In this process the researcher 
considers the diversity of local worlds, multiple realities, and the complexities of 
particular worlds, views, voices and actions. (Creswell, 2009). 
 The methodology includes a mix-methods approach, including information 
gathering, a learning approach to the multiplicity of voices from theory and 
participants, grounded theory and critical analysis, multiple visits to sites of socially 
engaged projects and two case studies, where direct critical observations12 were 
conducted and informal conversations with artists, architects and people who live 
around the sites took place.  
The meta-narrative of the research is inescapably framed within self-reflexive 
contingent experiences of the researcher as artist, architect and author. The voice 
and positioning of the author is clearly identified in section1.5. Author’s position. 
                                                
12 Critical observations are bounded by historical references. They constitute a source of 
informed experience and knowledge, beyond merely being empirical observations, which 
only reflect to the observer’s limited experience of the context of the act observed. 
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Nevertheless, within the cognitive frame between the agency of the researcher and 
the subject being researched, there will always be the uncertainty of “Unknown 
unknowns” (Luft and Ingham, 1955). What this proposition means is that it will 
always be risks included in any social situation were the unexpected could not be 
considered or foreseen.  
The uncertainty revealed in this process arrives from the context of research the 
author believes following Frederik Steier’s (1991) account on his own research 
methods, “in my research is in no way existent apart from my involvement in it –it is 
not out there”. (Steier, 1991, p. 1). Also, Steier emphasized that the research has the 
potential to “reveal an existent universe that might be known apart from my 




1.3.1. Self-reflexivity approach. 
Reflexivity as a research method could be considered an attitude towards the 
context of knowledge construction, especially to the effect of the researcher, at 
every step of the research process. The idea of knowledge as embedded within a 
“socially constructed as person-constructing process between the researcher as a 
in-a-culture”. (Shweder and Miller, 1985, p. 4) and the subject of his/her research as 
bounded by a socio-cultural system of language, traditions and politics. Within a 
reflexive system the perspective or position of the researcher shapes all research.  
Kirsti Malterud (2001) describes the reflexive approach as the position where “The 
researcher's background and position will affect what they choose to investigate, 
the angle of investigation, the methods judged most adequate for this purpose, the 
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findings considered most appropriate, and the framing and communication of 
, p. conclusions" (Malterud, 2001 483).  
Frederick Steier (1991) wrote, “We create worlds through the questions that we 
ask…”. Steier continued to argue “we as researchers construct that which we claim 
, p. to find”. (Steier, 1991 1). Steier was arguing about the context of the researcher 
constructions, as observer, either active or passive could not keep out of “his own 
and to hold onto vestiges of objectivism,” was a naïve proposition. , p. (Steier, 1991
4). The objective positioning, following Donna Haraway (1988) is understood for this 
research methodology as another “unmark” categories of patriarchal privilege 
simplifying knowledge and epistemology as universal. Haraway argued, “Feminist 
objectivity means quite simply situated knowledges.” (Haraway,1988, p. 583). 
Therefore, Haraway posited, “positioning”, in this case of the author/researcher as 
the “key practice in grounding knowledge.” (Haraway, 1988, p. 587). Thus, situating 
knowledge to location instead to a transcendence, “allows us to become 
answerable for what we learn how to see.” (Haraway,1988, p. 583). Whereby it is the 
position of this thesis not to follow Kantian objectivism (Schott, 1988) in this 
research process.  
This thesis relied on informal conversations, not on scripted interviews, thus the 
positioning of the researcher towards the field conditions (Allen, 2009) situating the 
researcher is of paramount importance to take into account. This type of research is 
in no way independent or detached from the author’s involvement within it (Steir, 
Therefore, following a self-reflexive approach to research the researcher’s 1991). 
background and positioning shapes and situates his/her interpretation. 
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Arturo Escobar argued about the self-reflexive relationship of the artist and the 
architects have with the design process. Escobar posited, “In designing tools, we 
(humans) design the conditions of our existence and, in turn, the conditions of our 
designing… we design tools and these tools design us back.” (Escobar, 2018, p. 
110). This statement has been a dictum for this research methodology. 
reflexivity is understood as a “bending back on itself” Furthermore, the notion of 
(G.H. Mead, 1962). Thus, since reflexivity is a “turning-back of one’s experience 
upon oneself” (Steier, 1991 2). I, as the researcher should be aware that my own , p. 
agency as an artist and architect is not autonomous, instead it is bounded to a 
socially constructed process dependent on what Winograd and Flores (1986) called 
the deep questions of design. They wrote, “We recognize that in designing tools we 
are designing ways of being.” (Winograd and Flores, 1986 xi).  What this means , p. 
is that the framework of how a research is planned and organized, together with all 
the “unknown-unknowns” on-the-field experience will inevitably change the 
structure of the research as the research progresses.  
The anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) wrote that the researcher becomes aware 
of his own research activities as “telling ourselves a story about ourselves”. In this 
research there will always be issues of self-reference that informed the 
methodologies and the research process in general. Nevertheless, the research was 
considered more as process of social reflexivity, and then, of self-reflexivity as 
social process (Turner, 1981). The cognitive jump that this research hoped to 
achieve from the position of the researcher was to be reflective (in showing 
ourselves to ourselves) and reflexive (being conscious of ourselves as we see 
ourselves) Steier (1991).   
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*** 
1.3.2. Grounded theory and critical analysis. 
 
Grounded theory is a good design tool to use when a theory is not available to 
explain a process (Creswell, 2007).  
This particular approach was chosen as part of a mix-methods research approach, 
because of the need to fill a gap in the literature about the particular research 
problems this thesis confronted. Although, a phenomenological approach could 
have emphasized the meaning of an experience for a number of individuals involved 
and affected by the interventions and works analyzed during the research, the intent 
here was to follow a mix-methods research, including a grounded theory design to 
move beyond mere description and to generate a theory, and outline an abstract 
analytical schema to promote a process of action and change (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). 
 
The thesis presents the research problem composed of a series of cognitive gaps 
and errors in the artists and architects’ design-thinking methodology, pedagogy and 
practices as they intervene as socio-spatial agents working in marginalized 
communities in Latin America. It appears that very little have been written in the 
context of these interventions in Latin America. Much of what has been written is in 
the context of uncritical praise in review articles in museum and exhibition 
catalogues and in art and architecture magazines, reviews and portfolios. A few 
books have been published in the past 20 years. Books by Luis Camnitzer (2007), 
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Juan Vicente Aliaga and José Miguel G. Cortés (2014), Bill Kelley Jr. and Grant H. 
Kester (2017), and Macarena Gómez-Barris (2017, 2018) have been some of the few 
notable investigations on contemporary art and socio-spatial currents and practices 
in Latin America. Nevertheless, most of these books take a historical narrative and 
less a critical examination on socio-spatial practices. Only Gómez-Barris books 
(2017 & 2018) are a contemporary review of performative and socially engaged art 
practices from Latin America. Nevertheless, Gómez-Barris narrative is more focused 
on praising the works because of the site and the artists’ subaltern conditions, 
rather than bringing a critical engagement with the ethics of participation, 
commercial and professional opportunism, epistemological and labour extractivism 
and other cognitive errors that this thesis posits as axial conditions materializing 
into a colonizing attitude in artists and architects’ socio-spatial practices in the site 
of marginalized populations in Latin America. 
The theory in this research was generated or “grounded” in conversations with 
participants who have experienced the process and the sites visited and studied. 
The researcher generated a general explanation (a theory) of these processes, 
actions and interactions influence and informed by the views of the participants 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998), together with a critical analysis of literature review. The 
social situation of marginalization, disenfranchisement and poverty of the 
populations that became sites for artist and architect’s socio-spatial practices form 
the research’s unit of analysis. The researcher took an epistemic position away from 
the “all knowing analyst” to the “acknowledged participant” observer (Clarke, 2005, 
xxvii). Therefore, during the on-the-field research, a theory developed, informed p. 
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by the researcher’s views, positions and learning experiences of the local situations, 
relationships, and hierarchies of power in the populations of these sites. 
The general framework of thought of the researcher was contextualized within the 
following questions that the researcher kept present during the processes of 
observation to understand the process of how individuals experienced the sites. 
1-What are the cognitive gaps present in the design thinking and 
practices of many artists and architects working as socio-spatial agents in 
marginalized communities? 
2-Why does a number of socio-spatial projects in marginalized 
communities tend to reproduce capitalism’s colonizing extractivist 
practices? 
3- What are the reasons behind the success and failure of socio-spatial 
projects? 
The challenges in the research were primarily the researcher’s needs to set aside, 
as much as possible, a priori theoretical ideas or notions so that a substantive 
theory could emerge. Thus was the need for not conducting scripted interviews, 
instead opening the research process to “uninvited participation” (Schalk, et al, 
 of informal conversations, observations and encounters. 2018)
 
Critical analysis: 
Gary Genosko (1996) wrote about how Michel Foucault expressed his feelings 
towards theory, “concepts were after all nothing but tools and that theories were 
equivalent to the boxes that contain them.” (Genosko, 1996 173). , p. 
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Critical analyses of the literature review were the method to shape “the boxes” for 
the theory developed here.  Critical analysis is a tool to properly contextualize the 
thesis arguments to the wealth of theory already in existence. 
From a vast bibliography of well over 300 sources contained within this research, 
texts are more or less divided between, texts with new ideas and texts referential to 
new ideas, which in turn reinforce and expand these ideas. The only way to critically 
analyse the usefulness of a text in the context of this research is by a continuous 
process of referencing texts to other texts, a kind of archaeological support and 
validation system. From a very large array of texts from the fields of philosophy, 
sociology, anthropology, political economy, geography, art, architecture, urbanism, 
and decolonial feminist theory, many pivotal thinkers and theories emerged as axial 
thinkers for this research. 
In order to understand the effects of socio-spatial agents’ interventions within 
marginalized and disenfranchised communities in Latin America it is essential to 
comprehend the instrumental agency, class, gender and race have as 
institutionalized methods of segregation, racism and violence in everyday life of the 
people that inhabit these sites. The works of Edward Said (1993), Franz Fanon 
(1963), Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2012), Homi Bhabha (1990,1994), Anibal 
Quijano (2000), Rita Segato (2018), Veronica Gago (2017), Maria Lugones (2010), 
Sayak Valencia (2018), Nirmal Puwar (2004), José Medina (2013) and Miranda 
Fricker (2010) are very important key thinkers for understanding the present 
situation of these social, political and cultural asymmetric relationships of power.  
The works of decolonial feminist’s theorist have been important to understand the 
processes of colonialism beyond the traditional patriarchal perspective: Rita Segato 
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(2018), Maria Lugones (2010), Veronica Gago (2017), Audre Lorde (1978, 1984) and 
Kimberle Crenshaw (1989, 1991,1991). 
The principal authors that influenced this research, from a philosophical perspective 
were: Donna Haraway (1988), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962), Martin Heidegger 
(1954, 1971, 2002), Michel De Certeau (1984), Michel Foucault (1969, 1978, 1980, 
1984), Walter Benjamin (1968), and Roland Barthes (1977). 
From the art and architectural perspective: Elizabeth Grosz (1992, 1993, 2001), 
Rosalyn Deutsche (1984,1998), Jane Rendell (2003, 2006), Jeremy Till (1998, 2006, 
2011), and Hal Foster (1983, 1987, 1996, 2002, 2011). 
From the sociology position: Agnes Heller (1977, 1984, 1994), Chantal Mouffe 
(2000, 2002, 2007, 2013), Saskia Sassen (2005, 2006, 2014), and Edward Soja 
(1989, 1996, 2010). 
Many more works have informed this research, some more than others. Throughout 
this thesis a vast landscape of theory is presented as ‘archaeological support’ to 
this thesis findings and conclusions.  
*** 
1.3.3. Informal conversations. 
 
 
The on-the-field knowledge learned during the time of research and travel for this 
thesis relied on informal conversations and critical observations, not on scripted 
interviews and structured visits that would have required and are depended on the 
afterthoughts of transcription. Transcription further emphasises the role of the 
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researcher as interpreter and translator of the experience of the other as seen, 
represented, filtered and translated through the inadequacies of the language and 
aesthetics of the researcher. Who by this action become the de-facto speaker and 
narrator for the other. This represents a hierarchical positioning of the author as 
epistemic translator, which further illustrates the ingrained prejudice about the 
other’s agency or lack thereof not being able to speak for himself or herself. This is 
a clear act of epistemic injustice and silencing (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013). 
Frederik Steier (1991) argued, that during the process of interview between the 
researcher and the subjects of his research “in respondents’ reports […] that 
respondents are perhaps shifting, during the interview, their ‘construction’ of the 
person to whom their responses are directed […] from researcher as expert”. 
(Steier, 1991, p. 7). This example further illustrates the need to blur the hierarchies 
between positions of subject and object of the research. 
A conversation should not be transcribed as it defeats its purpose to sense the field 
(Bourdieau, 1984) of complexities of the other’s experience, beliefs and affects. The 
futility of transcription of a conversation ruins the essence of the informality and the 
unrehearsed, spontaneous improvised qualities of the moment of exchange 
Keith Jenkins (1991) argued, “In every act of communication there between people. 
is an act of translation going on; that every act of speech is an interpretation 
between privacies” (Jenkins, 1991 39). However, to grasp the intangible nuances , p. 
of the other’s experience, a conversation is the closest to a free enterprise between 
peoples. 
Conversations were chosen over interviews or dialogues for the field research part 
of the case studies because interviews are a form of scripted participation with a 
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clear path to interpretation and hierarchical positioning. A dialogue in the other hand 
that which takes place in an irrevocably asymmetrical relationship.” (Karatani, is “
2005 73), it, p.  promotes debate between conflictual conditions searching for the 
banality of an imaginary consensus. (Bakhin, 1981). Therefore, a conversation is a 
perfect form of “uninvited participation” (Schalk, et al, 2018) to an open-ended 
relationship between unclassified agents and hierarchies. Conversations are the 
only relationships that allows us an imagining of “other worlds” (Lugones, 1987; 
Petrescu, 2007; Mouffe, 2013).  Since language and languaging are inseparable 
from the particularity of its context (Steier, 1991), conversation allow for an open 
encounter with the other to become a “transformative learning experience.” (Altés 
Arlandis, 2018). Frederick Steier (1991) synthesized the context of the conversation, 
“Multiple conversations are, in effect, multiple realities, no one being the real 
conversation” none of them is a meta-conversation. “They simple involve different 
domains […] moving from one conversation to another requires an understanding of 
issues of translation.” (Steier, 1991, p. 6). The overall purpose of this research was 
then to become a learning experience not a statistical exercise on collecting data. 
*** 
 
1.4. A critical epistemic methodology. 
This thesis proposes a critical epistemic methodology that would start by looking 
inwards in a critical intersectional contestation of its political and aesthetic values. It 
would then assemble methods, experiences, and designs from social and public art, 
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social architecture and critical spatial practices13 to forge a functional set of 
operations, tactics and a critical decolonial and epistemological perspective.  
The epistemic injustices and colonial thinking that permeate art and architecture 
practices have to be recognized. Followed by a critique of how this knowledge has 
been created, legitimized and disseminated to the communities where these 
projects are intervening. Only then can it be understood the epistemic injustices and 
silencing that these communities have been subjected to by the practices of socially 
engaged interventions. 
*** 
Gregory Bateson’s ideas towards what Frank Barron (1995) called the ecology of 
creativity comes to play a fundamental role in this research’s perspective when 
defining a transdisciplinary approach to inquiry that recognizes the lived experience 
and subjectivity of the inquirer (Montuori, 2005). Furthermore, the development of 
creative integrations between practices that Bateson (2002, p. 19) had alluded to, 
which “bring to people’s attention a number of cases in which two or more 
information sources come together to give information of a sort different from what 
was in either source separately.” This is necessary to start a critical epistemic 
practice. Pursuing a transdisciplinary way of inquiry that acknowledges the 
multiplicity of voices, knowledge, simultaneity, trans-geography and epistemic 
injustices of the hegemonic ways of legitimizing, interpreting, experience and 
testimony is the beginning of understanding what a critical epistemic practice could 
                                                
13 For a further discussion of critical spatial practice in art and architecture see: 
Marcus Miassen. 2016. ‘Crossbenching, Toward participation as Critical Spatial Practice. 
London: Sternberg Press. 
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be. Also, it is necessary to acknowledge that there is not a single universal 
perspective that will contribute towards an epistemology of justice approach to 
practice between audience/user and artist and architect. The artist and architect as 
social agents inherit the responsibility to be just and inclusive in an ecological way 
that promotes communal consciousness of solidarity, sustainability, community-
building and critical citizenship. Otherwise, the artist and architect are extractivist 
agents of the same colonialist capitalism that perpetuates the condition of abjection 
of the poor and marginalized populations. 
The methodological gaps created by epistemic injustices can be bridged by further 
expanding the nexus between socially engaged practices of art and architecture 
with decolonial feminist theory and socio-spatial practices. If a pattern of 
connections can be established through a transdisciplinary inquiry between these 
fields, a meshwork of relationships might be able to be contextualized as a practice 
(Bateson, 1972; Barron, 1995; Montuori, 2005). Thus, a theoretical and practical 
foundation for an epistemology of resistance (Medina, 2013) could be enabled 
between the audience/user – the subaltern marginalized –  and socially engaged 
artist and architect’s practice concerning the social engagement, community-
building, and the self-management of public and socially engaged art and 
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1.5. A speculative hypothesis. 
Before speculating whether or not some socially engaged projects are successful, a 
clear definition of what success is for the purposes of this thesis has to be stated. 
Success initially appears to be defined by how long the project is still in use by the 
community.  
Socially engaged art and architecture projects that have been successful initially 
appear to be because the projects were appropriated and connected to the 
everyday life narrative of the inhabitants of the places and surroundings where 
these projects were constructed. These projects appear to be the ones that the 
community helped to build, and the physical structure of the project became a 
gathering place where the inhabitants started to meet and share not only in the 
activities initially designed within the project’s design. Instead, the people around 
the project started to create by themselves new uses and activities beyond the 
project’s initial design characteristics. Thus, the people intended to be the audience 
became users, and re-contextualized the project under their own function beyond 
the artist and architect’s initial social and cultural vision. It could be inferred that the 
community appropriated the project into their own narrative. The projects that this 
research studied – La Perla Bowl (2006–present) in San Juan, Puerto Rico and El 
Potocine (2013–present) in Ciudad Bolivár, Bogotá, Colombia – both share this 
narrative of projects appropriated and recontextualized into the everyday narrative 
of the community. Testament to this is that both projects are still today in daily use 
and being maintained by the community. For this reason, these projects were 
chosen to be the case studies of this thesis.  
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The success of socially engaged projects appears to greatly vary depending on 
whether there was an existing organized community residing in the place and 
surroundings where the projects took place. It seems to be much harder to create a 
lasting socially engaged art or architecture project when there is not a prior sense of 
community. Therefore, this thesis speculates, the success of socially engaged 
projects depends on the projects being undertaken where there are established 
social and communitarian structures organized in already politically empowered 
communities. Furthermore, the thesis posits, the socially engaged projects by 
themselves are insufficient to create a sense of place and community 
consciousness. 
Thus, we see the unravelling of the Robinson Crusoe myth (Said, 1992), of artists 
and architects as socio-spatial agents, whereby they arrive to a “wilderness” and 
tame it into “civilized culture” by means of their own technical expertise and ethical, 
moral, and cultural superiority. These ideas can be rendered as parachuting 
practices of outdated cultural imperialisms, remnants of the colonizing missions of 
the age of Empire.  
If the design program of the projects intended to be constructed on these sites lack 
an integrated social relationship with the communities residing on the site, then they 
would be taken as “parachuting” practice. This means that the project’s “life” will be 
only temporary; that the project’s communal relationships will not last beyond the 
project’s construction and exhibition life.14 Such projects tend not to continue very 
                                                
14 By “exhibition life” I am referring to the period of time that the social agent is working with 
the project and other cultural or social institutions are covering the development of the 
project, creating a sort of public life of the project.  
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long after the social agents of the artist or architect leave. Examples of this type of 
unsuccessful project in Puerto Rico are: La Perla, Abiertamente (2005) (Fig.1) by the 
artist Ana Rivera Marrero, which has been abandoned for many years; Live-Savers 
(2005) by the artist Aaron Salabarrias; and Escalera como Protesis (2013) by 
Arquitectura Expandida. The latter two no longer exist as the sea eroded them both. 
Another project by Arquitectura Expandida, in San Cristobal, Bogotá, Colombia, La 
Casa del Viento (2010), was burned by members of the community.15 Although this 
research is focused only on projects based in Puerto Rico and Colombia for the 
case studies, many similarities can be found in the social impact these types of 
projects have in other parts of the world. Other failed socially engaged projects will 
be discussed later in the thesis. 
 
Figure 9. Ana Rivera Marrero. La Perla (2005). Abiertamente.. 
                                                
15 The projects Escalera como Protesis and La Casa del Viento are documented and 
discussed in Chapter 2 in the “Case studies” section. 












Figure 10. La Perla (2020). Abiertamente. 
*** 
1.6. Author’s position. 
“Once again I repeat that I am not an impartial critic. My judgements are nourished 
by my ideals, my sentiments, my passions.” 
      José Carlos Mariátegui. Lima, Perú 1928. 
 
Roland Barthes wrote, “Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text 
becomes quite futile.” (Barthes, 1977, p. 147). Following Barthes’ assertion on the 
necessity to “know” the author in order to make sense of the narration, I thus follow 
with a brief disclosure of who I am as the author and narrator of this research. 
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I experience the world around me in the same manner as David Chariandy 
described his own writing process, “rooted in a very specific embodiment” 
(Fournier; 2021). Chariandy described himself in his writings as a black man of the 
Caribbean diaspora. Chariandy was keenly aware of the racialized subjectivity 
imposed on him and his practice by the world-system (Wallerstein, 2004) that 
surrounded him. 
I embody the agency of the “epistemological colonist” (Willis, 2015). I am a trained 
artist, informal architect and academic educated in the western academic tradition 
doing research and building dwellings in Latin America (Fig 11,12,13,14). I have 
chosen to describe my practice in architecture as informal, as I choose to remain 
outside the regulated, licensed and professionalized parameters of architecture. 
My epistemological agency arises from the privilege of a “partial perspective” and 
“the conquering gaze” (Haraway;1988) of a male body. I inhabit a curious interstice 
between race, class, diaspora and tourism. I am considered, phenotypically a 
mestizo16. Nevertheless, in my country of birth, Perú, my social position is as –
white17 male, and a tourist since I only live there part-time. I have been treated as a 
‘minority’, a white-Hispanic male in the United States, where I studied a BFA and 
MFA, and I am considered a privilege bourgeois university professor in the country 
where I reside, Puerto Rico. I embody the foreigner, sometimes I camouflage as 
Peruvian diaspora in the Caribbean Island country of my mother, Puerto Rico, the 
last colony, an unincorporated territory of the Unites States since 1898.  
                                                
16 Mestizo, it is one of many colonial categorizations to divide peoples by racial mix to 
legitimize asymmetrical power divisions between indigenous, settlers and European colonist 
in the Americas. 
17  In this thesis it is argued that ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’ are not a dependent or relational 
categories of skin color. Instead, they are performative conditions of power. (Castro-Gómez, 
2005). 
   
 64 
Camouflaging as a foreigner has allowed me to move easily with a critical distance 
and very little social investment to lose. Albert Camus wrote it succinctly in 
L’Étranger, “je m’ouvrais pour la première fois á la tender indifference du monde. 
 I opened myself to the gentle indifference of the world.” (Camus, 1942, p. 9). As an 
apparent foreigner, a transitory figure of exoticism, a place between treat and 
seduction, I experience everyday life from a privilege position of motion. I am a 
white-mestizo male with a foreign accent (my vernacular language is Castellano –
Spanish, peppered with an array of national and regional accents from the many 
countries where I grew up). This particular condition has allowed me to move 
between countries with the luxury of doubt. Doubt about my national, and ethnic 
origins has permitted me to maintain a motion in between static definitions and 
allegiances of nationhood and citizenship.  
 
The philosopher of science Donna Haraway once argued, “positioning is, the key 
practice in grounding knowledge.” (Haraway, 1988, p. 587). As an artist, architect 
and academic I position myself to see, observe, experience my surroundings 
critically aware of my own vantage point of a “privilege partial perspective” 
(Haraway, 1988) of a privilege educated bourgeois –sometimes white male. Thus, I 
continuously have to check, and re-check myself into a self-reflexive exercise, 
almost a kind of auto-ethnography of my privilege “unmark position of man” 
(Haraway, 1988). This “unmark position” a “category” that have allowed me to “see 
and not be seen, to represent while escaping representation” (Haraway, 1988; 581) 
have made me conscious of how we (men) decide to act upon and express our 
position, privilege and agency in our everyday living, and how this positionality will 
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inevitably construct our perspective and position towards every subject of our 
effects, affects, love and contingencies. 
 
Privilege becomes a sedimented practice when it remains unchecked, 
unquestioned and unmarked, almost an ontological vectoring prerogative that 
frames and contextualizes every experience of everyday life experience. I have a 
necessity to achieve a cognitive jump beyond the confines of simplistic patriarchal 
Cartesian world-views towards a personal everyday “practice of freedom” 
(Freire,1976) critically aware of my own positioning and prejudices. 
As a male researcher from Perú, I find it necessary to start my practice as an artist, 
informal architect and professor with “the notion of the self as site” (Kossak, 
Petrescu, Schneider, Tyszczuk, and Walker, 2009). Elizabeth Grosz argued that the 
body itself could be regarded as “the locus and site of inscription for specific 
modes of subjectivity.” (Grosz, 1992, p. 241). Thus, it is in the action to excavate my 
own subjectivities that became the process of a self-deconstruction towards 
decolonizing myself from patriarchal expectations and desires. It has not been an 
easy proposition to achieve.  
Elizabeth Grosz positions agency as dependant on how we choose to accept that 
“designated position” of privilege and related to “the degree to which we refuse it” 
(Grosz, 2001; 22). Moreover, our identities are tied to this agency and privilege. As 
Grosz points out “we are effects more than causes [...]” (Grosz, ibid.). 
This thesis is grounded at its core to the question of agency and how we position 
ourselves within “the tricky we” (Reisinger and Schalk; 2017). We as a group 
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composed of artists and architects with the agency, illusions and hopes to 
endeavour to be good social agents for social change. 
We, artists and architects who venture into the realm of the social, to work with and 
for marginalized communities on the borderlands of the cities of the Global-South, 
are to embody the cognitive jump away from extractivist colonizer agents who 
appropriate knowledge, labour and bodies to further our professional careers, 
towards instead becoming an engaged socio-spatial agent for change. 
 
I started this research quite naively from the opposite side of what this research 
eventually became. I initially thought of myself as a socio-spatial agent, an 
artist/architect interested in working in the public space of marginalized 
communities. I thought of my thesis as a practice lead research involving myself 
conducting an intervention to transform public space for open access and 
participation with the community (Fig. 15). I played into the myth of the artist (Schalk, 
2007). I thought of my intervention as an everyday transforming event, a place-
making device. I could not be more wrong in my initial naïve assessment of what an 
artist’s intervention actually does in the social realm. I designed prototypes to 
construct interactive structures that I hoped would engage the public in playful 
relations towards nurturing conversations and eventually a better understanding 
between the participants (Fig. 16, 17).  My previous work as an artist had made me 
curious of the social relations formed through interactions and conversations. I 
explored the uses of technology and architectures as means to enable deeper 
relationships through conversations (Fig.18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23). Nevertheless, as I 
started to visit other sites where artists and architects had intervened with their 
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works as socio-spatial agents, my initial ideas started to change, I questioned what 
is the role artists and architects embody in these sites. I started to see with 
suspicion my own subjective positioning and practice. The more I travelled visiting 
sites of artists’ and architects’ interventions, the more I was repeatedly confronted 
with the notion that our practices on the site of poor and marginalized communities 
that we were aiming to help, were only reproducing the same colonizing and 
extractivist practices that we were criticizing governments and institutions for 
embracing neoliberal capitalist policies. Thus, my first cognitive jump towards a 
self-deconstruction was away from my own academic training as artist and 
architect. I hoped this apparent jump into a void would allow me a critical distance 
from the academic disciplines that have shaped the way I perceive and position my 
practice. The apparent jump into a void was not at all into an empty space, rather it 
was into the space of decolonial feminist theory and practice. The axial relationship 
decolonial theory took within my intellectual understanding of my own processes as 
a man, artist and architect were crucial to my belief that my practice could be 
decolonized and become more effective beyond the traditional parameters of 
academia and the institutions of art and architecture. 
The following pages of this thesis could be read as my own personal road map 
through the processes of decolonizing my practice and myself. 
   
 68 
 




Figure 12. Stone House. Rancas, Huayhuaysh Range. Perú. 2017. 
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Figure 13. Artist’s studio forest cabin. Karso Range. Ciales. Puerto Rico.1993. 
 
Figure 14. Casa Pukara. Karso Range. Ciales. Puerto Rico.1994. 
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Figure 15. Skater/conversation bench. 2013.  
 
Figure 16. Prototype play box .2013.  
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Figure 17. Swearing ball. Reactive record-play sound toy/sculpture.2008.  
 
Figure 18. La conversación / the conversation. Kinetic, sound and video interactive installation 2004. 
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Figure 19. La conversación / the conversation. 2004. 
 
Figure 20. La conversación / the conversation. MAX/MSP patch. 2004. 
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Figure 21. The Panopticon. Interactive video/sound installation. 2005. 
 
Figure 22. The Panopticon. Interactive video/sound installation. 2005. 
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Figure 23. The Panopticon. MAX/MSP patch. 2005. 
*** 
Chapter 2. Case studies.  
Why these sites were chosen? Frederick Steier (1991) wrote “constructing is a 
social process, rooted in language, not located inside one’s head…how one might 
be heard and that meaning is constructed…thus, a reflexive researcher requires an 
understanding of language”. (Steier, 1991, p. 5). 
Beyond the understanding of the vernacular language of any site, I believe any 
researcher needs to have a feel of the field (Bourdieu, 1984), otherwise the 
researcher risks only hearing half the story. Arturo Escobar (2018) argued that 
cognition is not based on the manipulation of knowledge towards achieving an 
objective. Instead, that the observer (the researcher) is not separated from the 
conditions of the world that he/she observes. The researcher “creates the 
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phenomenal domains within which she/he acts; and the world is created through 
language.” (Escobar, 2018, p.111). It is because of these conditions that to choose 
a site of study that it is far removed from the researcher’s life conditions has the 
potential to become an experience on extractivist tourism rather than an insightful 
epistemic exercise of learning, understanding, sharing and solidarity. This is why I 
chose the following sites for research. I have a long personal connection with both 
countries and cities San Juan, Puerto Rico and Bogota, Colombia and with the 
regions where these sites are located. I have friends and colleges that I have known 
for many years who live in these locations. Because of these connections, I was 
welcomed in these communities. I felt at ease, not because I belonged to them, but 
rather because my agency as a foreigner was recognized and accepted as a visitor. 
This research has been informed by two case studies and an array of personal 
experiences throughout my years working as an artist/architect visiting various 
projects in The United States, Perú, Puerto Rico, and Colombia. After experiencing 
many projects of socially engaged art and architecture in many countries, I 
observed that many of them fall in disuse and abandonment a short time after the 
socio-spatial agent leaves the site. Nevertheless, in the literature produced by the 
institutions that sponsored these projects: museums, galleries, local governments, 
NGOs, cultural institutions and universities, the life of these projects is only 
documented to the point of exhibition and catalogue. The archive for socially 
engaged projects appears more engaged in the portfolio of the individual artists and 
architects, the exhibition and catalogue, rather than in the effects on the 
communities where these works were initially designed to fulfil a specific social 
need. 
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The two case studies selected to inform the research were chosen because both 
works of socio-spatial practice are of the few examples of projects that have lasted 
long after the interest for archive, portfolio and exhibition have dwindle.  
The first work is La Perla Bowl, located in La Perla neighbourhood in San Juan, 
Puerto Rico. This work was initially designed and built as an artwork and open 
community pool/skate park. The second work selected is El Potocine18, located in 
the “barriada" of Potocí, an informal settlement, part of Ciudad Bolivár in Bogotá, 
Colombia. This work was designed to be a community movie theatre and 
community art centre.   
The two projects were chosen for this research because both projects have been 
successful as being appropriated by their surrounding communities and continue to 
be actively used many years after the initial artists and architects that designed 
them have left the sites. The sense is that both projects appeared to have fulfilled 
their initial functions as design objects and social objects. Both projects have lasted 
for many years after the artist and architects that designed and built them have left 
and that both projects are in constant use being taken care of by the community for 
whom they were designed. This all signals that both projects have been integrated 
into the everyday lives of the communities’ inhabitants. 
The research on the case studies site was conducted following a social 
constructivist qualitative approach (Creswell, 2009) of mix-methods. These 
                                                
18 The name Potocine can be translated as: poto, from the name of the Barrio Potocí, and 
cine, which means “movie theatre”. 
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included: grounded theory research, multiple visits to the sites, field notes and 
observations and informal conversations.  
The informal conversations were conducted with adult persons who were at the 
time of the visits living in the area. Most of the persons that were part of the 
conversations had been born and raised in the areas. Some of them had in fact 
helped build the projects, and some of them continue to take care of the projects. 
Also included were conversations and visits to the sites with the artist, the 
architects and the community organizers and other people that participated with 
these projects and continue to be involved in running or maintaining the projects. 
The conversations and personal observations on the sites helped to inform the 
conclusions of this research. Together with academic theorizing from the fields of 
sociology, anthropology, political economy, geography, art, architecture, urbanism, 
and decolonial feminist theory, these conversations and field observations framed 
these theorizations into a praxis. 
This research studied the apparent successes of these socially engaged projects as 
a means to understand how the design thinking and process together with social 
relationships between the socio-spatial agents and the community that inhabits 
these places were developed. What were the specific practice, social and cultural 
aspects of these projects that made these two projects last, in continuous use, from 
their construction to today?  
*** 
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2.1. Case study 1: La Perla Bowl.  
 
Figure 24. La Perla Bowl community pool and skate bowl (2020). 
La Perla, San Juan. Puerto Rico. 2006–present. 
Artist: Chemi Rosado-Seijo, in collaboration with Roberto ‘Boly’ Cortés.  
The case study research was informed by several in person visits by the researcher 
to document research through field notes and informal conversations with various 
people, including the following persons during the years 2013, 2016, 2017, 2018: 
Chemi Rosado-Seijo, artist. Marisol Plard, artist and resident of La Perla. Marina 
Moscoso, insurgent urban planner. Omayra Rivera Crespo, architect and organizer 
of Taller Creando sin Encargos. Sofia Unanue, community organizer, founder of La 
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Maraña, human centred design atelier. Erika Fontánez Torres, professor 
jurisprudence, legal theory and property law, University of Puerto Rico Law School. 
 
Artist Chemi Rosado-Seijo describes the artwork: “In 2006, La Perla Bowl (Fig.5), a 
skateboarding bowl and an actual pool, was completed. Done in partnership 
between artist Chemi Rosado-Seijo with Roberto ‘Boly’ Cortés, who was a veteran 
skateboarder since 1976, in teamwork with the neighbours from La Perla 
community, and with the help of skaters, surfers and people from around the island 
of Puerto Rico. The bowl was handmade and collaboratively built in front of the 
Atlantic Ocean on reclaimed land, outside the Old San Juan walls, like the 
community where it stands. La Perla Bowl has gained international recognition 
through skateboarding magazines and global media” (Rosado-Seijo, 2015).  
 
Figure 25. La Perla surrounded by the colonial walls of Old San Juan (2020). Google Earth. 
La Perla neighbourhood (Fig.6) is located just outside the city walls of the Old San 
Juan colonial town centre; fronted by the Atlantic Ocean on its northern side, and 
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flanked on three sides by the walls of the colonial city built by the Spanish 
conquerors from 1586 and fully encircling the city of San Juan by 1783. 
La Perla was established around the late 19th century as the abattoir for the old 
colonial city. It is located on a spit of leftover rocky coast outside the city walls. Its 
original residents were slaves and the poor workers of the slaughterhouses and it 
was the place for the town’s Santa Maria Magdalena Cemetery. In time the families 
of the abattoir’s workers moved in as the slaughterhouses began to be relocated to 
other areas of the island. La Perla remained a small community of around no more 
than 4,000 people, with a reputation as a slum riddled with poverty, crime, 
prostitution and drug trafficking. La Perla remains occupied by the informal 
dwellings built by its own inhabitants, on land deemed by the state as an illegal 
occupation of the state’s land. La Perla maintains its informal infrastructure by 
“stealing” electricity and water from the public state’s companies; sewage remains 
discharged untreated to the ocean from a multitude of home-made septic tanks, 
and the livelihood of its inhabitants is reputedly sustained through government 
welfare and a “subterranean” informal economy that includes smuggling and drug 
trafficking.  
Since the late 70s, La Perla has attracted a style of bohemianism because it is 
exalted as a poor and marginalized community that keeps on resisting the 
government’s interventions for their eviction. This bohemianism has attracted all 
kinds of artists, writers and musicians to La Perla. The subsistence of poverty and 
suffering of La Perla’s inhabitants has been romanticized in songs, literature and 
paintings, coalescing an imaginary community for artists, poets and musicians. In 
1978 Ismael Rivera, one of the great international performers of salsa, co-wrote a hit 
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song with Curet Alonso about La Perla. This event started a fashion in art and music 
circles of using La Perla as a backdrop for legitimizing the “street credit” of the 
artist. 
In 2009 mainstream performer of “urban rap” Calle 13, together with internationally 
famed musician Ruben Blades, again composed, performed and made a music 
video for another “tribute” song to La Perla as a romantic ideal of social struggle. 
However, in the last twenty years La Perla has been being slowly art-washed and 
gentrified, initially by art students from the School of Plastic Arts that it is located 
close by, just on the inside of the city walls. At the time when he started to build the 
artwork La Perla Bowl, in late 2005, artist Chemi Rosado-Seigo was an art student 
at the School of Plastic Arts and was living in La Perla. It is very common for poor 
neighbourhoods to attract art students because of the cheap rents and the 
romanticized bohemian lifestyle of living in dangerous, disfranchised areas of 
society. 
*** 
Nowadays, La Perla has been pacified by the popular attention it has gained since. 
It has become a favourite site for art fairs, installations and interventions by 
architects, and for filming music videos. Nowadays, La Perla is a tourist attraction, 
having been pacified by artists and made world-wide famous by the 2017 Luis 
Fonsi and Daddy Yankee megahit music video “Despacito”, filmed using La Perla 
Bowl as background. The attention brought to La Perla since the early days of the 
90s has made public its informal economy and occupation. This has attracted the 
attention of the government to La Perla’s informality, which has had the effect 
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described by Veronica Gago (2017) of the insertion of the state’s formal institutions 
and laws into informal communities. Gago described the consequences for a 
marginalized community of losing their informality as a loss of identity and authority 
over their own economic and social welfare. Once a marginalized community is 
“integrated” into the logic of the state, it becomes dependant on a state’s system of 
bureaucracy and corruption. Therefore, the community starts to lose its autonomy 
and flexibility and its idiosyncrasy as a united community. 
The residents of La Perla have been for more than a century an actual community of 
interrelated families and peoples who have inhabited this place for generations. La 
Perla maintained its cohesive and closed community in large part because of the 
abjection and anomie it has been represented by for centuries. This marginalization 
from the city next to them reinforced their communal bonds as a means of survival. 
Their viveza generated an informal economy and livelihood independent of the state 
and in resistance to the periodic incursions of the police to vacate them from La 
Perla. These bonds of resistance made the residents of La Perla a singular resilient, 
independent and defiant community. 
La Perla, by 2010, was in the process of “urban renewal”. This phase was initiated 
by a series of public art festivals sponsored by the government following the 
attention that La Perla Bowl had received by the international art world and art 
biennales. Artist Chemi Rosado-Seigo has remained active, organizing other public 
art projects in La Perla. La Perla’s Portrait is an annual kite festival created by 
Rosado-Seigo and supported since 2013 by a grant from the Creative Capital 
organization based in New York. These events brought the attention of land 
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developers, the government and other private interests that saw in La Perla, just as 
its name suggests, a pearl sitting on oceanfront location waiting to be developed. 
*** 
La Perla has been known to me since the early 90s, when I was a young artist hired 
to teach sculpture at the School of Plastic Arts. Then, La Perla was still considered 
a dangerous neighbourhood and was not at all considered a tourist attraction. Art 
students from the School of Plastic Arts routinely found cheap lodging there and 
started to use La Perla as site for their artworks. My first visit to La Perla as an art 
teacher was in 1993, as part of a class critique: a student had displayed, to the side 
of a bar in the main street of La Perla known for the sale of illegal narcotics, a 
sculpture designed to be a hiding place for illegal narcotics during police raids. By 
the time the artist Chemi Rosado-Seigo, then still a student the School of Plastic 
Arts, started to build La Perla Bowl in 2006, the community of La Perla was well 
accustomed to the presence of student artists and their art-class projects. 
Artist Chemi Rosado-Seigo’s practice building of the La Perla Bowl took a couple of 
years to coalesce into the artwork as it is known today. This artwork has lasted for 
more than a decade, and is consciously being used and maintained by the 
community of residents of La Perla, even though La Perla is going through a period 
of tourist development and gentrification. This is largely attributed to a series of 
conditions that Rosado-Seigo generated in his relationship as an artist with the 
community of La Perla, before and during the building of La Perla Bowl. Rosado-
Seigo’s personal relationships with the community and the social cohesion of La 
Perla’s community made it possible for this place to become the site for Rosado-
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Seigo’s social practice. It could be said that Rosado-Seigo unknowingly developed 
his own social practice with a sensibility, solidarity, and critical epistemology 
naturally flowing from his learning experiences with the community. 
The series of relationship can be catalogued as follows: 
 - The artist was a resident of La Perla during his school years as an art 
student. He knew members of the community and was known by the 
community. 
 - La Perla was already a tightly knit community with a clear and defined 
leadership before the artist arrived. 
 - The artist as a young art student and resident of La Perla attracted the 
curiosity of members of the community when he, together with Boly Cortés, 
started clearing an abandoned vacant space, and started to gather found 
materials around La Perla. 
 - Members of the community started to donate sacks of cement and leftover 
cinder blocks to the artist. It is important to note that La Perla is a self-build 
dwelling, where most residents continuously construct and reconstruct their 
own dwellings. Thus, building knowledge and techniques of working with 
cement, rebar and cinder block are part of the vernacular architecture of La 
Perla. 
 - Chemi Rosado-Seigo’s humble, friendly and open-to-learning attitude 
attracted the solidarity of members of the community, who freely started 
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helping him in the building of La Perla Bowl; women from the community 
even started to feed the artist and his helpers as they took a liking to them. 
 - Although the community initially did not understand the idea of the artwork, 
they understood the function of a pool in their community. 
 - The fact that Rosado-Seigo was a young artist not affiliated with any art 
institution or government program created a personal sense of trust between 
him and the community. 
 - The community always (and does still today) saw the artist just as Chemi the 
person, and not as an artist incarnating the role of expert agent of social 
change. 
 - This became a process of open participation by members of the community 
that transformed the original purpose of the artwork from a skate rink for 
surfers and skaters to include also the role as community pool open to 
everybody. 
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Figure 26. La Perla and La Perla Bowl (2020). Google Earth. 
Through multiple visits to La Perla Bowl (Fig.7) between 2016 and 2018, many 
conversations took place with residents and national visitors, as well as with 
tourists. There is not a single consensus within each group or between groups 
about the social impact of La Perla Bowl beyond that all enjoy using it. 
Rosado-Seigo’s artwork predated all the developments that were to come to La 
Perla. It is very possible that La Perla Bowl anticipated and at some extent 
promoted the ultimate pacification by art19, gentrification and ultimately the 
expulsion of the community of La Perla. 
It is also true that the development of La Perla was eventually to happen, if not 
catalyzed by the permanence of Rosado-Seigo’s artwork then by real-estate 
development following the tourism boom brought by the Bourdain effect20 on 
travelling in the so-called “third world”. In today’s globalized consumer capitalism 
there is nothing that can remain local for long. Glocalites (Meyrowitz, 2005) is the 
new name for the oxymoronic representation of a positivist naive attitude that seeks 
to resist globalized consumer-capitalism homogenizing desires by thinking that the 
local can be sustained even in a globalized society. Sociologist Roland Robertson 
(1980), who coined the term glocalization, meant "the simultaneity—the co-
presence—of both universalizing and particularizing tendencies” (Robertson, 1980). 
                                                
19 Pacification by art is a take on Sharon Zukin’s term pacification by cappuccino (1995). 
20 Bourdain effect: named after cook, writer and media personality Anthony Bourdain. The 
adventuring free bohemian spirit of a neo-colonizing tourism as traveller of the white 
heterosexual male who fashionizes and pacifies dangerous and marginal “third world” 
locations in his search for adventure. 
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Nevertheless, La Perla is today a tourist attraction, listed in Airbnb as “an old and 
very particular neighborhood that became famous after the recording of the music 
video ‘Des-pa-cito’ (Luis Fonsi ft. Daddy Yankee)” (Airbnb review, 2020). Rosado-
Seigo’s artwork La Perla Bowl remains as a testament to the power artist’s 
interventions do have on marginalized communities. Some people in the community 
say that this was for the good of the community; others see it as the trigger that 
started their eventual expulsion from La Perla.  
*** 
After La Perla Bowl gained notoriety in the international art world, La Perla became 
a fashionable site for more government-sponsored artist and architect interventions. 
In 2013 an architecture collective based in San Juan Puerto Rico, Taller Creando sin 
Encargos, comprising architects Yazmín M. Crespo, Irvis González, Omayra Rivera 
and Andrea Bauza, with the sponsorship of the School of Architecture of the 
Pontificate Catholic University of Puerto Rico, organized a series of interventions 
and workshops in La Perla. Their aim was “to create a forum for participative work 
between universities, students, academics, international guests, artists, 
communities […] focusing on the laboratory and action” (arquitecturaexpandida.org, 
2013). Their work constituted a series of workshops and architectural interventions. 
Their methodology and praxis remained within the formalities of the traditional, 
Henry Sanoff’s community-based design learning model and praxis (Sanoff, 1999). 
Thus, their works consisted of the parachuting practices critiqued in this thesis. 
Their workshops and interventions lasted a week, without leaving any discernible 
contribution to the community. Nevertheless, a series of catalogues and publicity 
was produced to show the university’s engagement with socially marginalized poor 
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communities, and the collective Taller Creando sin Encargos gained a legitimizing 
project to show in their own publicity. The atelier Arquitecture Expandida based in 
Bogotá, Colombia was invited to participate. Their contribution was quite “silly”, to 
quote some of the residents of La Perla who witnessed the event (Fig 8). It 
consisted of fixing a cement staircase that led to the coast from the street above in 
La Perla. The stairs have been eroded and the last few steps were demolished in 
the passing storm a few years back. Arquitecture Expandida proposed building 
back the stairs to help the community regain access to the beach, and adding a 
station for surfers to change. The project was named Escalera como Protesis (Stairs 
as Prosthesis). Part of the proposal was for members of the community to 
participate with students of the School of Architecture of the Pontificate Catholic 
University of Puerto Rico. Therefore, the community and the students would engage 
in a participatory learning experience on modern techniques. The result was not 
what the community expected. The members of La Perla community are adept 
builders on concrete and masonry. Most of them have constructed their own 
houses in a communal vernacular form of organized construction that dates almost 
a century. 
   
 89 
 
Figure 27. Intervention by Arquitecture Expandida (2013). View of the remaining stairs leading to the 
beach, before the workshops. 
  
Figure 28. Arquitecture Expandida and the students from the School of Architecture of the 
Pontificate Catholic University. Escalera como Protesis (Stairs as Prosthesis) (2013).   
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The community members did not participate in the construction or the workshops. 
The project was built by students from the School of Architecture of the Pontificate 
Catholic University (Fig.9). The whole exercise resulted in an example of 
architecture as a reflexive practice, and the marginalized community as backdrop to 
legitimize an inconsequential event. Nonetheless, this event still appears in the 
university’s publicity to illustrate their social commitment with poor and 
marginalized communities. 
*** 
During on the field visits to La Perla, I had many conversations with artist Chemi 
Rosado-Seijo and artist Marisol Plard. Many ideas started to sprout about the role 
of the artist and architect’s interventions in marginalized communities. During this 
time the idea that the artist and architect were acting as a form of colonizer agent 
began to appear. This concept I further develop in chapter 6.  
In conversations with the insurgent urban planner Marina Moscoso, ideas on a 
critique on traditional planning participation and the misconceptions on community 
and marginalization were brought to the forefront of the social problematic in artists 
and architects social practices, which I later developed on chapter 5. 
The architect and organizer of Taller Creando sin Encargos, Omayra Rivera Crespo, 
together with Sofia Unanue, community organizer and founder of La Maraña, human 
centred design atelier, both were important for this research to see and experience 
in action the cognitive gaps in participatory urban planning and community 
participation methodology, which architect Meike Schalk describes as, prescribed 
tokenism (Schalk, et al, 2018). These experiences contributed to develop the ideas 
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of cognitive gaps in art and architecture’s socio spatial practices, which I later 
develop in chapter 4. 
The conversations with legal theory and jurisprudence professor Erika Fontánez 
Torres, brought to the forefront the importance of a political framework necessary 
for a in depth site analysis, specially when working in marginalize communities. 
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Figure 29. El Potocine, community self-managed movie theatre (2016). Ciudad Bolivár, Bogotá, 
Colombia. 
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2.2. Case study 2: El Potocine  
Ciudad Bolivár, Bogotá, Colombia. 2016–present. 
Architects: Atelier Arquitectura Expandida – Architect Harold Guyaux, Belgium, and 
Architect Ana López Ortego, Spain.  
Commissioned by the community organization Ojo al Sancocho. 
The case study research was informed by several in person visits by the researcher 
to document research through fieldwork notes and informal conversations with 
various individuals, the following persons informed this case study during the years 
2017, 2018, 2019: Angie Santiago, and Carolina Dorado, organizers Ojo al 
Sancocho community organization. Liliana Parra, participant of Ojo al Sancocho’s 
video making workshops, and resident of Ciudad Bolivar. Gladys Angulo, 
anthropologist based on Bogota Colombia. Architects Ana López Ortega (Spain) 
and Harold Guyaux (Belgium) founders of atelier Arquitectura Expandida.  
El Potocine is a social-architecture design project (Fig.17). It is a community self-
managed movie theatre, designed by the architecture collective Arquitectura 
Expandida, based in Bogotá and commissioned by Ojo al Sancocho, a local NGO 
community organization. It was co-operatively built by the architecture collective 
Arquitectura Expandida together with the community organization Ojo al Sancocho, 
and the collectives Monstruación, and Golpe de Barrio (Esquizofrenia Crew). El 
Potocine is located in the neighbourhood Barrio in Potocí in the barriada21 of Ciudad 
                                                
21Barriadas is the local word used in Latin American Spanish for marginalized, poor and 
informal settlements constructed in the periphery cities. Other words used to name such 
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Bolivár in Bogotá, Colombia. The community organization Ojo al Sancocho remains 
in charge of El Potocine’s management, activities and education programming.  
The social tectonics of Ciudad Bolivár have changed enormously in the past 30 
years. There has been exponential population growth over the past 30 years, 
together with the subsequent enormous land occupations that have periodically 
continued since the initial informal settlements in the 1940s. Ciudad Bolivár today, 
with an estimated population of more than 1 million, is the largest informal human 
settlement in Colombia. The name barriada no longer applies to Ciudad Bolivár; its 
size has caused it to be recognized by the official government of Bogotá as its 19th 
district. Nevertheless, Ciudad Bolivár continues to grow, and its expanding margins 
are still informal settlements of great poverty without any public infrastructure. The 
neighbourhood of Barrio in Potocí, where El Potocine is located, is an older part of 
Ciudad Bolivár, and it is now a more developed part of Ciudad Bolivár where public 
utilities and schools are present. Still, the community relies heavily on its grassroots 
community organizations to run and maintain the limited public infrastructure 
provided by the state. The community organizations that work within Ciudad Bolivár 
have to balance and negotiate their own presence and actions in a paradoxical 
balance between the armed forces of Colombia, the local police and the 
narcotraficantes22 that are firmly established in the community.  
                                                                                                                                                  
settlements are favelas (in Brazil) and pueblos jovenes (in Perú); a close translation in 
English would be “slums”. 
22Narcotraficantes are drug traffickers. 
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Figure 30. El Potocine, community self-managed movie theatre (2016). View of Ciudad Bolivár. 
El Potocine has a different story to most other projects of social architecture. El 
Potocine was not the independent initiative of the design collective Atelier 
Arquitectura Expandida that designed and helped with its construction. El Potocine 
was an idea created by the community organization Ojo al Sancocho, based in the 
neighbourhood of Ciudad Bolivár. Ojo al Sancocho is a grassroots organization 
created by young persons who are native residents of Ciudad Bolivár. Together with 
other organizations based in Ciudad Bolivár, they decided to build El Potocine. To 
this end Ojo al Sancocho approached the Atelier Arquitectura Expandida for help in 
the design of El Potocine. 
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The Atelier Arquitectura Expandida has been based in Bogotá from the early 2010s 
and was known for its works on social-architecture projects in poor communities. 
I visited the members of Arquitectura Expandida in March 2018. We shared many 
interesting conversations about their works in Colombia and their intervention in 
Puerto Rico, which they themselves categorized as an unsuccessful event. They put 
me in contact with members of Ojo al Sancocho, who invited me to visit Ciudad 
Bolivár and took me on a tour of El Potocine. During the conversation between the 
many members of Ojo al Sancocho as well with Harold Guyaux and Ana López 
Ortego of Arquitectura Expandida, many observations came to light about the 
design process and practice that have made El Potocine a successful lasting work 
of social architecture. The observations are as follows: 
 - The Atelier Arquitectura Expandida was invited into the community by a local 
community organization. Arquitectura Expandida did not parachute into the 
community with an already designed project. 
 - The design of the project was made in conversation with the members of Ojo 
al Sancocho, who are native local residents who clearly could define what 
they needed as a community. Arquitectura Expandida listened to their voices 
throughout the design process. 
 - Arquitectura Expandida did not engage in traditional participatory strategies 
of human-centred design, nor did they try to follow collaborative design 
practices of community-based design architecture. 
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 - Arquitectura Expandida related to the community’s needs as a client-
architect model. Arquitectura Expandida listened to the community as a 
client and not as a helpless, poor, ignorant community. 
 - The design, materials and construction techniques were based on readily 
available cheap, re-used and donated materials. The construction was based 
on vernacular building techniques. Thus, members of the community 
participated in the construction of El Potocine. 
 - The construction of El Potocine became a social communal event, 
reminiscent of the communal work “faenas” done by rural native communities 
in the Andean region of Colombia. 
These events constituted a critical epistemic practice of solidarity and sensibility 
towards the community and their living space. It is because of this practice that El 
Potocine continues to serve and be appreciated by its community.  
*** 
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Figure 31. La Casa del Viento burns (2010). 
La Casa del Viento (House of Wind) (Fig.was a community library designed by 
Arquitectura Expandida in 2010 in the district of San Cristobal in Bogotá. In this 
case the project was built without knowing the political differences and rivalries 
between the leadership of the community. In San Cristobal it was the case that one 
of the community leaders was affiliated with the ruling government party. The 
community organizations that worked with Arquitectura Expandida were 
independent organizations separate from the political-party leadership. The mistake 
with this project was the assumption that the community was a single united entity 
and the failure to see that within the community there were many conflictive parties 
competing for leadership. The leader of one part of the community saw the building 
of La Casa del Viento as a threat to his own political aspirations. It is thought that 
this leader was responsible for the arson of La Casa del Viento. This experience 
educated the members of Arquitectura Expandida to take a critical perspective in 
the politics of the communities and to avoid the perspective error of assuming a 
community as a unitary homogeneous political social structure. 
*** 
During my field visits, I had the opportunity to meet a person who was a young girl 
when El Potocine was being built. Liliana Parra conveyed to me the importance that 
this work had on her education. Her school periodically participated in film and 
video workshops offered in El Potocine by Ojo al Sancocho, and she regularly 
attended film festivals organized in El Potocine. She said that El Potocine opened to 
her a world beyond Ciudad Bolivár. Today, she lives on the north coast of Colombia 
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and is involved with environmental organizations and activism protecting 
Colombia’s natural heritage. This particular moment enlightened me to the positive 
possibilities these kind of projects could have if done epistemically responsible and 
socially sensible together with the people and communities that inhabit these sites. 
These methods I further explore in chapter 7. 
During these conversations on the field with organizers Angie Santiago, and 
Carolina Dorado, founders of Ojo al Sancocho and participants like Liliana Parra, in 
Ciudad Bolivar were when my first suspicions appeared about the traditional script 
of community participation. The conversations between architect Ana López Ortega 
and architect Harold Guyaux further asserted these doubts. In my field notes Ana 
López Ortega called participation in these kinds of community architecture projects 
a simulacra pasted over the conflicts of coexistence. Ana López Ortega and Harold 
Guyaux referred to their practice that evolved through the years of working in 
Colombia as a kind of tactical provocations and a rupture with the machine of 
consensus. These concepts became key ideas in developing my critique on the 
public as a hypothesis and on the myth of participation (Chapter 6). 
The Colombian anthropologist Gladys Angulo brought further attention to what she 
explained as a consistent lack of local and national knowledge not only from foreign 
artists and architects working in disfranchised communities in the informal human 
settlements surrounding Bogota, but also from national artists and architect who, 
she said, were more knowledgeable about international styles and Americo-
European political history than the local history of the communities where they were 
working. These points reinforced my initial ideas about the need for a socio-political 
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formation for artists and architects, which I start to explore in Chapter 3 as a key 
cognitive gap in the traditional art and design patriarchal pedagogy. 
 
Chapter 3. Framing the problem. 
 
This chapter explores the socio-spatial situations where art and architecture’s social 
practices are nowadays situated. The artist and architect have been since the early 
90s involved in generating new socio-spatial processes that opened new fields of 
practice for their disciplines. However, both disciplines have attempted a social 
practice since the early 60s, with environment art, happenings and “activities” as 
forms of social practice, from the Situationist International 1952–1972 (Kaprow, 
1993), social sculpture (Beuys, 1970s), Gordon Matta-Clark’s New York City artists’ 
co-operative project FOOD (1971–73), to the Latin American social conceptualism 
movement Tucuman Arde (1968) public interventions and political happenings 
(Camnitzer, 2007). Architecture also searched for a new function in new forms of 
intervention in the social realm, from Cedric Price, Paul Barker, and Reyner 
Banham’s (1969) Non-Plan urban planning proposal, to the interactive social 
environments experiments of the utopian architecture group Archigram (1961), and 
the works of the Anarchitecture group (1970s). Another strong influence came from 
the side of social housing research and praxis.  Some of the influences that 
established an early foundation for an art and architecture social practice were the 
work architect John F. C. Turner did on informal architecture and social organization 
in marginalized, poor settlements outside Lima, Perú (1976), the work architect 
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Nabeel Hamdi’s (1991) participatory social housing research in India and London, 
and Samuel Mockbee and D. K Ruth’s Rural Studio (1993) pedagogy for 
collaborative design housing practices in communities in extreme poverty in the 
southern United States. 
Thus, following Cedric Price’s assertion that “architecture is too slow to solve 
problems"  (Price, 2003, p. 57), many architects interested in developing a social 
practice went on to look for ways to “create new appetites, new hungers” in the 
social realm of the marginalized poor community to reinvent their practices into a 




This research is centred in the conflictual negotiations between the Western 
academic tradition of art and architecture social practice and the human 
geographies where these practices are exercised. The locations where these 
practices of socially engaged art and architecture projects, interventions, 
collaborations, artworks and workshops take place have been chosen by the artists 
and architects because of their unique appeal of their human constituency and the 
openness in their social and political informality. This informality is understood to be 
a way of navigating everyday life outside the social, political and juridical order of 
the state (Nezar, 2004). The locations where these populations of poor, displaced, 
and migrant workers settled at “the margins” of the city in search of a better life are 
usually regarded as informal settlements constituted by the “community” of the 
“marginalized”.  
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These are the locations, and social relationships, that have attracted artists and 
architects to work in the public spaces and social conditions of the “community of 
the marginalized”. Within the context of the social-public space, the artists’ and 
architects’ operations of their practices are different to the usual academic 
practices of the private space of the artist and the architect’s design studio. 
Therefore, an understanding of the geopolitical situation of the human populations 
that inhabit these locations, their social and political interrelations and the causality 
of why artists and architects have chosen to work within these locations are the 
interest of this thesis. 
A socio-cultural and political-economy overview of the location is necessary to start 
to understand why marginalized communities have been attractive to artists and 
architects. As well as a critique of art and architectural practices, their patriarchal 
and colonial ideological origins, their commodification, and their subsequent crisis 
of legitimacy are necessary to understand as a practice that is situated in social 
fields instead of private studio spaces. The so-called social-turn (Bishop, 2006) in 
art and architecture practices has to be understood in terms beyond the artist and 
architect protagonist mythology, the art-object, and the architecture. It also needs 
to be thought in terms of its social effect and political legacy on the social field and 
the social actors (Bourdieu, 1977) – the people who inhabit the day-to-day places 
where these practices take place. Who are these people? What do they gain from 
these practices of artists and architects who at times seem to surprisingly 
parachute into their communities? What are these artists and architects looking for 
by engaging in these social practices? These are some of the transcendental 
questions it is necessary to appropriately frame.  




 “When there’s no name for a problem, you can’t solve it. When you can’t see a 
problem, you can’t solve it” (Crenshaw, 2016). 
 
Kimberlé Crenshaw presents us with the principal problem that lies at the nexus of 
art and architecture’s social practices: the problem of naming. In the course of this 
research this caveat will come to be deconstructed into the array of epistemic errors 
that have contributed to the ineffective and exploitative social practices of artist and 
architects. Naming is a complex authoritarian process that reifies hierarchies and 
sediments history’s narrative from the perspective of the victors. 
This is not a glossary; it is a critical overview of key concepts in this research. This 
section contains a series of definitions of key terms that consolidate abstract ideas 
into tangible, graspable concepts necessary for properly understanding this 
research. The speculative nature of these definitions is framed by the conceptual 
blindness that lies between the universal character of the Eurocentric colonial 
definitions and the localized character of the decolonial definitions. 
This thesis challenges many established practices in art and architecture practices 
and theory. It also finds antinomies in our own social praxis and consciousness of 
how we come to feel and understand the functions of art and architecture in our 
own lives. The thesis critically questions the sedimented practices that we take for 
granted as normative, unquestionable and ever-present in our everyday relationship 
with art and architecture. This thesis is to question from a decolonial feminist 
   
 104 
critique the hermeneutical conditioning that we have grown accustomed to accept 
as an unchallenged set of interpretations and epistemic legitimization and 
hegemonic agency of power structures and institutions over everyday life practices. 
In order to avoid the uncritical epistemic pitfalls of reproducing knowledge 
produced somewhere else, critical epistemic perspective and hermeneutics has 
been taken in analysing their localized social meaning and purposes. This is not by 
any means a simple reinterpretation of terms. On the contrary, these are sceptical 
observations of how language becomes a weapon and to whom these weapons 
serve. 
This thesis will be challenging many reified definitions that structure our quotidian 
experiences of daily life. Followed by speculating on concomitant, simultaneous and 
transversal alternative definitions to envision and understand the everyday 
experience beyond our own socio-political positioning and life experience. The 
thesis argues that we all experience our everyday life from and within a limited 
social perspective, framed by segregations of class, gender, sexuality, “race”23, 
family, phenotype, etc.  
The parameters that enclose our individual understandings lie in the social 
positioning that each of us occupy and are designated to play in the society and 
culture we inhabit. This social, political and cultural positioning is dictated by social 
                                                
23The invention of race was created on the 1500s to biologically and theologically legitimize, 
both ethically and morally, the colonization of the new world and the extraction of slave 
labour from the bodies of the conquered. “The codification of the differences between the 
conqueror and the conquered in the idea of ‘race’, a supposedly different biological 
structure that placed some in a natural situation of inferiority to the others” (Quijano, 2000, 
p. 533).  
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determinants that affect all of us; and determine the social expressions that we 
inhabit from positions of power to marginalization, sexual identities and our somatic 
depths, experiences and somatic norms (Puwar, 2004). Some of us were born into 
one of these social expressions, but many more were forced into one by being 
expelled from their own. 
In order to decolonize our understanding of the living environment around us, we 
have to start by recognizing the ways by which, historically, meanings have been 
constructed and assimilated into our social consciousness in order to name and 
define the world around us in support of asymmetric power relations based on 
class, race and gender. Perpetuating culturalisms (Segato, 2018), fundamentalisms, 
nationalisms, political structures and social hierarchies concomitant with consumer 
capitalism colonizing practices; together with the global gospel of commodification 
of the everyday life experience, desire and convenience. 
Charles Mills criticized the field of the academy for unquestionably accepting 
“tacitly taking the white body as normative” (Mills, 1998, p. 120). Privileging and 
supporting the vision and history of the world from the perspective of the universal 
norm of the Anglo-European heteronormative male white body: the universal human 
form and somatic norm (Puwar.2004). Therefore, the complicity of language as an 
instrument of power is the site to start challenging universalism and the resulting 
colonizing sedimented genderized and racialized social and political practices. 
Thus, all previous definitions from the established hegemonic institutions of 
knowledge legitimization –: museums, academia, and the state – are to be viewed 
with suspicion. As Rita Segato pronounced in 2019 during Lima’s International 
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Book Fair in Perú: “everything that reinforces our own certitudes has to be seen with 
suspicion”. 
The fundamental institutions that are the locus of the fabrication of an imaginary 
cosmology of epistemic legitimacy that rationalizes the paradigms of social control 
and power dynamics of desire, class, gender, and the racialized hierarchies 
embodied in the construction of the mythologies of the nation, are the visible state 
and the invisible forces of capitalism.  
*** 
There are many conflicts when writing about these kinds of projects that are built in 
marginalized communities. Many of the terminologies used to describe the site and 
the people who live there are pejorative and continue to reproduce racist, sexist, 
and patriarchal attitudes and violence over these communities. 
It is difficult to name the type of settlements where these works are placed. The 
places where these works are located have been called by many names throughout 
the years. As government policies change, social and community organizations 
arise from within these settlements and the influence of the presence of third-sector 
organizations is more visible; the words that have been used to name, describe and 
thus stigmatize these communities are in constant flux. 
The traditional term in use was barriada. Favela is the Brazilian-Portuguese 
translation, and is the most popularly known term in common usage in academic, 
political and social literature. A proper English translation would be slum. Barriada 
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has always been a derogatory term used to stigmatize its inhabitants to the lowest 
abject strata of society.  
Herein lies the problem of using terms that reproduce patriarchal colonialist disdain 
and hierarchy. It is important, when we are using them, that we recognize their 
proper historical context to avoid washing over the historical injustices that have 
been perpetrated towards these populations. Then, the use of terms such as 
barriada should be used as means to reaffirm that the injustices are still in place. 
Wash-over terms, installed by governmental agencies and third-sector 
organizations to name the barriada, have included: land invasions, informal 
settlements, young towns, and the latest appeasing term, human settlements. Each 
new term carries with it the power of language as an instrument of the ruling class. 
Each term does bring an image of the legality, temporality and agency or lack 
thereof that each settlement has. 
The same goes for the use of the term the marginalized. It is another problematic 
term to use or to disavow. Sayak Valencia (2018) argued that the use of this term 
should be stopped because it perpetuates a condition of intellectual complacency 
and political idyll necessary to stop the martyrization of the poor as victims or 
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3.1.1. The socio-spatial agent. 
This thesis is concerned with the socio-spatial practices that a particular kind of 
artists and architects has chosen to follow in the social realm of marginalized 
populations, especially, in the context of this research located in the Global South. 
These practices have been addressed in art and architecture by many names, being 
the latest widely used term, socially engaged practices. 
Borrowing the term “spatial agent” from Matrix Feminist Design Co-operative 
(Dwyer and Thorne, 2007), together with Gerald Raunig (2009), who suggested the 
term “critically engaged artistic practice”, to explain a practice, which interweaves 
social criticism, institutional critique and self-criticism as its mode of operation. For 
the purposes of this research, I would be addressing these artists and architects 
who are working within the social and spatial context of marginalized communities 
in the Global South as socio-spatial agents. Following Raunig’s (2009) postulate of 
an artistic practice as being critically engage this thesis argues that the socio-
spatial agent in many cases lacks the socio-political and historical foundations to 
act critically within the context of its own positioning within its own practice. 
Critically refers to works that simultaneously question hegemonic ideologies, socio-
political problems, while exploring the particular disciplinary procedures that confine 
art and architecture into an instrumentalist function instead of an “emancipatory 
project” (Lahiji, 2016). 
 
Nevertheless, the socio-spatial agent designs, structures and orchestrates the 
system-project, the participation and the epistemic agency and production. The 
intention of naming the socio-spatial agent is to group together an array of 
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individuals and practitioners from the artistic to the architectural including the 
syncretic manifestations that sprout between the interstices of these disciplines 
when working within the realm of the social. This relational practice grounded on the 
social as site and context is further problematized by the paradoxical conditions of 
the artist and architect’s role as expert professionals and agents of epistemic 
hegemony, simultaneously located in the seemingly emancipatory role of the social 
agent for social good, participation, collaboration and solidarity. 
Here the thesis confronts another paradoxical condition in the use of what Karin 
Reisinger and Meike Schalk describe as the “tricky we” (Reisinger and Schalk, 
2017). The allusion to the use of the pronoun “we” during the research and writing 
of this thesis refers to the relational condition of a syncretic academic identity that 
categorizes the author as an artist as well as an architect. This “we”, refers to the 
ideas that Meike Schalk and Karin Reisinger outlined as a feminist strategy to make 
visible the author, to understand how to see ourselves in relation to, and by others 
“not as a foundation, but what we are working toward.” (Ahmed, 2017, p.  7). 
Following what Donna Haraway (2016) described “we” as “part of an environment 




The principal lacuna embedded in the methodologies of socio-spatial agents 
practices lies in the failure to recognize the root of any social problem as composed 
by many intersecting social, economic, political, gender, racial, class, and cultural 
elements. The simultaneous dynamic relations between all these elements, 
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contextualized within conflictual constructs between an official institutional history 
vs. a local history, makes the design of a social practice a complex endeavour. 
Nevertheless, the design of a responsible social practice needs to understand and 
apply an intersectional approach to its research and praxis. 
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw initially coined the term intersectionality in 1989. The 
praxis of intersectionality presented how the intersecting conditions of gender, race 
and class structured the social and judicial systems of segregation and 
discrimination of black women (Crenshaw, 1989). The theory has been proven to 
provide an insightful landscape of the multiple conditions – race, gender, class, 
phenotype, sex, sexuality, ability, nationality, citizenship, religion and body type – 
that intersect to frame the relationships of power in contemporary Western capitalist 
societies. 
Patricia Hill Collins (2015) referred to intersectionality as “the critical insight that 
race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability, and age operate not as 
unitary, mutually exclusive entities, but rather as reciprocally constructing 
phenomena” (Hill Collins, 2015, p.1). Intersectionality is a method to describe how 
our overlapping social categories, constructed identities and power relationships 
relate to the structures of racism and oppression sedimented on our everyday 
practices. Intersectionality presents how a problem is not the result of a single 
condition but instead is the additive effects of multiple simultaneous and historical 
conditions brought into the mix to result into a new contemporary condition. 
Crenshaw argued that “The problem is, in part, a framing problem” (Crenshaw, 
2016); the necessity to have a clear frame of references from where locates and 
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names the locus of injustice. “Without frames that are capacious enough to address 
all the ways that disadvantages and burdens play out for all members of a particular 
group, the efforts to mobilize resources to address a social problem will be partial 
and exclusionary” (Crenshaw, 2016). 
Standing at the intersection of socio-political injustices; intersectionality operates on 
multiple levels, creating multidimensional experiences. Hence, for this research the 
practice of intersectionality has been as Patricia Hill Collins argued: “a knowledge 
project whose raison d’être lies in its attentiveness to power relations and social 
inequalities”.  Thus, this research followed Patricia Hill Collins’s argument: 
“intersectionality as an analytical strategy that provides new angles of vision on 
social phenomena; and intersectionality as critical praxis that informs social justice 
projects” (Hill Collins, 2015, p. 1). For this research intersectionality is a 
methodology, a praxis, and most importantly a way to feel through the invisibilities 
of power interrelationships that structure injustices from the somatic to the 
epistemic, to the violence monopoly of the state, to the epistemic error embedded 
in the social practices of the artists and architects. Intersectionality is not an 
approach to problem solving; instead it is a method to identify the sources of the 
problem.  
*** 
3.1.3. Plasticity of words. 
Jean Baudrillard called words “bearers and generators of ideas – perhaps even 
more than the reverse” (Baudrillard, 2003, p. ix). He continuous to address those 
words acquire dynamic meanings as words “metabolise into one another by kind of 
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spiral evolution”. He refers to this phenomenon as the “temporality of words”. What 
Baudrillard is positing is that the ideas contained within the signified container of the 
word changes evolve as the usage of the word expands in “successive 
metaphorizations”. Following the actions in which words are continually generating 
and regenerating ideas, Baudrillard assigns words the action of “shifters”. By this he 
explains that “ideas intersect, intermingle at the level of the word”; words acquire 
new meanings through their social interactions. 
“Because words pass, then; because they pass away, metamorphose, become 
‘passers’ or vehicles of ideas along unforeseen channels not calculated in advance” 
(Baudrillard, 2003, p. x). 
Now arises the question: In what social interactions do words own their meanings? 
Baudrillard followed Wittgenstein, who argued that words do not have a fixed 
meaning (Wittgenstein, 1953). They are signified and re-signified by the social 
interactions that surround their everyday usage in language. Words acquire their 
meaning by the people who are using them. As such, meaning is relational to the 
social, political and cultural situations where the people that are using them dwell. 
Their meaning is relational to two spaces of signification: one, the external or social 
arena of exchange; two, the internal space of the colonized subject’s interpretation 
and translation. 
The colonized and the marginalized materialized their own “linguistic codes” 
(Bernstein, 1960) as a means of camouflaging their own restrictive and elaborated 
social dialects used by the middle to lower classes to protect their communications 
from the hegemonic authority. 
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The external social space is territorialized and dominated by suitable universal 
definitions and behaviours designated by and in support of the hegemonic 
institutions of power. Territorialized into divisions of taste and class, these external 
definitions guarantee the continuation of power by the ruling class and the 
perdurance of a socio-economic and political system that assures its reproduction: 
consumer capitalism. The internal space of the subject is colonized by definitions, 
meanings and desires that assure the reproduction of the reigning system of 
consumer capitalism. The determinant categorizations for the colonized subject are 
race and gender together with the appropriate definitions; the subjugation of this 
subject is guaranteed. (Puwar, 2004; Segato, 2018) 
*** 
Words and language are used in multifarious ways, shifting meaning from all kinds 
of language games (Wittgenstein, 1953). A word or sentence acquires meaning only 
when it is fixed to some context of use. Context is constructed by the hegemonic 
authority to legitimate its claim to epistemic superiority. Meanwhile, the colonized 
subjectivities of the marginalized are contextualized by genderized and racialized 
words imposed to them by the former. 
Hence, the plasticity of words is shaped by a colonizing system of hegemonic 
power, signification and influence. Plasticity refers to a nature without a 
predetermined shape or function; it refers to a capacity for being moulded and 
altered, to the ability to morph without a preconceived end, thus, free of a priori 
judgement and determinism. 
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This concept of plasticity is different from the polysemy of words: the coexistence of 
many possible meanings of a world. Where the meanings emerges from the 
standard denotations and connotations suggested by the material shape of the a 
given word (Roudiez, 1982). 
For this thesis, the plasticity of words is a determinant concept for reading with a 
contrapuntal suspicion (Said, 1993), the forms of epistemic legitimization of 
authoritative concepts as the vernacular. These are concepts that are utilized as 
applicable universal truths; as they are authorized and canonized by science they 
become “dominant myths and overshadow everyday life” (Poerksen, 1995, p. 4). 
Poerksen explains: when words move away from authoritative spheres like science 
and pass to the colloquialism of everyday language, words “lose any potential for 
prediction, concreteness, or exactitude” (Poerksen, 1995, p. 8). But here again, 
whose science is the legitimatizing authority? The sedimented universalism of 
science as the realm of rational and logical truth has been the subservient epistemic 
legitimizer of the power institutions of colonialism. 
This authority imbued into science as the repository of universal truth has been 
used to legitimize racism and gendered differences as being inferior to the somatic 
norm of the universal white heteronormative patriarchy. This has been legitimized by 
European philosophy and science to be the nexus from where only true intellect can 
originate. The white heteronormative male body is defined by philosophy and 
science to be the only entity that can achieve the rational separation between body 
and mind; necessary for true intellect voided of stains from the subjective bodily 
functions of the organic and its connection to nature. Hence, he is the only one who 
can transcend earthly limitations of the body and achieved proper pure knowledge. 
   
 115 
Women’s bodies and dark bodies are seen as closer to nature and thus unable to 
disassociate themselves from passion and other emotions and abjections of the 




3.1.4. Contrapuntual reading.  
The normative legitimizing authority of universal truth and values generated from the 
Eurocentric self-serving perspective of the proper ethics, morals and aesthetics of 
life is why all texts must be taken with a good measure of suspicion and distrust.  
Only by a contrapuntal reading (Said, 1993) can an effective set of decolonizing 
tactics emerge. Contrapuntal reading is the practice Edward Said posited to 
interpret colonial texts, considering the perspectives of both the colonizer and the 
colonized. To interpret contrapuntally is to simultaneously analyse the historical and 
political perspectives from which the text was written. By whom and from whom it 
was written, and how these interactions play within the meaning of the text. Hence, 
taking into account both perspectives, from imperialism and the resistance to it. 
In a curious turn of descriptive irony, even Martin Heidegger, who by all accounts 
reifies the colonizer’s model of heteronormative patriarchal universal Eurocentric 
philosophy, said about language: “man acts as though he were the shaper and 
master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man”. (Heidegger, 
1971). 
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*** 
3.1.5. Perception, the manifold problem. 
Leif Finkel (1992, p. 393) wrote: “We take the world largely for granted”. Finkel 
posited that the way we come to perceive the world that surround us, and thus the 
way we conceive reality, as we know it” is the result of “largely an internally 
generated construct of the nervous system”. Finkel’s instrumentalist biology led him 
to conclude that, once this reality is “constructed it is projected back onto the world 
through behavioral interactions with objects”. (Finkel, 1992, p. 393). Finkel’s 
unquestioned dependency on the instrumentalization of the biological, “the nervous 
system”, in order to render a behavioural causality by transitional objects (Winnicott, 
1951) underscores the rift between how we “biologically” perceive and how we 
socially construct reality. 
Finkel presented that we need a cohesiveness between the perpetual and the real 
to make sense of our reality, for a “triumph of the familiar, argues for an inherent 
order and coherence in our immediate universe” (Finkel, ibid).  
Marshall Sahlins argued that we construct our everyday lives in a perceptual 
relativism, on a world of complacency, conformity, convenience, familiarity and 
security (Sahlins, 2000). Our views of the world are subjective to perception and 
experience, even beyond any cultural conventions. The perceptual relativism of 
experience mediates our familiarities and structures; our “immediate universe” to 
the sense of certainty we posit on reality. 
Arjun Appadurai adds that the dilemmas of perspective and representation, as well 
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as variations in the situation of the observer, may affect the process and product of 
representation (Appadurai, 1989, p. 48). The volatile condition of perspective, and 
thus the insecurity of representation, bring us to what Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Verela present as the idea that “we tend to live in a world of certainty, of 
un-doubted, rock-ribbed perceptions: our convictions prove that things are the way 
we see them and there is no alternative to what we hold as true. This is our daily 
situation, our cultural condition, our way of being human” (Maturana and Varela, 
1998, p. 18). 
Maturana and Varela warn us “not to fall in the temptation of certainty”; if we as 
actors cannot “suspend his – our – certainties” nothing can be achieved as we are 
already “embodied in his – our – experience as an effective understanding of the 
phenomenon of cognition”, of the way things work in the world that we as 
spectators inhabit and as consumer use. Our experience of certainty is an 
“individual phenomena blind to the cognitive acts of others”, Maturana and Varela 
posit; but, taken from the solitude of the individual, this individual phenomenon “is 
transcended only in a world created with others” (Maturana and Varela, 1998, p. 18). 
These are the social structures of culture and tradition that we form to validate our 
own beliefs. 
Maturana and Varela state that cognition is “an effective action, an action that will 
enable a living being to continue its existence in a definite environment as it brings 
forth its world” (Maturana and Varela, 1998, p. 30). Thus, we live in this world that 
we created to surround us, where our perceptions are entitled, only if we belong to 
the epistemic authority of the colonizer. As Merleau-Ponty wrote, “all knowledge 
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takes its place within the horizons opened up by perception” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 
p.241). The authorized perception of epistemic truth comes from the colonizer: the 
ones with the agency to govern and institutionalized their ways of life and 
aesthetics, values and morals upon the subjugated other. 
Merleau-Ponty wrote that “since we can never fill up, in the picture of the world, that 
gap which it comes into existence for someone, since perception is the ‘flaw’…” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 241). An agent of epistemic legitimacy and authority 
positions himself as a colonizing agent at the beginning of the ontological 
construction of experience and thus of legitimate reality. Where there is a cognitive 
blurring between perception and actual experience (Maturana and Varela, 1998) 
there is an erasure of perception, not as a science of the world but instead as a 
deliberate act. This is what Merleau-Ponty called “the background from which all 
acts stand out, and is presupposed by them” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. xi). 
In the condition of colonization of a territory, be it a land or mind, the position of 
reality is oppositional to what Merleau-Ponty argues to be the real: “The real has to 
be described, not constructed or formed. Which means that I cannot put perception 
into the same category as the syntheses represented by judgements, acts or 
predications” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. xi). Perception is another socially 
constructed instrument. As Finkel proposed, the nervous system might transmit 
signals from the senses to the brain. But it is our culturally constructed language of 
sings and symbols that interpret these signals as songs or only noise. 
In the space of cognitive blurring between perception and actual experience that 
Maturana spoke of, Santiago Gómez-Barris saw perception as being the crucial 
nexus of constructing reality. Gómez-Barris saw an opportunity “an invitation to 
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reflection by opening a space of awareness” (Gómez-Barris, 2017, p. 9). This 
“invitation” has already been taken by the colonizer agents of real-estate 
speculation and political manipulators. From the space of blurriness, a categorizing 
institutionalized hierarchical social typology is created and imposed as social reality. 
The institutional bureaucracy of a territory’s governing structures and the imaginary 
construct of a nation in the mind of the people who dwell in this territory. The state 
is not a single cohesive hegemonic power. It is an entity riddled with power 
asymmetric and cognitive contradictions. It is inhabited by an abundance of 
opposing actors, agents and users that constitute its ontological physiognomy. 
Merleau-Ponty wrote that “all knowledge takes its place within the horizons opened 
up by perception” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 241). By this he proposes that 
perception comes before episteme. He continues: “there can be no question of 
describing perception itself as one of the facts thrown up in the world”. Merleau-
Ponty’s is a romantic sense of perception as an aura outside our body. He names it 
as a natural, indelible “fact” of being in the world. The poetic gesture where he 
pictures perception as the luxury of the colonizer who has the agency to 
metaphorize the instruments of colonization into his own romantic narration. How 
perception as fact is used to legitimize invasion, appropriation and expulsions of 
peoples from their own places. How it enables the construction of new places for 
the colonizer on top of the layers of history left behind by the displaced. “Since we 
can never fill up, in the picture of the world, that gap which we ourselves are, and by 
which it comes into existence for someone, since perception is the ‘flaw’ in this 
‘great diamond” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 241). The “gap” he speaks of is  left open 
only in poetry. Perception is the instrument, even in the “flaw” – in the perception of 
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the subaltern, that construct the “great diamond”, that is the appropriation of place. 
*** 
 
3.2. Socio-spatial structures. 
 
The social practices of artists and architects take form in space. What does space 
actually mean?  The Scottish geographer Neil Smith (1984) argued that “the 
concept of space tends to be taken for granted” (Smith, 1984).  The spaces where 
these practices locate their sites are commonly referred to as the places of 
marginalized communities’ dwellings in informal settlements on occupied lands at 
the borderlands of cities. This almost automatic cognitive jump using space and 
place almost interchangeably is one of the perspective errors in artists’ and 
architects’ social practices. Space is commonly defined in design thinking as 
imagined Cartesian terrain of terra-nullius, whereas place is thought socially in 
terms of location of dwelling. Site is a grid on the map where space and place are 
hierarchically positioned as tectonic elements in the description of a location for 
work, intervention and change. The design-thinking methodology where space is 
described, place is thought, and site is constructed is a contrived structure that 
needs to be thought in terms of a trialectic instead of as a stable set of definitions. 
Almost thirty years ago Michael Keith and Steve Pile (1993) noted the attention 
generated by the spatial turn in the reintroduction of space and spatial relations by 
intellectual circles as foundations of modern capitalist society, which they referred 
to as the “spatial vogue” (Keith and Pile, 1993, p. 2). Nevertheless, the fashionable 
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attention given to spatial practices does not dilute the importance of a critical 
understanding of socio-spatial dialectics in capitalist societies, where space 
becomes a material product (Soja, 1989) and the ideological contends of socially 
created space (Soja, 1989, p. 76) is instrumentalized into the publicity of the market 
economy and nationalisms. Thus, the recognition of “decisive and pre-eminent” 
spatial structural forces embedded in modern capitalist societies (Harvey, 1973) is 
of paramount importance for the artist and architect’s development of their socio-
spatial practices and awareness of the conjuncture between “how relations of 
power and discipline are inscribed into the apparently innocent spatiality of social 
life” (Soja, 1989, p. 6). Hence, there follows a description of what space and place 






Space cannot remain thought of as an empty, passive, abstract arena where things 
happen unrelated to the rest of human and environmental relationships (Keith and 
Pile, 1993). Lefèbvre described the sense of space as a political field: 
“Space is not a scientific object removed from ideology and politics; it has 
always been political and strategic. If space has an air of neutrality and 
indifference with regard to its contents and thus seems to be ‘purely’ formal, 
the epitome of rational abstraction, it is precisely because it has been occupied 
and used, and has already been the focus of past processes whose traces are 
not always evident on the landscape. Space has been shaped and moulded 
from historical and natural elements, but this has been a political process. 
Space is political and ideological. It is a product literally filled with ideologies” 
(Lefèbvre, 1976, p. 31). 
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Lefèbvre is well known today by his famous dictum that space is socially produced. 
He argued that when space is considered in isolation from the politico-social, space 
remains an empty abstraction (Lefèbvre, 1991, p.12). Lefèbvre’s critical approach to 
space as a social product is part of his theorization on the Critique of Everyday Life 
(1947). Here is where Lefèbvre asserted his point that under modern capitalism the 
conditions of work and production have become part of the everyday life. The 
conditions of capitalism have become our state of everydayness (Löw, 2008, p. 27). 
Lefèbvre contents not only that space is socially produced, but also that space is 
politically controlled by capitalism’s means of social and political appropriation. 
Lefèbvre explains that capitalism and the state simultaneously protect their 
structures of hegemonic power by regulating the access to the configurations of 
space. The traditional spatial conflictual binaries of private/public are ingrained into 
the “social training” of democracy (Pateman, 1970, p. 41). Lefèbvre described the 
conditions of hierarchy and functionality of the state and capitalism’s management 
of space as: “of ‘boxes for living in’, of identical ‘plans' piled one on top of another 
or jammed next to one another in rows” (Lefèbvre, 1991, p. 384). This is what 
Lefèbvre refers to as the “abstract space” of capitalism (Lefèbvre, 1991, p.  229).  
Lefèbvre primarily followed the Marxist tradition when he developed his conceptual 
triad of space (Lefèbvre, 1991, p.  38) composed of spatial practice/perceived 
space, representations of space/conceived space, and spaces of representation, 
representational space/lived spaces. When Lefèbvre referred to “spatial practice”, 
he related this to space-related modes of behaviour. This is to say that everyday 
practices and habits are created and shaped by the production and reproduction of 
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spatial localities; abstract, political, social and existential (Noeberg-Schulz, 1971). 
Lefèbvre’s view of spatial practices, although it includes the aspect of action of the 
space upon the body as suffering and experience, remains very much under the 
impression of capitalist structural constraints (Löw, 2008). 
In Lefèbvre’s third part of his triad of space, he adds to this conception an agency 
of action/behaviour. Hence, ‘spaces of representation’ stand for spaces of 
expression and cognition. In such “spaces” is where Lefèbvre places the role and 
agency of the artist. 
The German sociologist Martina Löw (2008) argues that such “theoretical 
considerations of space permits reflection on the ordering logics of simultaneity, 
space is subjected to analysis in the social sciences as a ‘product of social action’ or 
as a ‘product of social structures’” (Löw, 2008, p. 26). British social scientist and 
geographer Doreen Massey (1999, 2005) on the other hand refers to space as a 
category suited to express the spheres of juxtaposition and coexistence. Space 
maintains a theoretical anonymity, and a universal image of neutrality, even as a 
product of social action. When space makes the cognitive jump from theory to 
experience, as action and performance, in history and in narrative, the intensity of 
experience transforms space into a place. Therefore, people actively transform their 










The American philosopher Edward Casey wrote that “to exist is to exist in a place” 
(Casey, 1997), given that place is a structurally dominant part of the very 
construction of what we determine is our “world”. The world as a representation of 
culture, nation, tribe, family and society. A “world” is defined by the Argentine 
feminist philosopher Maria Lugones (1987) as “in my sense may be an actual society 
given its dominant culture’s description and construction of life, including a 
construction of the relationships of production, of gender, race, etc” (Lugones, 
1987, p. 10). She adds that a “world” doesn’t need to be the construction of a 
whole society, and that many “worlds” can be constructed of the same society as 
they remain different “words” in themselves. This idea of a “world” as place and 
experience of the social-spatial determinism of identity, belonging to non-
hegemonic groups of non-conformist or transgressive ideologies, phenotypes, and 
sexuality, ethnicity is the social imaginary of cohesion, and the narrative historical 
determinism of place-making. 
The appearance of cohesiveness is what holds together our representations of 
place. Casey saw people, as emplaced beings, where “place is an a priori of our 
existence on earth” (Casey, 1997, p. x). Place is a contested definition. Historically, 
notions of what determines place varies from cultures, to politics, to personal 
narratives. For Heidegger (1951), place was equated with being in a place, which 
meant for him as “being-in-the-world”.(Heidegger, 1971). 
Places are intrinsically diverse. Places are heterogeneous systems independent of 
geographic territory. Places are intersecting realms of amorphous and plastic 
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compositions and shapes. Some places claim territory as means to define 
themselves; other places exist in communal imaginaries of diaspora communities. 
Places are traditionally tied to communities but they are independent of a cohesive 
public. Places are transitory, mutable and recombinant. Places are determined by 
intensity, power and narration (Bhabha, 1990). Places are like history. Represented 
by the narrative of the victorious. History is a tool of the powerful, which dominates 
the narration and creates the language of the narration. Thus, places are visible and 
invisible depending on to whom these places belong. This is what Massey (1994) 
called the progressive sense of place. Massey said that places by their nature are 
progressive, never static; they might seem static and concrete, as history does, but 
this is just a temporal trick that lasts only as far as human memory last. Distortion is 
an inherent quality of the nature of humanity’s narration and 
construction/deconstruction of themselves. Throughout their systems of 
classification and representation, aesthetics and hegemony, humanity constantly 
reproduces place. Hence, humanity relies on the construction of place, to validate 
their identity, culture and a sense of self.  
In the 1970s, Edward Relph was arguing that in the modern homogenized world of 
20th-century capitalism the “sense of place” has been largely lost and replaced with 
an “inauthentic” attitude. He argued that the loss of place diversity in the modern 
world was symptomatic of a larger loss of meaning. He alluded to the idea that the 
loss of traditional cultures that produced vernacular places was being replaced by a 
homogenized consumer culture that produces the sense of “placeness”. Relph 
defined “placeness” as “the casual eradication of distinctive places and the making 
of standardized landscapes that results from an insensibility to the significance of 
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place” (Relph, 1976, p. v). The French anthropologist Marc Augé later defined these 
standardized landscapes as “non-places” (1992), a series of homogenized 
architectures that define a sameness of behaviour, taste and aesthetics that 
envelop the modern consumer capitalist world. By this Relph meant the loss of the 
“authenticity”. Relph’s parochial idealism of place authenticity based on romantic 
images of pre-industrial societies falls into the same localism of authenticity that 
constituted in Heidegger an ontological fear of the other.  
Heidegger’s localism is related to what Massey argues as the persistent 
identification of ‘place’ with ‘community’. In Heidegger’s case this relates to the 
idea of pure-community. Massey posits that what gives place its particularity is not 
“some long internalized history” but instead its construction by “a particular 
constellation of social relations, meeting and weaving together at a particular locus” 
(Massey, 1994). 
Relph argued that place is experience-based. Relph said that “the unique quality of 
place was its power to order and to focus human intentions, experiences and 
actions spatially” (Relph, 1976, p. 3).  
When Relph defined people’s identities, tied to the identity of and with place, he 
referred to the quality of such place as a “persistent sameness and unity”, two 
structuring disciplinary attributes. He continued by stating, “Which allows that 
[place] to be differentiated from others” (Relph, 1976, p. 45). The disciplinary and 
exclusive form of the definition that Relph gives to place is short-sighted as it limits 
place to stable categorizations of being. Nevertheless, Relph argued for an 
“authentic sense of place”. He thought there could be “a direct and genuine 
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experience of the entire complex of the identity of places”, if only the harmful 
intrusions of “mass communication, mass culture, and central authority” could be 
eliminated from “undermining of place for both individuals and cultures”. He blamed 
modern technology and mass culture without a clear critique of modern consumer 
capitalism systemic colonization of everyday life. Thus, his critique of the loss of 
place remains reactionary, and stuck on binary moralism. The American writer and 
art critic Lucy Lippard wrote that “More often place applies to our own ‘local’ 
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Chapter 4. A crisis in art and architecture. 
This chapter explores the social conditions that have contributed to what has been 
called a crisis in the social legitimacy of art and architecture practices (Mouffe, 
2007; Awan, Schneider, and Till, 2011; Cruz, 2012; Miessen, 2016). It has been 
posited by many authors that art and architecture practices have been since the 
late 60s in a slow but constant decline of their social relevance as transformative 
capital of innovation and social engagement with the public. In reaction to this 
crisis, art and architecture practices have taken a “social turn” (Thompson, 2004; 
Bishop, 2006) towards designing practices that directly engage with the public as 
user and participant. Art and architecture practices since the early 90s have been in 
a process of re-contextualization of their disciplines away from the individual 
professional practice of the private studio and towards a more socially conscious, 
participatory and collaborative design thinking. The aim has been to gain social 
legitimacy, placing art and architecture practices as innovative and transformative 
instruments for social change. The chapter concludes by presenting how the social 
assemblages of culture and culturalism have influenced the social construction of 
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4.0. A crisis of legitimacy in art and architecture. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote in The Social Contract (1762) that “Legitimacy rests 
on the general will of the people” (Rousseau, 1997). The questions that must be 
clarified here are: What is this general will? And Who are these people that are being 
spoken of? 
The “general will” is advertised as the meaning that the common people bestow 
upon their description of legitimacy. Meaning and legitimacy are thus tied together, 
even more in today’s experience-driven economy (Pine II and Gilmore, 1998).  
What a thing is to us is, in a Heideggerian sense, what that thing signifies within a 
framework of truth. Of this truth is what we have come to believe is legitimacy. Truth 
is nothing more than a structured perspective of meaning by the hegemonic power 
of the moment. In contemporary society the instruments of legitimacy are defined 
by their apparent publicness (Habermas, 1975). Advertising, participation and 
democracy are the media’s favourite legitimizing instruments. The media, as a 
multifarious sinister organism, is the network of institutions that structure, 
manufacture, reproduce, and disseminate the ideological content of advertising, 
participation and democracy. The media produces the forms needed to create “the 
general will” of the people by whoever has the hegemonic power of the moment 
(Merrin, 2006; Lacy, 2009). 
Contemporary consumer capitalism has produced a system of media publicity to 
archive a globalizing influence. It might have started by printing newspapers and 
advertising catalogues of the 19th-century European lifestyle. The selling point was, 
and still is, to achieve a universal homogenizing desire of a certain lifestyle and 
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values. Then, capitalism can provide all the items of recognition necessary to fulfil 
such desires, by continuing with the creation of meaning by the fabrication of need 
by the advertising media. The media and advertising are the instrument and the 
purpose wrapped together in the necessary order of priority according to the 
service to provide: meaning, legitimacy and consumption. 
Nowadays the media is the hegemonic global instrument of legitimacy. Although it 
is far from the instrument that McLuhan spoke of in his 1960s dictum, “the medium 
is the message”. It is also beyond Baudrillard’s own dictum of the 1980s, “the 
medium is no longer identifiable as such…” (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 30). 
Global electronic media is ubiquitous in the everyday lives of the people. With the 
term “the people” I am alluding to the objects of democracy, most commonly called 
the common people in political propaganda. The common people is the transitional 
definition between the proletariat of early 20th-century Marxist class-struggle lore 
and the precariat of the neoliberalism of global consumer capitalism. 
The common people is the romanticized definition that alludes to the image of 
provincial-rural inhabitants of the countryside; with the corresponding “old time 
values” of God-fearing goodness, purity, conformity, simplicity, truth, and humility. 
In contrast to the inhabitants of the city, these are the “othered”, the people who 
have been categorized not to belong to the normative majority, by phenotype or 
behaviour. They are seen as the different, threatening, deviant, ethnic, distrustful, 
foreign and strange. Hence, the media takes its place as the homogenizer of needs 
and desires. 
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The image displays the simplistic epistemic authority of the eyewitness. In the 
experience economy (Pine II and Gilmore, 1998), the truth of experience is 
seamlessly exchanged between witnessing as present action, and witnessing as 
consuming action, of an event from afar mediated through a screen. Therefore, 
today’s media ubiquity and its constant individual “customized” consumption by the 
common people has had the transformative effect of turning our everyday life 
experience into our own personal consumption of our own life on the screen (Turkle, 
1995). 
In the era of the image, the legitimizing agency of the media is thus mediated by 
“the art of seeing”. Paul Virilio called it “the pernicious industrialization of vision” 
(Virilio, 1997, p. 89). This is the production of context, content and affect by images; 
the condition of our everyday lives mediated by images created outside us.  Such is 
a life of “perceptual disorder”, where manufactured images serve as “vehicles of 
experience”. Virilio argued that people in the hyper-consumption of life experience 
as images had “lost our status as eyewitness of tangible reality once and for all” 
(Virilio, 1997, p. 91). There is nothing to regulate the constant bombardment of 
images disguised as fact or knowledge, “as mirrors of reality and sumptuous 
simulations of desire”. (Virilio, 1997, p. 90). If there is not such a thing as “ethics of 
common perception”, then people are the entrapped in “a paradoxical blindness 
due to the overexposure of the visible” (Virilio, 1997, p. 91). In the excess of the 
visible as experience, the video artist Gary Hill said: “vision is no longer the 
possibility of seeing, but the impossibility of not seeing” (Virilio, 1997, p. 90). 
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This condition leaves the people without any other agency to merely converse in the 
world as audience, or what Guy Debord called in 1967 “consumers of spectacles” 
(Debord, 1995). Thus, art’s function is relegated to the service of the media’s 
production of images for mass consumption, and architecture is still mediated by 
the same images designed by the media to portray the proper lifestyle.  
*** 
4.0.1. The emancipatory function of art. 
In the romantic image of art, art is endowed with the emancipatory function of 
agency to the common people. Arnold Farr presented the idea that “The freedom to 
think and reflect that is made possible at the level of culture makes it possible to 
construct values and ideals that pose a challenge to the social order” (Farr, 2020). 
Farr called this the emancipatory function of art. 
Marcuse argued that “the cultural realm or civilization is characterized by intellectual 
work, leisure, non-operational thought, and freedom” (Marcuse, 1965, p. 16). These 
freedoms are of course by-products of the bourgeois life of an educated upper 
class. Thus, the production of a cultural realm of civilization befalls onto the 
condition of the bourgeois as the educated and privileged class. Farr’s argument of 
the emancipatory function of art as classless is naive. Farr’s call “to construct 
values and ideals that pose a challenge to the social order” (Farr, 2020) is an 
exercise available only to members of the ruling social class, and only to those 
included at level of the mandate of the social hierarchy; women and people of 
colour are often left outside. 
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The legitimacy of art does not go much further than the ornate, and the production 
of representational object of social status for a privileged class. 
It appears, then, that art’s palliative function “would be the social effect (function) of 
a work, which is the result of the coming together of stimuli inside the work and a 
sociologically definable public within an already existing institutional frame” (Bürger, 
1984, p. 87). This is about art as a reflexive practice. Art that functions only within 
an appropriately educated public, trained in the culture of the arts, and which is 
protected from the outside world by the architecture of the institutional frame. 
Michel de Certeau posited: “The masses rarely enter these gardens of art. But they 
are caught and collected in the nets of the media” (De Certeau, 1984). 
Thus, art’s legitimacy befalls to the “the social ineffectiveness of their own medium” 
(Schulte-Sasse, 1984, p. xi). 
*** 
4.0.2. Art and architecture’s turn to the social practices. 
“An actor or institution experiences a crisis of legitimacy, it is argued, when the 
level of social recognition that its identity, interests, practices, norms, or 
procedures are rightful declines to the point where it must either adapt (by 
reconstituting or recalibrating the social bases of its legitimacy, or by investing 
more heavily in material practices of coercion or bribery) or face 
disempowerment” (Reus-Smit, 2007). 
Art’s turn towards the realm of the social was to legitimize its practices by finding 
new meanings in the social wrongs of society. Thus, the artist could serve as the 
protagonist agent in righting the wrongs of society with the emancipatory agency as 
the function of art. Evolving from Walter Benjamin’s call to artists to become the 
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revolutionary agents of change (Benjamin, 1968), Cuban artist Tania Bruguera 
engaged with undocumented immigrants with her work Immigrant Movement 
International (2011) in Queens, New York City. Though her work, Bruguera sought to 
bring attention and activism to immigration reform in the United States. 
Nevertheless, history shows us that “art can both protest and protect the status 
quo” (Schulte-Sasse, 1984, p. xxxv). 
In the romantic idealisms of art and the avant-garde, art and activism go hand in 
hand. This is a popularized empiricism tenuously grounded on the romanticized 
mythology of the artist as a “revolutionary” agent of social change. Yet, “in every act 
of Romanticism, small violences hide” (Zambrana, 2019). Or at least the image of 
the artist is commercialized as fashionable rebel against a presumed status quo. 
Chela Sandoval (2008) called it “artivism”. She posited that “the term artivism is a 
hybrid neologism that signifies work created by individuals who see an organic 
relationship between art and activism” (Sandoval and Latorre, 2008, p. 82). 
Moreover, there have always been doubts about how much agency the artist can 
actually enact over or against the structure of art institutions and on society at large.  
*** 
Architecture as the foundation of civilization is another presumed and popularized 
truth. The architect as the genius philosopher and designer of a better lifestyle is yet 
another common myth. The architect has had the presumed responsibility and 
labour to design society out of its social troubles.  From Georges-Eugène 
Haussmann's renovation of Paris commissioned by Emperor Napoleon III in 1853, 
to Benito Mussolini’s 1937 commission EUR citadel outside of Rome, to Lúcio 
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Costa, Oscar Niemeyer and Joaquim Cardozo’s design of Brasilia in 1956, this 
responsibility has been entrusted to architecture and the architect by dictators, 
philosophers, governments, and states from Ancient Greek to the present.  
However, the image of the architect as social saviour and designer of grand plans 
has been continually eroded since the presumed end of high modernism, and the 
discontinuity of totalitarian states. Nevertheless, the architect’s expertise and social 
and political authority has been diminishing as other professions like engineering 
and urban planning are increasingly entering the terrain of what used to be the 
exclusive field of architecture. Hence, the necessity of the architect is being 
questioned. The question of whether or not it has become obsolete to be an 
architect nowadays is asked more and more frequently in academia and in 
professional circles (Awan, Schneider and Till, 2011).   
To confront this crisis, art and architecture turned to the social practices in search 
for a place where they could be functional again. Art and architecture needed a new 
field to reconstitute their legitimacy as constitutive functional and vital parts of 
contemporary society. The creation of new meanings for art and architecture’s 
practices represented a new place where to reinvent art and architecture’s social 
function. 
The political theorist Chantal Mouffe (2007) asked whether artistic practices can still 
play a critical role in society. The Chilean architect Alejandro Aravena questioned 
the role of architecture in 2016: “One of the biggest mistakes that architects make is 
that they tend to deal with problems that only interest other architects.” He added, 
“The biggest challenge is to engage with the important non-architectural issues – 
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poverty, pollution, congestion, segregation – and apply our specific knowledge. It’s 
not enough to raise awareness. I want people to leave with more tools. We must 
share the challenges so we are aware of the coming battles” (Aravena, 2016). In this 
conciliatory statement, Aravena unknowingly presents the cognitive gaps of 
instrumentalist thinking, as he frames architecture’s epistemic authority as a tool for 
social change. He may include art, together with architecture as its acolyte à la 
Barbara Kruger24. 
Art and architecture are rendered as legitimate practices, because both have been 
academized and instrumentalized as disciplines of Western true knowledge. As 
such they are “themselves effects of historical concrete, dynamic relations of 
power” (Grosz, 1993). Elizabeth Grosz argues that this is what Foucault, in The 
Discourse on Language, meant when he spoke of the division of knowledge into 
disciplines as the means for regulating and supervising knowledge. This is what 
power exerts over discourse. Hence, the use of the word discipline to describe and 
frame a practice. The action of legitimate authority is to discipline, and by this 
action, to safeguard the accepted epistemic framework of the hegemonic structure 
of power. These parameters are not static; these are constantly and dynamically 
repositioning themselves to the ever-mutating conditions of the present hegemonic 
discourse. The American historian Hayden White, paraphrasing Nietzsche, said that 
“every discipline is constituted by what it forbids its practitioners to do” (Jenkins, 
1991).  
                                                
24 Barbara Kruger’s humour see p. 92. 
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The art critic Hal Foster described contemporary art’s condition in 2010 as 
paradoxical. In his critique of contemporary art, he argued that “what is new is the 
sense that, in its very heterogeneity, much present practice seems to float free of 
historical determination, conceptual definition, and critical judgement” (Foster, 2010, 
p. 1). This contrasts the cliché of “spirit of artistic freedom” that is continuously 
commodified as the social character of art.  
The social function and the social image of the architect are very often conflated 
into one. On the other hand, the social function and the social image of the artist are 
very often paradoxical and antithetical. Both practices are not necessarily presented 
as conterminous. Art is seen as bohemian, visceral, free and unruly. Architecture is 
understood as formal, calculated, true and dependable. Civilizations around the 
earth have depended on architecture to legitimize their power by the construction of 
hard symbols of power to themselves, from pyramids, to temples, to churches and 
to parliaments, and corporate skyscrapers. Architecture has erected the 
monuments to last, and to reify the history of the victorious on stone, heat 
strengthened tempered glass and high tensile steel. 
The marketable image of the artist has resided within the theology of originality and 
the myth of the autonomy of art. Originality was an index of integrity in the arts 
(Kaprow, 1993).  “Traditionally, the artist-genius, creator of the masterpiece, was the 
analogue of God the father, creator of life. One artist, one original; one God, one 
existence. But today there are countless artists and reproductions, countless gods 
and cosmologies. When ‘the one’ is replaced by ‘the many’, reality may be 
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perceived as a menu of illusions, transformable and replenish able according to 
need” (Kaprow, 1993, p. 145). 
Once, it was thought that this dogma could be taken away by mass reproduction 
(Benjamin, 1968). What is left is probably that art remains there to give a kind of 
social panache to the rituals of high culture. As Barbara Kruger once said: 
“If architecture is a slab of meat, then so-called public art is a piece of garnish 
lying next to it” (Mitchell, 1991).  
The artist Allan Kaprow in his essay ‘The Education of the Un-Artist’ (1974) argued 
that the art world had lost its audience: “Its sole audience is a roster of the creative 
and performing professions, watching itself, as if in a mirror…” The art world has 
lost its audience to what Martha Rosler refers to as “the far more interesting 
perceptual effects of everyday life” (Rosler, 1987, p. 9). Thus, everyday life “ties to 
the ‘real’ world, rather than the art world” (Kaprow, 1993, p. 131); and, as Kaprow 
concludes, “non-art is more than art-art” (Rosler, 1987, p. 10). 
Kaprow was reflecting the ethos of the 1970s in the culture society in the United 
States, a reality for only a small section of the population that belonged to the elite 
group of academically educated white middle and upper class. Nevertheless, the 
attitude of the epoch was that art and architecture had lost its legitimacy and 
should regain it only by working collectively and on the social field, moving away 
from the elitist individualistic models of the artist-genius-creator. The call was for art 
and architecture to engage with the ‘real’ common people and be an instrument of 
social change away from what was already the coming of the globalized consumer 
capitalism’s structural transformation of society. 
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This was the anti-institutional ethos expressed in the 70s art world, even if only by a 
small vanguardist section of the fine arts and architecture. This mode of thought 
was not restricted to Anglo-European sphere of art; it was actually more politicized 
in the conceptualist avant-garde of the Latin American art scene in South America 
(Camnitzer, 2007).  
The German conceptual artist Joseph Beuys had already, paradoxically, ruined the 
exclusiveness of the modernist artist aura of originality, by claiming in 1973 that 
‘Every man is an artist’. In exemplary white heteronormative patriarchal privilege, 
Beuys did not even hint at what he meant by “man”; for him, the assumption of 
whose body should exemplify the universal somatic norm of the artist was clear.  
Beuys explained what this meant: “Only art is capable of dismantling the repressive 
effects of a senile social system that continues to totter along the deathline: to 
dismantle in order to build A SOCIAL ORGANISM AS A WORK OF ART. This most 
modern art discipline – Social Sculpture/Social Architecture – will only reach fruition 
when every living person becomes a creator, a sculptor, or architect of the social 
organism.” (Gallery label, November 2015, TATE Modern. UK.) 
Paradoxically, even as he was stating the crumbling of the institution of the original 
artist-genius-creator, simultaneously he was reifying himself as such. He was 
claiming the bestowal of the crown by negating it. Whilst he appeared to be the 
great emancipator between the elitism of the art and the popular masses of the 
common “man”, Beuys was crowning himself to be the heir apparent of the new art 
form. He created a whole new reconstruction around himself shrouded on an 
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eclectic mysticism of cultural appropriations, where he presented himself as a kind 
of teacher, oracle, hero and messiah. 
This is what Harold Rosenberg foretold in 1964, when he referred to an inherit 
narcissism of the artist as creator in his book The Anxious Object: Art Today and its 
Audience. Rosenberg presented that there is a shift in the art world away from the 
created art object to the artist as creation. 
Beuys’s actions were well received by the art world. The institutions of art needed a 
new product to reproduce their social capital; hence the new practices of politically 
conscious discourse and socially engaged arts were to be commodified as the new 
product of art. Art as well as architecture had been accused of elitism and being 
reflexive practices, “ in the safety-blanket of self-reflexive language that architecture 
wrapped itself in since the Renaissance” (Awan, Schneider and Till, 2011), its 
accessibility open only to a cultured audience – the only audience that could 
possibly understand the intertextualities of these practices. These new 
developments opened a new franchise of arts populisms for the institutions of art. 
There is nothing surprising in this, since art and architecture, in their modernist 
permutation as social practices, had been entrusted with the roles of propaganda, 




   
 141 
4.0.3. Art and architecture’s “service” and “accessibility”. 
The question of the function of art and architecture has been at times been framed 
as a question of “service” and “accessibility”. The emancipatory image of an 
inclusive society is one where all people can have “access” to good art, design and 
architecture. These have come to be publicized by the state as inherited social 
goods in which everyone in capitalist society should have “participation”. Art and 
architecture are portrayed in this social economy as service practices to this 
“participatory” ethos of the democratization of everything. 
Hal Foster mentions that the sociologist Ulrich Beck “has argued that modernity has 
become reflexive, concerned to retool its own infrastructure” (Foster, 2011, p. ix). 
The infrastructure of meanings and values is where art and architecture’s functions 
are being “retooled”. 
Within this modern construction of consumer capitalism, art and architecture remain 
structurally placed as only accessible to the few bourgeois classes. Hal Foster 
argued that “the pretense that the cultural is separated from the economic is 
finished” (Foster, 2011, p. ix). Nevertheless, the democratization of access is only 
apparent. 
The Dutch architect Aldo van Eyck was quoted in the mid-l960s as stating the 
following: "we know nothing of vast multiplicity-we cannot come to grips with it-not 
as architects, planners or anybody else. . .  [But] if society has no form – how can 
architects build it counter form?" (Frampton, 1980, pp. 276–77). His preoccupation 
came as a result of the social function that governments had bestowed upon 
architecture during the past century, when modernist doctrine assumed the 
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solutions of the modern crisis of industrial capitalism could be solved by the 
advance of urban planning and architecture as the solutions to urban decay. Van 
Eyck affirmed his disbelief that "society has no form”, and he argued that 
architecture remained a significant endeavor in the reinvention of society. James 
Holston agreed that architecture deserves such function: “I want to argue that one 
of the most urgent problems in planning and architectural theory today is the need 
to develop a different social imagination – one that is not modernist but that 
nevertheless reinvents modernism's activist commitments to the invention of society 
and to the construction of the state” (Holston, 1998). 
Holston brought into the discussions on the social function of architecture a 
paradigm of reinvention in theory and practice. He called these new forms of 
reinvention the spaces of insurgent citizenship or insurgent spaces of citizenship 
(Holston, 1998 p. 157). Holston’s reference of insurgent meant the relationship of 
opposition that he observed inscribed into the spaces of citizenship (agency) 
countering the modernist spaces that physically dominate the cities of today. By 
this Holston proposed a new source of legitimization, away from the institutionalized 
constructions of the state. These notions of the concept of spaces of insurgent 
citizenship that Holsten theorized in the mid-90s can be seen in practice as 
reformulations of agency and land appropriation in the tactics of self-management 
in community movements at work in many marginalized communities in Latin 
America. 
Holston also presented in his theorizations on spaces of insurgent citizenship an 
interesting observation in how he saw the situational awareness of the site, as one 
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of “to hunt for situations that engage, in practice, the problematic nature of 
belonging to society and that embody such problems as narratives about the city” 
(Holston, 1998, p. 173). His perception of “to hunt for” has been appropriated by art 
and architecture social practices as a De Certeau-esque “to poach for” (De Certeau, 
1984, p. 174). That is, the opportunistic habit of artists and architects finding sites 




4.0.4. Meaning and purpose. 
Art and architecture have been going through a crisis of meaning and purpose for 
the past few decades. As a result of this crisis the art-architecture connection 
appears today as relevant only “to attract business and to brand cities” (Foster, 
2011).  The banality implied in such association draws the pessimistic question: 
what remains as the instrumental place of art and architecture in contemporary 
society today? Or, has art and architecture had just become the proverbial 
“decorated duck”25 (Foster, 2011). 
Architecture’s practice is circumscribed by much more instrumental demands than 
art’s practice is. Architecture as a practice is determined and bounded by the 
                                                
25 The decorated duck: Hal Foster. The Art and Architecture Complex. This is a funny take 
on Venturi, Brown and Izenour’s formal duck and decorated shed critique from Learning 
from Las Vegas (1972).  Hal constructs a composite of both concepts to: “combine the 
wilful monumentality of modern architecture with the faux-populistic iconicity of 
postmodern design” (Foster, 2011, p. 15). 
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shortcomings of the short-term priorities of clients and the market (Awan, Schneider 
and Till, 2011). Art, on the other hand, appears to be free from the social and market 
responsibilities that are socially coerced and politically imposed upon architecture. 
Architecture lost its social primacy with the end of the modernist doctrine. 
Modernism’s master plans signalled architecture and urban planning as the 
instruments for social change and design source for the solutions to the urban 
questions and the social problems caused by an advancing industrial capitalism 
(Holston, 1998).  
Art lost its place at the vanguard of aesthetic revolution to publicity; and its idealist 
independence of the creative self to the homogenizing practices of fashion and to 
the commodification of the art object. Have both practices become only legitimizing 
vehicles for the new practices of globalized consumer capitalism and the ideologies 
of neoliberalism? 
Throughout the processes of transition from an industrialized capitalism to a 
globalized electronic capitalism (Spivak, 2012), consumer capitalism continues to 
be defined by its extractivist practices and consumption before production (Gago, 
2017). The rise of globalized consumer capitalism driven and disseminated by the 
time-space compression of globalizing media of Information Technology and 
Communication (ITC) (Castell, 2005; Sassen, 2006) has appropriated art’s aesthetic 
vanguard and autonomy as commodities. It has appropriated them as instruments 
of production for the objects and experiences for an aesthetic of mass 
consumption. From the invention of marketable items of social recognition and 
desire, to the validation of taste and class that belong to the global homogenizing 
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menu of choice of identity branding and the artialization (Roger, 1997) of the natural 
landscape as a consumable product of our everyday experience, art has remained a 
good site of extraction for capitalism’s interests. 
Art and architecture as disciplines encountered a crisis of social meaning and 
purpose. But it was clear that the crisis included a more profoundly dialectical crisis 
between the commodity value and social value of both disciplines. A crisis of 
meaning and purpose became quite quickly a crisis for legitimacy.  As the 
commodity value of the experience of art and architecture became trivialized and 
packaged for consumption as cultural tourism, political branding, social 
pacification, art-washing, and urban renewal, thus they became at the service of 
and agent to the politics of urban renaissance, gentrification and expulsion 
(Deutsche and Gentel, 1984).  
Ironically, in the experience economy (Pine II and Gilmore, 1998) of globalized 
consumer capitalism, where object-hood, desire and experience have been 
designed to be marketable subjects with a very short shelf life, art and architecture 
have become the most excellent social containers and brand value. 
Both disciplines have always cultivated and exuded the mythology of the author, as 
a consequence of originality of the artist martyr and the architect genius. Both 
practices share a kind of the elitist facade as exercises in bourgeois privilege and 
good taste. The social critique of art and architecture very often arises from such 
distinctions of both disciplines being accused of being conceptually detached from 
the “real” life and contextually as being disassociated from the everyday life 
experience of the common people. Art and architecture as reflexive practices 
   
 146 
necessitate an intertextual aesthetic in order to properly understand their discourses 
and forms, hence the elitist nature of the disciplines. 
Art and architecture as reflexive practices legitimized themselves by the fabrication 
of their own narratives, histories and myths. Both require – and have an ontological 
need to design and construct – the hard signs of their own legitimizing narratives in 
the forms of museums, galleries, churches and skyscrapers. These are the hard 
signs of the architecture of power that unequivocally legitimate their narratives into 
history. 
*** 
4.0.5. Practising ‘otherwise’, critical feminist architectures. 
 
 
Dolores Hayden (1980) started her article, What Would a Non-Sexist City Be Like? 
Quoting the chauvinist dogma "a woman's place is in the home" (Hayden, 1908, p. 
170). Hayden argued the patriarchal shortsighted attitude has been ingrained in the 
core principles of architectural design and urban planning in the United States. 
(Hayden, 1980). The chauvinist frame of mind embodies an epistemology of 
oppression and silence against women and other peoples of color. This frame of 
mind signals the locus of the problem this thesis argues as the foundation of a crisis 
in art and architecture’s practice and pedagogy. The thesis also posits an ongoing 
crisis of the traditional social legitimacy and positioning of architecture in western 
societies.  
Architecture has been portrayed as a conservative discipline and practice (Ghirardo, 
1984; Frichot, 2018). This position has not been necessarily a negative one for 
architecture. For a long time, conservatism in architecture was a relevant issue 
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securing tradition, culture and the instrumentalism of civilized societies over 
assumed lesser cultures and peoples. Architecture’s conservatism reified the built 
environment to the image of white-man’s epistemic hegemony. 
  
The American historian Hayden White argued, “Every discipline is constituted by 
what it forbids its practitioners to do.” (White, 1984, p. 220). What this argument 
means to architecture and art is that it places its practitioners within a paradoxical 
milieu between agency as expert professional oppositional to the role of socio-
spatial agent. This would be a kind of Tafurian paradox, between accepting being 
part of a conservative discipline, instrumentalized epistemology and professionalism 
“form without utopia” while simultaneously claiming a kind of insurgent attitude as a 
socio-spatial agent “sublime uselessness” (Tafuri, 1976; ix). Elizabeth Grosz (1992) 
had argued “the body to be regarded as the locus and site of inscription for specific 
modes of subjectivity.” (Grosz,1992, p. 241). Whereby the body of the architect 
remains inscribed within the discipline of architecture while an array of subjectivities 
remains in construction in architectural practice. Léopold Lambert described 
architecture as “the discipline that organizes bodies in space.” (Lambert, 2019, p. 
14). Whose bodies was Lambert referring to? The gendered body or the universal 
epistemological body of the architect –white’s man body? 
Diane Ghirardo (1984) argued architecture has retreated from social engagement 
and sought refuge in formalism. Ghirardo questions why architecture tries to remain 
“pure”, instead of responding to what Friedrich Engels in his essay The Condition of 
the Working Class in England in 1844 (Engels, 1973) had asserted as the conditions 
and effects of capitalism on society and the built environment; “the relationships 
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between political intentions, social realities and building.” (Ghirardo, 1984; 387). 
This condition Ghirardo calls architecture’s abdication of responsibility. Ghirardo 
posits architecture is presented as service practice and as a consumer commodity, 
economically dependent to the client and thus conservative in inclination. 
Ghirardo asks, “Can one build while critical of the power structures that support 
building activity?” (Nesbitt, 1996;385). 
Ghirardo’s question remains circumvented while architecture’s practice and 
pedagogy continues epistemological silencing of other voices coming from women 
and people of color. Architecture’s silencing, colonialist and extractivist attitudes 
regarding the site and its populations has become symptomatic of an architectural 
exhaustion and thus in need of an urgent reorientation (Frichot, 2019).  
Alberto Altés Arlandis (2018) argues that architecture has lost its social relevance. 
He adds, if architecture is to “become socially relevant again” (Altés Arlandis, 2018, 
p. 275) then, there is a dire need to create new forms of “responsible practices” 
(Medina, 2013; Altés Arlandis, 2018). How then it is for this project to deconstruct 
an exhausted discipline? The architect Meike Schalk (2007) argues that a start 
should be deconstructing “the myth of the artist-architect whose authority is based 
on professional judgment and authorship” (Schalk, 2007, p. 165). To this Ghirardo 
(1984) had argued, when standards of judgment are reduced to mere categories of 
“formal resolution”, “integration”, and “authenticity”, architecture’s disciplinary 
structure is reduced to judgment based purely as “matter of taste” (Ghirardo, 1984).  
Taste is camouflaged as objective professionalism. Objectivism has been 
instrumentalized by the patriarchal epistemic hegemony to separate reason and 
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pure knowledge away from women and people of color, thus silencing their voices 
and impeding their contributions to knowledge (Schott, 1988). 
Objectivism from Socrates, to Plato and Aristotle up to Kant and continental 
philosophy has been instrumentalized as the tool of preference to claim ontological 
purity of thought, rational control and true knowledge. Thereby claiming white men 
as the locus of pure rational thought absent from the impurities of the flesh, 
sensuality and emotion, which cloud rationality from women and people of color. 
This epistemological canonization has relegated women and people of color to 
subaltern categories of hysterics, sexuality and unabridged emotions, which 
contaminate their capacity for rational thought (Schott, 1988; Shiva, 1993; Puwar, 
2004). 
Continental philosophy fetishism of true objectivity coming from the unmark 
category of white men (Haraway, 1988) has been the locus of epistemic hegemony. 
Kantian objectivity have been assimilated in Euro-American culture beyond a theory 
of knowledge, instead it has been absorbed into a foundational pillar of social 
practice (Schott, 1988). 
Thus, to dare question the politics of knowledge and go beyond the trivial issues of 
fashion, taste, building laws, and the myth of the artist-architect only then Diane 
Ghirardo (1984) argued, can we approach the possibility of what she calls an 
architecture of substance. 
Elizabeth Grosz in her book Architecture from the Outside posits the question; Can 
architecture construct a better future? (Grosz, 2001, p. 137). As long as architecture 
remains grounded in the spatial alone, the possibilities of finding a relevant place in 
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the social, beyond the meaningless consumable artifact of capitalist logic are very 
much diminished.  
Architect Meike Schalk argues, architecture has been dependent and subjugated to 
the changing conditions of the market. This dependency has molded the practice of 
architecture and the architect’s agency. (Schalk, 2018). Schalk believes that 
architects still have a role to play in society beyond the technological functionalisms 
and its fashionable aesthetisms. Schalk claims that architects can in “their critical 
and creative capacity to envision projections of alternative futures.” (Schalk, 2018; 
213). Nevertheless, the architect’s agency would always remain a limiting factor in 
imagining alternative futures.  
The sociologist Sharon Hays (1994) argued against the simplistic idea of agency, as 
a form of freedom. Hays presented agency as being always constrained, and 
shaped to the structure of society. Whereby, the choices any agent makes are 
always dependent and confined within “the realm of the structurally provided 
possibilities” of society, culture and traditions (Hays, 1994, p. 64). 
The social structure is what constitutes the disciplinary limits and the field of 
practice. To move beyond its own agency the architect require a re-politicization 
(Ghirardo, 1984) towards becoming a social critically engaged individual (Raunig, 
2009) who could then become an agent of social change. Ghirardo calls this 
individual “the insurgent architect” (Ghirardo, 1994, p. 64). 
The idea of insurgency in architecture has been defined as a way for the 
architect/spatial practitioner to delink from the formalism of architectural dogma 
and to create counter hegemonic spatial practices. It requires of the spatial 
practitioner to reengage with the socio-political realities of the site and its 
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population. Thereby the insurgent spatial practitioner creates new ways of exploring 
existing urban practices, constructs new ways of encounter and engagement, and 
argues for alternative forms of critical and insurgent forms of citizenship (Holston, 
1998), towards constructing innovative architectural and spatial practices for life in 
common. Insurgency in architecture defines a position where the political remerges 
as an immanent practice within the production of urban space (Harvey, 2000; 
Miraftab, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2016; Schalk, 2018). 
 
Alternatives to the crisis of architecture come from among an engaged group of 
feminist architects, practitioners and theorists. These new actors bring different 
kinds of insurgent practices challenging the disciplinary shortsighted traditional 
patriarchal ideals and pedagogies that have limited architecture. Architecture has 
remained within a paradoxical relationship between “the artistic character of 
architecture in one hand and its obligations to produce technically sound and 
socially functional environments on the other” (Swyngedouw, 2016, p. 54). Feminist 
architects and theorists reconcile these paradoxical positions in architecture 
between art, dwelling and the social with transgressive critical thinking and 
practices since the early 80s.  
The philosopher and feminist theorist Elizabeth Grosz theorizations on “situated 
knowledges” (1988), and “Knowing and doing otherwise” (1999). Doina Petrescu’s 
ideas on “practising ‘otherwise’,” (2007), and the imagining of “other worlds” 
(Lugones,1987; Petrescu, 2007; Mouffe, 2013) have been the initiators of some of 
the key ideas this thesis had followed. 
*** 
   
 152 
 
The following feminist architects, theorists and practitioners have had the primary 
influence of opening worlds, ways to think about, dynamically, differently and 
“becoming different, about change” (Petrescu, 2007) not only about architecture 
rather expanded towards challenging issues of power, agency, identity politics and 
the politics of location. (Braidotti, 1994). 
*** 
Matrix Feminist Design Co-operative. 1980-94 London, UK. 
One of the influential practices developed by Matrix was the architect as ‘spatial 
agent’. In this role, the architect stood down from its role as expert professional and 
embodied social roles as activist, professional adviser and collaborator (Dwyers & 
Thorne, 2007). In such a role, the architect using her professional agency 
empowered women's groups and individual women with professional advice 
together with communal organizing skills that allowed them to take control of their 
own environment (Matrix, 1984). This kind of social empowerment practice of the 
‘spatial agent’ inspired this thesis to use the name socio-spatial agent to specify the 
role of artists and architects who chose to work with marginalized and disfranchised 
communities. 
Matrix’s work was centered on challenging the socio-political context where women 
are restricted within the built environment and excluded from designing the built 
environment. Other ideas Matrix developed that have been important issues for the 
thesis were the position of marginality allocated to women in the creation of the 
built environment. Matrix argued, the built environment is bias towards the white 
male section of society as it is designed following a patriarchal set of sedimented 
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ideas which promote power asymmetries between, who has agency and who has 
not (Matrix,1984). Another fundamental guiding principle in Matrix’s work has been 
the context of “situated knowledges” (Grosz, 1988) regarding women distinct 
experience and knowledge of the built environment usually ignored by the male-led 
profession of architecture and urban planning. Matrix argued this case bringing 
forth the idea that “because women are brought up differently in our society, we 
have different experiences and needs in relation to the built environment” (Dwyer & 
Thorne, 2007, p. 45). Whereby Matrix sought to develop participatory design 
methods more accessible to the everyday layperson not only to the traditional 
client-based audience of architecture. Matrix’s overall contribution was to teach us 
to look critically at how the built environment is thought, designed and the socio-
political implications spatial practices have on maintaining women and people of 





Architect Doina Petrescu brought forward influential concepts challenging 
preconceived ideas on agency and practice in architecture. The concept of “altering 
practices” (2007), Petrescu argued could mean “undermining”, “subverting” the 
whole gamut of what she posits as “received identities, rules, norms and tools” 
(Petrescu, 2007, p. 3) derived and conditional to patriarchal hegemonic epistemic 
positions. Petrescu presents altering practices as an “affirmation of difference” a 
dynamic method to work around and against preconditioned meanings and 
practices in everyday life. Altering is a reflexive and situated approach to practice, a 
   
 154 
process of “making different, about change” and subverting and reframing identity 
constructions (Butler, 1990). 
 
Petrescu (2005) presented a critique on participatory practices in architecture 
centered on the argument, “process is more important than the result.” (Petrescu, 
2005, p. 46). Whereby “the architect should accept losing control. Rather than being 
a master, the architect should understand himself/herself as one of the 
participants.” (Petrescu, 2005, p. 58). This implies a very different positioning away 
from the usual “designer-hubris problem” (Willis, 2015, p. 6) promoted by traditional 
patriarchal design pedagogy. This critique presents a way for the architect and 
spatial agents and practitioners for delinking from the traditional professionalization 
of practice towards an open practice with “the agency of letting go”, (Kossak, F; et 
al, 2009, p. 11). Thereby following this process of ‘alterity’ the architect and spatial 
agents can openly confront a self-reflexive evaluation of their epistemic 
assumptions and prejudices about our social environment, our relations and our 
everyday encounters in the world (Kossak, F; et al, 2009). 
The potential of altering practices presents the architect and spatial agents with a 
liberating agency from egotistical traditional professional practice, opening the 
possibility of an “architecture on behalf of others and with others” (Kossak, et al, 
2009, p. 17). Thus, the architect and spatial agents are free to explore the 
multiplicity of voices, spaces of social encounter and economic exchange, that are 
part of the local communities where they intent to intervene.  
Petrescu (2009) argued, to intervene also always means interposing, intercepting 
and often interfering. (Kossak, F; et al, 2009, p. 6). Nevertheless, the architect and 
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spatial agent’s responsibility is to contextualized their agency within the local 
political and ethical meaning, remaining aware of their influence and how their 
intervention will affect the course of the everyday lives of the people where they 
have chosen to ‘step in’. 
Another important concept Doina Petrescu (2007) develops is “the logic of 
becoming”. Petrescu posits ‘becoming’ as the potential for a dynamic practice in 
“perpetual change”. A practice which remains open to change and new positions. 
This logic of becoming presents the alternative for a practice that adapts to, and 
reclaims sustainable futures with long-term perspectives. (Petrescu, 2007). 
Petrescu presents us with a preoccupation on architecture’s “uncertain future” 
(Kossak, F; et al, 2009, p. 10). She posits that architecture needs to transform and 
re-evaluate its social function, what she calls architecture’s commitment to society. 
Petrescu argues the discipline of architecture have been “crowed out” by the 
changes in global market economy and the market crash of 2006. She argues that 
architecture needs to change in order not only to survive as an economically viable 
profession, but even more importantly on how architecture will be able to respond 




The architectural theorist and philosopher Hélène Frichot argues, “Because 
architecture is a conservative discipline…” (2018, p. 275), architecture is confronted 
with a series of obsolescence in its practice and design thinking. Frichot posits that 
architecture as a masculinist discipline is therefore constrained by and limited to 
   
 156 
conservative biases, which keep the practice in “the suspicion that all we are left 
with is more of the same, practiced perpetually through serial permutations.” 
(Frichot, 2018, p. 268). Starting with but not limited to “the obsolescence of man-
form” (Frichot, 2018, p. 269), a pillar of practice is more preoccupied with 
perpetuating the status quo rather than representing and evolving with the changes 
in society. 
Hélène Frichot and Stephen Loo (2013) had alluded to architecture’s exhaustion 
when they posed the question; has architectural thinking exhausted Deleuzian 
philosophy? Nevertheless, the large question remains if the whole of the practice 
and its pedagogy are in fact exhausted beyond any particular philosophy. 
Exhausted means that architecture as a discipline is unable to offer solutions to the 
large problems of society beyond the status quo of design, habitation and the 
politics of planning and urbanization. (Frichot & Loo, 2013). 
Nevertheless, Hélène Frichot positively argues that architecture has a renewed 
interest and investments in the social and the politics of space, which in this case 
feels more as an obligated and desperate survival strategy of the discipline, rather 
than an actual change in the epistemological legitimation of architecture. Frichot 
frames architecture’s exhaustion on the patriarchal impossibility to innovate with 
dynamic solutions for a worldwide-connected society, which continually transforms 
faster that the discipline of architecture can. Nevertheless, Frichot posits that 
architecture is confronting it obsolescence in the face of an increasing critique of 
the patriarchal hegemony and with new understandings of obsolescence of the 
man-form to bring creative solutions to an increasingly fragile world system (Frichot, 
2018). Moreover, Frichot presents the concept of a woman-form, which entails “a 
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promise to future work” (Frichot, 2013, p. 88). Following Isabelle Stengers (2005) 
intriguing questioning of what is a practice to be, Stengers argues “we do not know 
what a practice is able to become; what we know instead is that the very way we 
define, or address, a practice is part of the surroundings which produces its ethos.” 
(Stengers, 2005, p. 195). 
Frichot sees an opportunity in novel feminist practices to renew architecture’s future 
(Frichot, 2018). Frichot presents a series of transformative ideas within the context 
of what she calls, feminist architectural creative ecologies of practice (2019). 
Following some of the ideas presented in Bateson’s ecology of mind (2000), Frichot 
brings the idea of an ethics of encounter (2019) as related to her concept of 
ecologies of creative practices as an alternative to counterbalance the masculine 
ethos in architecture. Ethics of encounter (Frichot, 2019a, p. 10) represents an 
approach to site and practice with an ethic-aesthetic ‘test-sites’ approach (Brünner, 
2015), where the practitioner understands that we learn through the generosity of 
exchanging and sharing “concept-tools” and encounters with others (Frichot, 
2019a, p.165). This concept is related to Altés Arlantis (2018) proposition for 
‘aesthetics of encounter’. Where Altés argues that our learning processes “require 
each other in unexpected collaborations and combinations.” (Altés Arlantis, 2018, p. 
275). Both propositions follow Donna Haraway’s (2016) situated knowledges ideas 
where “we become-with each other or not at all.” (Haraway, 2016, p.4). 
Frichot argues architecture needs to dispose of the hero/genius figures that 
dominate architecture’s mythology. Also, it needs to deconstruct what Meike 
Schalk (2007) argues is the myth of the artist-architect as the figure of hegemonic 
epistemic agency. Otherwise, architecture remains unable to reinvent itself beyond 
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its deeply conservative biases, masculinist ego and conformity to a decrepit status 
quo. (Frichot, 2018; 268). 
 
Frichot frames her strategies to deconstruct architecture’s masculinist lethargy 
utilizing Guilles Deleuze’s statement, “there is no need to fear or hope, but only to 
look for new weapons.” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 178). Frichot finds “new weapons” to 
deconstruct the discipline of architecture in an interesting insurgent concept of an 
indiscipline approach26 (Frichot, 2018). Indiscipline is framed as a “transgressive 
challenge” to architecture “that unsettles its conservative inclinations” (Frichot, 
2018, p. 277). The cognitive challenge to architectural epistemology Frichot 
presents is Dirty Theory (2019b). The argument Frichot posits is one of the most 
interesting and far-reaching concepts to counteract the idiocy of Kantian 
objectivism as a fundamental pillar of western academic thought. Kantian 
objectivism represents the a priori epistemic canon that dominates the discourses 
of continental philosophy. Kantian objectivism follows Anglo-Saxon epistemology 
based on purity of reason embodied only in the white male (Schott, 1988). Against 
this dogma of purity and reason, the fear of the emotional, the sensual and the 
sexual27 which has dominated the epistemology of aesthetics situating women to 
subservient positions of epistemic dependency. Frichot answers, “Pure reason must 
be muddied.” (Frichot, 2019b; 8). Dirty theory could be a decolonizing tool for a 
practice too much preoccupied with its own legitimacy that it fails to avert its own 
                                                
26 Frichot quotes indiscipline as a concept being explored in the works of Jasmin Dücker. 
(2016). 
27 See Kant’s biographical account referring to his sexual abstinence and emotional contempt. 
(Schott, 1988).  
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obsolescence. Meanwhile, architecture is dismissing new creative possibilities 
beyond the mere aesthetic play between ‘ducks’ and ‘decorated sheds.’ (Venturi, et 
al,1972). 
Frichot posits, “The mythical island of reason has disappeared into the mist.” Thus, 
indiscipline remains as a counter method for a practice of architecture in need to 
reinvent its social function towards a practice where care, repair and maintenance 







The architect and urban theorist Meike Schalk has contributed to the field of 
architecture with interesting and challenging concepts on critical participation, 
insurgency and urban curating. These are strategies and at times responsive tactics 
to transform and open up the discipline of architecture to innovative forms of 
practice that challenge architecture’s the status quo of masculinist epistemology 
and practices. Schalk’s research explores gender, diversity and inclusion in 
architecture’s design practice and pedagogy. Schalk follows a critical inquiry 
approach engaging with discourses of democracy, participation and sustainability 
as key objectives for developing a socially engaged practices in architecture. 
Schalk (2017) posits throughout her work the idea of “making visible” as a feminist 
tactic to reclaim women’s positions “rendered invisible” by a patriarchal society. 
The lack of representation of women’s work and experiences as genuine 
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contributions to knowledge is presented as the critical site of contestation in 
architectural practic. (Reisinger & Schalk, 2017). Invisibility and lack of 
representation are part of the epistemic injustices of silencing and prejudice 
(Fricker, 2007; Medida, 2013) this thesis argues are the locus of marginalization and 
disfranchisement in poor and migrant populations in informal settlements. 
(Bennholdt-Thomsen & Mies, 1999; Gago, 2017). Schalk, Kristiansson and Mazé 
(2017) posit, “becoming” as a viable “new positions from which to reclaim 
sustainable futures with long-term perspectives. (Reisinger & Schalk, 2017, p. 2). 
Thereby, “becoming” could be used as a tactic of appropriation of space in informal 
settlements, thus transforming what the state, private owners and land speculators 
deem ‘illegal land invasions’ into sustainable places for community growth. 
 
Another area of architectural and planning practice Meike Schalk confronts with a 
smart keen critique is the ubiquitous moniker included in most planning and 
architectural proposals, participation. Schalk presents participation in the traditional 
context of the institutionally governed planning process as prescribed tokenism 
(Schalk, et al, 2018). On the other hand, Schalk proposes a “critical participation” to 
challenge the scripted planning process using an array of tactics from social media, 
interventionist practices and performative methods (Schalk, et al, 2018, p. 299). 
The proposed alternatives to traditional scripted models of participation in planning 
and architecture are to “broadening the circle”. The circle is the hierarchy of usual 
experts and professionals’ agents representing the institution vis-a-vis the state and 
private corporative interest. Critical participation calls for the inclusion of “engaged 
citizens” with the hope of “repoliticizing the discourse on possible urban futures.” 
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(Schalk, et al, 2018, p. 299).  This type of participation is often uninvited and 
requires the desire to participate. Also, critical participation aims to produces social 
relations between the institutions and the “insurgent architects” (Schalk, et al, 
2018). Schalk relates this concept to Chantal Mouffe’s critical artistic practices 
(Mouffe, 2007) and frames critical participation as an instituent practice (Raunig, 
2009). Schalk utilizes Gerald Raunig’s concept of instituent practice as a strategy 
towards promoting a criticism of the institution without leaving the institution. 
Raunig (2009) explains it as an “exodus from institutionalism without escape; that is, 
neither rejecting institutions nor serving them but challenging and transforming 
them.” (Schalk, et al, 2018, p. 302). 
Insurgency is a concept Meike Schalk utilizes to define transgressive, counter 
hegemonic practices that counteracts the legitimacy of the status quo. The 
insurgent architect embodies and instrumentalizes this concept into an ethos. 
Schalk summarizes the American sociologist David Harvey’s (2000) definition of the 
insurgent architect as a “metaphor that portray an individual with the desire for 
transformative action who thinks strategically and tactically about her tools and 
collaborations.” (Schalk, et al, 2018, p. 300). 
Insurgency has been used to define many concepts from insurgent citizenship 
(Holston, 1999), insurgent public space (Hou, 2010), insurgent planning (Miraftab, 
2009). In all of these cases insurgency refers to an attitude to subvert, transgress, 
resist and imagine a different way of doing and thinking in opposition to institutional 
legitimacy and status quo. In a way, insurgency as a practice shares a similar 
attitude with Jane Rendell’s concept of critical spatial practice (Rendell, 2003).  
Rendell explains critical spatial practices as everyday activities and creative 
   
 162 
practices that “resist the dominant social order of capitalism” (Rendell, 2011, p. 24). 
Being the capitalistic order the ‘necessary’ experiential frame of legitimacy and 
social life (Karatamy, 2005). 
 
Urban curating has been another field of interest for Meike Schalk. Raoul 
Bunschoten and artist Jeanne van Heeswijk (1993) initially used the term as part of 
their Chora research group methodology. Urban curating has come to mean an 
alternative disruption to the authoritative position of urban planning as de-facto 
legitimate timeless agency of the expert professional upon communities. Urban 
curating proposes an itinerant, impermanence process away from scripted “hit and 
run practices” of participatory planning design and strategies (Greed, 2000). 
Thereby dislodging urban planning from permanence and conventionality into 
flexible temporal frameworks of the exhibition as method and forum for an 
unconventional practice free of static design and planning rules (Schalk, 2007). The 
architect acting as ‘curator’ is liberated from the ‘myth’ of the artist-architect whose 
authority is based on professional judgment and authorship. In this new position as 
‘curator’, the architect redefines their professional positioning in the middle, in 
between institutions, clients, and users. Rather than a master director, the architect 










Curator Elke Krasny contributions to art and architectural practice has been 
centered in the theorizations and practice of urban curating. Her new incoming 
book titled Urban Curating: Care, Repair, Refuse, Resist (2022) further explores the 
concepts of Curatorial materialism, community building and restorative practices 
applied to the politics of urban transformation. 
Krasny (2016) argued the feminist concept of independent curating was very much 
responsible for catalyzing the transformation from modern art towards 
contemporary art. Feminist critique informed the necessity for the practice of 
independent curating, which became the foundations of curatorial materialism 
(Krasny, 2016).  Curatorial materialism is based on a feminist perspective on Marx’s 
materialism and how it has politically influenced the framework of independent and 
co-dependent practices of curating.  Curatorial materialism brings the complex 
relations between art, architecture and planning practices, theories and 
historiographies into a dialectical relation with the socio-political and economic 
struggles of society. 
Curatorial materialism follows Marxist materialist approach to history and class 
struggle towards a narrative, where political economy and material interactions are 
the inevitable protagonist in all political and socio- economic struggles of modern 
extractivist capitalism (Gago, 2017; Gómez-Barris, 2017; Valencia, 2018). 
Krasny suggests (2016) curatorial materialism as a methodology for critical 
investigation into the conditions and means of curatorial production. Krasny brings 
special attention to the asymmetrical power relations and hierarchies between the 
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complex networks of relations that feminist curatorial practices have transformed. 
Thereby, feminist curatorial practices have changed the way in which art relates to 
the world. (Krasny, 2016).   
Krasny presents this transformation as a practice of relatedness. Such practice is 
integral to the practice of curating as ‘relatedness’ transforms the power 
asymmetries and hierarchies between actors and agents. Krasny further argues the 
practice of relatedness as central to curatorial materialism and “relatedness to the 
world as a way of producing, including the production of new epistemologies and 
emergent histories.” (Krasny, 2016, p. 97).   
Recently, Elke Krasny (2019) has worked together with architect Meike Schalk on 
feminist practices in art and architecture researching practices of resistance and 
resiliency. Their work was centered on “ability to connect” and “building up 
networks” (Krasny & Schalk, 2019, p. 179). Their research looked up three specific 
events: Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (Buenos Aires, Argentina.1977-ongoing), 
Colectivo Precarias a la Deriva (Madrid, Spain. 2002-ongoing) and the art project by 
artist Suzanne Lacy, The International Dinner Party (1979). The research 
investigated the emergence of new subjectivities, the appropriation of public 
hegemonic spaces and resiliency through transgressive practices. 
*** 
The unifying nexus between these five authors, actors, theorist and practitioners 
has been transgression as the key performative epistemic action to create new 
transformative epistemologies, relationships and practices that promote 
sustainability, solidarity, connectedness and justice. Feminist practices reveal the 
urgent need for a different understanding, a way of “knowing and doing otherwise” 
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(Grosz, 1999), “practicing otherwise” (Petrescu, 2007) to make visible (Schalk, 2017) 
and to create new futures. Nevertheless, the postcolonial feminist theorist Chandra 
Talpade Mohandy (1984) warns us, grouping together on the basis of a shared 
oppression, assuming a universal patriarchal framework and a feminism that binds 
together because of the “sameness of their oppression.” (Mohandy, 1984, p. 337). 
Whereby we must be careful not to fall into Marx’s hermeneutical injustice, (Fricker, 
2007) if “they cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.” (Mohandy, 
1984, p. 354). 
*** 
4.1. On the commodification of art. 
“I am an artist. I am a woman. I am a wife. I am a mother. (Random order) 
I do a hell of a lot of washing, cleaning, cooking, renewing, supporting, 
preserving, etc. Also, (up to now separately) I ‘do’ art. Now I will simply do 
these everyday things, and flush them up to consciousness, exhibit them, as 
art [...] MY WORKING WILL BE THE WORK” (Laderman Ukeles, 1969).  
In the commodification art one thing must be made clear: art and the art object are 
two different merchandises. The former is the immaterial social capital that is 
produced by the social interactions in participating of the art market and the 
conspicuous prestige of taste and class relational to being close to the art world. 
The latter, the art object, is the traditional materiality and value of the object 
produced, given that it also embodies the immaterial value of the mythology of the 
artist. Nonetheless, the art object becomes a transitional object (Winnicott, 1951) 
between transactional desire of the art object as means to a goal, and the goal itself 
a dependency of consumption for social positioning. 
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What makes a thing into a commodity? The simplest explanation is: 
commodification is the process of transforming a good or service into an 
exchangeable merchandise for the purpose of profit. This means that the exchange 
value of a thing (product) prevails over its use value. 
On the other hand, the activity-labour that produces the "cultural content" of the 
commodity is regarded as immaterial labour. These involves a series of activities 
that are not normally recognized as "work" – in other words, the kinds of activities 
involved in defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, 
consumer norms, and, more strategically, public opinion (Lazzarato, 1996). Artists 
and art institutions; museums, art foundations and galleries have adopted the 
representation of cultural workers to define their field of action and to legitimize their 
social function. Artists have moved away from the concept of the revolutionary artist 
(Benjamin, 1968) and embraced the concept of radical cultural workers, whose task 
“is to reveal the constructed character of meaning” (Trend, 1995, p. 9). Artists and 
architects have exploited this image of themselves as radical cultural workers to 
accentuate the marketability of their immaterial labour. 
When art is treated as a commodity, rather than thinking of the commodity as a 
certain kind of “thing”, following Arjun Appadurai (1986), it would be more precise to 
think of it as a stage or period in the life of the artwork. When art is a cultural 
artefact, and an object of exchange, its value and identity as art are subject to the 
changing winds of taste and fashion. Art as commodity is subject to the whims and 
fluctuations of capital. As “Capital operates across places, territory, and scales, 
deploying a logic that is ultimately planetary but must continuously come to terms 
with resistances, frictions, and interruptions that crisscross the expansion of its 
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frontiers and geographies” (Medrazza and Neilson, 2019, p. 3). Thus, art also 
inherits the properties of its master: capital. 
Robert Layton and Gillian Wallace (2006) posited that “The market economy is itself 
a cultural phenomenon”.  Thus, art falls together with the idea that “all commodities 
(even raw materials) are cultural artefacts in the sense that demand for them is 




Jean Baudrillard tried to demystify the ideology of consumption as a utilitarian 
behaviour, where the subject is driven by pleasure and personal desire (Lipovetsky, 
1994). In Baudrillard’s theorizations on the consumption of things driven by the 
social goal to achieve a per-se social and political positioning, the art object as well 
as the architecture built to contain it – museums, luxury homes, and corporate 
headquarters – are incorporated into the same system of desire and consumption. 
Baudrillard’s position on consumption is close to Thorstein Veblen’s theory of 
conspicuous consumption (Veblen, 1899). Here the prevalent behaviour of the 
consumer is to acquire the proper items of distinction to display wealth and income 
rather than to cover the real needs of the consumer, as a kind of functioning social 
camouflage. Hence, consumption is principally guided by a scripted performance of 
social positioning, rather than the individual’s prescription of fulfilment of pleasures 
and desires.  Antonio Negri and David Hardt (2000) argued that desire is an 
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ontological motor of the biopolitical practices of being (Negri and Hardt, 2000, p. 
389). For Deleuze, Kim Dovey argues desire is the primary force of life. Kim Dovey 
describes desire as a flow of life, an event of becoming that precedes being and 
identity (Dovey, 2010). 
Therefore it can be said that the need to consume is guided by a competition for 
social status, where merchandises are “class exponents” or the social signifiers of 
class status and social mobility. As Gilles Lipovetsky posited on the production of 
objects: “Innovation exists only in order to reproduce social differentiation” 
(Lipovetsky, 1994, p. 144). 
Margaret Crawford opens the section titled “The Utopia of Consumption“ in her 
essay “The World in a Shopping Mall” (1992) by stating that there is a “new ethos 
that has penetrated every sphere of our lives”; by new ethos she means a 
completely infectious new way of sensing the world around us that has become our 
principal characteristic as a society and as individuals, a kind of pre-packaged 
ideology. Crawford posited that this ethos of consumption has converted “culture, 
leisure, sex, politics and even death” to items of consumption, or commodities.  
Hence, “consumption increasingly constructs the way we see the world, (Crawford, 
1992). That was stated almost 28 years ago. Nowadays it is not a supposition, but 
is the globalizing aesthetic of a life of consumption that unites most countries 
around the world. Capitalism’s triumphant worldwide expansion has had the 
“unifying” sense of a pseudo-homogenization. Cees J. Hamelink called this a 
synchronization of taste and desire (Hamelink, 1983). Instead of using the concepts 
that come with homogenization as being composed of only one expansion, the 
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hyper-consumerist social form of capitalism nowadays better reflects the site of a 
menu than the sense of free choice. The menu consists of homogenizing globalizing 
options within an ample range of consumer options (Valencia, 2018). The pastoral 
image of the ordinary man (De Certeau, 1984), the common person, from the 
sedimented ideals of homogenous purity, harmony and congeniality of consumer 
capitalist societies of the Global North, is nowadays firstly defined by its 
consumption habits. Commodities define lifestyles but beyond the mere acquisition 
of commodities is the acquisition of the items of social and class recognition in 
globalized consumer capitalism. The social camouflage of class position, where the 
cloak of consumption fashionize the traditional recognizable markers of class, 
gender, sexuality, and ethnicity, represents a global drive towards an expanded 
sense of homogeneity by camouflage.  
In such fashion the idea of the individual is determined by the consumption of the 
appropriate items of identity and taste. Marc Auge argues that the individual “is not 
just anybody: he is identified with the society of which he is an expression” (Auge, 
1995, p. 21). 
Agnes Heller (1977) relates to this ontology of the individual defined by its social 
environment instead of its natural qualities.  
“The supposition that the human essence is the starting point or the nucleus to 
which all social influences are superimposed to, instead it constitutes a result 
of these social influences over which the supposition that the individual, since 
its birth is in an active relationship with the world within she was born into and 
that her personality is formed thru this relationship” (Heller, 1977, p. 7). 
According to Baudrillard, individuals are no longer citizens in the traditional sense of 
historical materialism, of citizens fighting for their civil rights; nor proletarians, 
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anticipating the onset of communism. They are rather consumers, and hence the 
prey of objects as defined by the social codes of consumption (Baudrillard, 1996).  
Michel de Certeau refers to “the euphemistic term consumer” to describe the user, 
the dominated element of society (De Certeau, 1984, p. xii). Sayak Valencia adds 
that “identity itself is reconfigured and re-subjectivized through the media, publicity, 
technologies of gender, and hyper consumerism” (Valencia, 2018, p. 213). 
In the present social frame of consumerism as an identity-shaping performance, 
even the least privileged want access to the emblematic symbols of the society of 
hyper-consumption, and they give every sign of individualistic aspirations and 
behaviours, even if they are simply following the fashion of influencers and the 
market set of the upper class (Lipovetsky, 2007, p. 183). Thus, the art object and 
proper architecture remain as favourite signs of elite taste and class advancement. 
*** 
4.1.2. Demand and desire. 
In his book The Social Lives of Things (1986), Arjun Appadurai raises the notion of 
demand; regarding the economic transaction, he says that demand is still viewed as 
a mystery. Appadurai states that it is so because we understand demand as 
attached to desire. He continues with the assertion that demand emerges as a 
function that arises from the variety of classifications and social practices. Demand, 
he posits, must be thought about as a proper human phenomenon. Demand is 
constituted as a mechanical response to a social manipulation. 
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In the interstices between the cultural complexities of consumption and the 
dilemmas of desire is where the transitory art object is continuously rearranged and 
placed within the art-architecture complex (Foster, 2013). By the art object, I refer to 
a generalization for a materiality needed in order to reify art as product , although, 
the Western meaning of the art object has always been linked with the experience 
of art in tandem with the fetishization of the tangible material object. The art-
architecture complex is produced from the relationships between demand, desire 
and consumption. Hal Foster links this relationship to the critique of art and 
architecture’s legitimacy. Foster argued that this relationship is driven solely by 
economic convenience before any critical theoretical spatial or aesthetic discourse 
(Foster, 2011). 
Within the logic of neoliberal capitalism, demand is an economic expression of the 
political logic. Therefore, to find the logic of demand it has to be searched within the 
political. What I am referring to is to the fundamental aesthetic change between the 
logic of post-Fordism capitalism, where the demand for a homogenized desire for 
mass consumption was the prescribed aesthetic, to the simulation of participation 
of the consumer as user – user of an apparent menu of possible scripted 
participations in the market-production relationship. 
Appadurai suggests that consumption as an action is eminently social, relational 
and active, instead of private and passive. Certainly, this point, which Appadurai 
raised in 1986, is necessary to include today, when consumption is participation or 
participatory.  The logic of participation is always about a structured selection within 
the limits of a prescribed menu of options. It is not the mistakenly colloquial sense 
by which it is assumed that to participate has to do with the existence of an 
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imperative of individual protagonist with the power to change, contribute or co-
operate with the stipulated a priori logic. Participation is founded on the same 
designs of scripted actions and performances, which are usually related to ideas 
about democracy. 
Art as object or art as experience is positioned as the social classificatory 
instrument in service of the market. The conterminous relation between art with the 
market lies in the manufacture of the elite taste, the good taste, the cultivated taste. 
The elite taste has the social function of discerning from multiple exogenous 
possibilities, appropriating, assimilating and then providing the appropriate models 
for the market, together with the political control for the production of internal taste 
as a global product for mass consumption. 
In this era of globalized electronic capitalism (Spivak, 2012) the homogenization of 
the market structures as well as desire as machine-desire (Guattari and Deleuze, 
1983) has been used as a production mechanism of social capital through the 
manufacture and acquisitions of the items of social recognition. The items 
necessary for social camouflage as the ideal of consumer capitalism’s desire to blur 
class differentiation by means of acquisition and consumption. Camouflage is to 
assimilate. Assimilation involves a process of relating to the environment, given that 
the environment includes the appearances and behaviours of other human beings, 
not only the built space of architecture and the constructed space of society. 
Assimilation is not limited to the purely physical, though;  it happens on a  mental 
level too (Leach, 2006). Neil Leach wrote, “We human beings are governed by a 
chameleon like urge to blend in with our surroundings – to ‘camouflage’ ourselves 
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within our environment. We need to feel at home, and to find our place in the world” 
(Leach, 2006, p. ix). 
The paradoxical condition of the commodification of art is that, for centuries, art and 
all its distinct categories of its practice have been used as objects of economic 
value and social capital. The ritualized commodification of the art object in Western 
society is part of its Western ontology. Art as mythicized anti-merchandise 
commodity, from the theological perspective of the sacred art object to the 
modernist avant-garde conception of art as the revolutionary anti-capitalist 
ephemeral commodity. Art plays the anti-hero character in Western capitalism’s 
story of market commodification. 
The commodification of art is tied to the structuring of desire, capitalized as global 
and, in a manner, homogenized or synchronized to the particularities of the market’s 
taste. Mark Poster states that “In a commodity the relation of word, image or 
meaning and referent is broken and restructured so that its force is directed, not to 
the referent of use value or utility, but to desire” (Poster, 1988). 
The inherent tendency of capital is towards the creation of a global market, 
according to Marx in his Grundrisse manuscript (1974, p. 408). By this logic, Marx 
argues that each limit that shows up is a barrier to exceed. Capitalism, as a global 
socio-economic system, is simultaneously a politico-economic and aesthetic 
phenomenon. This logic appropriates and absorbs all manifestations within and 
outside the system and makes them its own. It transforms, modifies, purifies, and 
commodifies all objects and experiences into the production of fashion as identity 
politics. 
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*** 
4.1.3. Art process and the capital gain of the art object. 
The feminist activist Zillah Eisenstein argued that “Capital is intersectional. It always 
intersects with the bodies that produce the labour. Therefore, the accumulation of 
wealth is embedded in the racialized and engendered structures that enhance it” 
(Eisenstein, 2014). 
For gallery owners, museum directors, art dealers, collectors, critics, curators, and 
audiences, the relative capital gain of art, its simulated uniqueness, and its shortage 
of product are all integral parts of the manipulation of an art market reigned by an 
‘international style’.28 A fashionable aesthetic directed by the international art fairs 
and biennial circuit. The manipulation of the art market and its subsequent 
manipulation towards a “proper style” – the “gallery-ready” image – hides the non-
diverse nature of the politico-aesthetic discourses within the processes of art-
making. This is supplanted by superfluous spectacles of exotic process presented 
as vanguardist artistic practices that appropriate from social and community 
activism tactics, aesthetics, and discourse into their own legitimizing discourse. 
From the once romanticized wilderness of Rousseau to the coasts of Gauguin’s 
Tahitian utopianism, the underground allure of the socially marginalized of the 
Parisian brothels and the surrealist, and even including the mysticism and adventure 
of civil-war Spain, throughout modernism, undying romance with suffering has been 
                                                
28 I am borrowing from architecture of the 20s and 30s. This term was coined by Phillip 
Johnson and Henry Russell Hitchcock in 1932 to describe the architecture style that came 
to dominate stylistically and conceptually the world architecture until the 1970s. I am using 
this term critically to emphasise the instrumental problematic of adopting functionalist 
models as dogma to follow.  
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the fodder of “inspiration”. The new class of Hemingway-esque-style artists and 
architects who are “inspired” by the plight of the marginalized and exploited classes 
of the poorest countries of the earth, are here now trying to find their own “raison 
d’être" between activism and tourism. This new social agent, the socially engaged 
artist and architect, are going to have to decide to whom they serve: this could be 
the commodification of culture by artivism tourism of art-washing that enables 
gentrification and expulsions; or it could be a selfless exercise of solidarity. As 
Deleuze and Guattari had argued, “There is no desiring-machine capable of being 
assembled without demolishing entire social sectors” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972). 
Baudrillard posited that “the only thing that exists is what can assume value, and 
hence pass from one to another” (Baudrillard, 2003, p. 77). Albeit that the romantic 
illusion of art as a selfless practice is only publicity. The crude reality is as 
Baudrillard states: if art cannot assume value as a commodity, in this socio-
economic system, it will cease to exist as such. Art without commodification as 
social capital is culturized as folklore. 
With this fateful statement I leave the clear postulate of the impossibility to change 
the art market and its functionalist influence over the practice of art-making without 
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Chapter 5. The site and its marginalization. 
This chapter conveys the socio-political elements that compose the social tectonics 
of the space where artists and architects are implementing their practices. The “lack 
of space” for artists and architects, especially from developed nations, to create a 
meaningful professional practice in their own countries has had the effect of a 
professional rush to the cities of the underdeveloped nations of the Global South. 
The spaces that have been most attractive to these artists and architects have been 
the informal dwellings of the poor living in the periphery of the city. The following is 
an exploration into what constitutes these spaces, and how these spaces became 
the site of artists’ and architects’ social practices. This chapter concludes by 
arguing that artists and architects have constructed the idea of the site from a 
colonizer’s perspective, where the poor, disfranchised, and marginalized inhabitants 
of informal settlements are portrayed in need of the artist and architect’s 
intervention. 
5.0. On the site. 
The site is not a grid on a plan; it is a place inhabited by many peoples in various 
social structures, interactions, and struggles. The amalgam of group relations 
between people and their natural and constructed environment shapes the social 
tectonics of the site. The social and political human interventions and struggles over 
the site’s territory and human composition ineluctably shape the form and feel of 
the field. The social interactions within the site and between agents from outside 
makes the site a place of contested definitions and rights. The social tectonics 
(Jackson and Butler, 2014) of the site are thus complex and dynamic. The site as 
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abstract space is terra nullius, a site for colonization, open to intervention; on other 
occasions the site is a socially constructed space and a violently contested place. 
The site as a place of dwelling is an informal definition. But the site is never just flat 
data, or the erasure of socio-topographically singularities of place (Frampton, 
quoted in Rice, 2012). 
The recordings and mapping of imaginary geographies indexed as cognitive maps 
(Lynch, 1960) of space as site associated with a particular value in the construction 
of legitimization of a particular history, place, events and feelings. Social hierarchies 
and cultural classifications are often described and spatially bounded, placed, 
located, included or excluded within a spatial metaphor that is the site. Sites 
become symbols that are woven into the narrative of the self, the local, the culture, 
and the nation. Sites become tools of differentiation. Sites become places when 
they start to exude feelings, senses of affective ties. When sites achieve the sense 
of topophilia (Bachelard, 1958; Tuan, 1976, 1977), sites become interwoven into the 
individual’s everyday narratives. Site defines the space away from Cartesian 
abstraction. Site is place when the intensity of recollections of life, myth and stories 
bring together sentiment and place, effectively tying a person to their environment. 
(Shields, 1991). 
“In forensic terms the division is straight forward: the field is the site of 
investigation and the forum is the place where the results of an investigation 
are presented and contested” (Weizman, 2014, p. 9). 
The forum in turn brings into the dynamics of the research practice a place where 
the results of the research are presented and contested. The forum is understood as 
a composite of three distinct and complementary elements. Weizman called the first 
element “a contested object or site” and the second element “the interpreter” or 
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translator. Third, “the public”, is what Weizman named “the assembly of a public 
gathering” (Weizman, 2014, p. 9). This assembly could be seen in terms of art and 
architecture practices as an audience or as a public. The determinants that make 
this division, as Martha Rosler (1987) states, are that the audience is the 
assemblage of consumers of spectacles, in contrast to public, which refers to those 
having “the space of decision making” (Rosler, 1987, p. 14). The site, the interpreter, 
and the public are much contested terms, semantically as well as politically. 
However, in art and architecture social practices these concepts are routinely used 
without a clear distinctive definition.  Thus, these concepts are unknowingly treated 
as universal definitions that could be applied to all social tectonics regardless of 
geopolitical and cultural differences. 
*** 
5.0.1. The city as site. 
“The city has operated as a grand aesthetic curatorial project, a monstrous 
public art gallery for massive exhibitions, permanent and temporary, of 
environmental architecture ‘installations’; monumental ‘sculpture gardens’; 
official and unofficial murals and graffiti; gigantic ‘media shows’; street, 
underground and interior ‘performances’; spectacular social and political 
‘happenings’; state and real-state ‘land art projects’; economic events, actions 
and evictions (the newest form of exhibited art); etc., etc.” (Wodiczko, 1987, p. 
41). 
The crisis for liveable space is a major problem; it is at its core about the lack of 
public accessibility to space. That is, accessibility not only to space as an abstract 
concept, but also to the general concept of participation in the democratic 
constitution of a society. Where the individual’s need of a space to live and thrive is 
not a concession but a right, this problem points towards the access to the basic 
human right to live and be in place(Heidegger, 1971). A person can be, in this way, 
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on a piece of land or on the 66th floor of a structured multi-floor piece of 
architecture. The right and human need to be and dwell as a constituted person, a 
citizen of a society and as part of a community is the locus of this crisis, and to all 
the concomitant problems that arise out of it. All of this belongs to the constitution 
of the ‘modern city’. 
Such crisis is thought to be intrinsically inevitable to the evolution of the modern 
city, and to the limits of the practice of planning the modern city. This is not a 
problem that is caused only by lack of sufficient built space or insufficient public 
space. There are more complex socio-economic and political causalities behind this 
crisis. The shortcomings of the state’s social plans and the behaviour of consumer 
capitalism’s strategies to benefit capital over all other matters are at the centre of 
this crisis (Bennholdt-Thomsen and Mies, 1999; Sassen, 2014; Gago, 2017). 
Traditional short-sighted urban planning remains focused on dwellings as its main 
topic subjected to transformation and experimentation, relating superfluous 
considerations to the access and availability of public space only as instrumentally 
aimed to pacify social life. 
Adolf Loos (1931), the modernist architect, one of the architects who were at the 
forefront of the critique of mainstream architecture of his day, argued that 
architecture is not like art, “responsible towards nobody” – a private business 
regarding the client and the architect – but “rather it is responsible towards 
everybody” (Loos, 1931). 
The history of intent in architecture, to solve the problems of the modern city, is 
filled with well-intentioned initiatives. The 19th century left a legacy of rules and 
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regulations that were aimed at creating, first, the idea of public infrastructure –  
water, power, sewage and sanitary services organized and managed by the state – 
and second the creation of universal regulations of public order. The list of 
international conferences intended to solve the ills of the modern city are vast. 
Starting in 1928 the CIAM I conference The Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture 
Moderne, that took place in La Sarraz, Switzerland, these conferences were initially 
held in the period in between the two World Wars: CIAM II, in Frankfurt (1929); 
CIAM III, in Brussels (1930); CIAM IV, in Athens (1933). Each of these conferences 
produced a charter of successive improved regulations aimed at making live better 
in the fast-growing modern cities of Europe. They also served as a blueprint to 
follow in the planning and developing of all cities across the world. To this day we 
are still using some of the practices that were agreed in these conferences. Not all 
of the practices and regulations that came out of these conferences proved to be 
successful at solving the urban human habitation problem. Le Corbusier’s 
contribution, the 1943 matrix housing and zoning ideas, eventually proved 
disastrous in some social-housing projects, as represented by the Pruitt-Igoe 
housing project that came to be protagonist of the failures of modernist social 
architecture.  
Another of Le Corbusier’s social-housing projects was Nantes Rezé, which also 
came to epitomize the end of the grand plans of High Modernism that the state had 
imbued architecture to resolve, and in the process protect the hegemony of the 
state over the city and the nation. At CIAM XI, in Otterlo, the Netherlands,  the so-
called “subversive” Team X intended to changed the focus of modernist 
architecture from the industrial mass development towards an interest in the 
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“ordinary-standard man”; sadly enough, as in the case of Michel De Certeau’s 
theorizations in The Practice of Everyday Life (1984), they forgot to look at who  
“ordinary-standard man” might be. The people who were migrating to European 
cities in the post-war years were not the “ordinary-standard” women and men that 
were thought of as the traditional patriarchal Eurocentric working-class “man”. 
There were also in increasing numbers the people displaced by the independencies 
of the old colonies of the European empires, who came to live in the social-housing 
experiments at the periphery of European cities but were neither ordinary nor 
standard for the European idea of city dweller.  
*** 
5.1. On community. 
“One man’s imagined community is another man’s political prison” (Appadurai, 
1989). 
“Almost anything can appear under the heading of 'community' and almost anything 
can be justified if this prefix is used.” Stanley Cohen argued this truism in his book 
Visions of Social Control (Cohen, 1985, p. 116). He rightly observed that the word 
“community” by itself did not have any actual clear meaning. Instead the word 
“community”, Cohen posits, “is rich in symbolic power”. One of its greatest 
symbolisms, Cohen observed, is that the word “community” does not have any 
negative meanings attached to it (Cohen, 1985, p. 117). The colloquial use of 
“community” envisions a de facto sense of implicit goodness.  Unlike all other terms 
of social organization – the state, nation, society, culture, class – community never 
seems to be used unfavourably, and it is a term that never suggests conflict or 
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opposition (Williams, 1983). Thus, community has the same discursive appeal to all 
political agendas.  
One part of this ephemeral symbolism of goodness that the word community 
embodies is what Jean-Luc Nancy (1991) presented: “Community is what takes 
place always through others and for others. It is not the space of the egos – subjects 
and substances that are at bottom immortal” (Nancy, 1991, p. 15). There is an 
implicit theological morality attached to the word community; it is presented as 
selfless action for the good of the many. On the other hand, community is a 
disciplinary structure that structures the individual to adhere to the community’s 
“moral code” (Heller, 1970). 
The Hungarian philosopher Agnes Heller (1970) wrote: “A community is a 
structuralized and organized group or unit stratum in which a relatively 
homogeneous system of values obtains, and to which the person necessarily 
belongs” (Heller, 1970, p. 34). 
Heller posited that community is a social category, in so far as it is a category of 
integration. Thus, Heller pairs community to integration. Heller goes on to categorize 
some forms of social integrations as means for human beings organizing 
themselves into groups, social classes, villages, and families. All can be 
communities but are not necessarily so, unless they meet what Heller called “the 
concrete content of integration”.  
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The definition of community that Heller presented takes a functionalist reasoning to 
community as “necessary” from the point of view of the social aggregate29 and 
society in which the unit of production or of management – usually both – is the 
community, and in which the community forms an organic and indispensable 
component of the social structure. 
Heller presents a close view of community where the individual is necessarily “born 
into” the community; the limits of his community are prescribed at the moment of 
birth (Heller, 1970, p. 34). 
Communities that arise not as embodiments of essential social needs, but as 
derivate of political actions and/or individual development – for example, diaspora 
communities and transnational communities – play a completely different part. 
In these contexts, it becomes the world-idea community in its visualizations: 
quotidian, political and social-scientific, with much of the symbolic power derived 
from a profound sense of nostalgia. 
There are other definitions of what community is away from what David Harvey 
called the collectivist rhetoric of the 1960s social movements (Harvey, 1990). There 
are the definitions that tied community to the specificity of a particular land, as a 
territory, and also as a common patrimony or bequest, in the sense of communal 
property. This becomes a vital problem when communities are expelled from their 
ancestral lands and become migrant and diaspora communities. 
                                                
29 A social aggregate is a collection of people who are in the same place at the same time, 
but who otherwise do not necessarily have anything in common, and who may not interact 
with each other. 
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“If there is no land on which the farmers may assemble, it is no longer possible 
to develop a community” (Kluge, 1979). 
Away from this more traditional perspective of community tied to land, the French 
philosopher Jacques Rancière argued of “community as a way of occupying a place 
and a time, as the body in action as opposed to a mere apparatus of laws; a set of 
perceptions, gestures and attitudes that precede and pre-form laws and political 
institutions” (Rancière, 2009, p. 6). Rancière’s definition of community by the 
performative act of occupation is linked to the consolidation of public space as a 
performative act of communal occupation to act “in public” (Arendt, 1998). He goes 
further to differentiate what he calls a “true community”: “A true community is 
therefore one that does not tolerate theatrical mediation; one in which the measure 
that governs the community is directly incorporated into the living attitudes of its 
members” (Rancière, 2009, p. 3). 
Nevertheless, the sense that we, in most modern Western societies, receive from 
the word community is from the culturalized sedimented definition of community, in 
common usage; from colloquialisms of political discourse and the social sciences, 
literature, art and architecture.  
John Dewey wrote in The Public and its Problems (Dewey, 1980, p. 148) that 
democracy is “the idea of community life itself”, which brings into the question of 
community what Noelle McAfee brought to the forefront about the plurality of 
definitions about community: “how a heterogeneous and diverse society can come 
to any kind of agreement about matters of common concern” (McAfee, 2000, p. 
184). 
*** 
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5.1.1. The romanticism of the pure community. 
This sense of community suffers from a romantic nostalgia – the symbolic evocation 
of a lost world, and melancholia about a symbolic utopian past. This is a past that 
might not really have existed, but whose mythical qualities are profoundly 
intertwined on our social consciousness of a cultural identity.  A paradoxical past, 
where things were better, nobler, simpler and more authentic. It is quite close to 
Heidegger’s existentialism and his romanticism of the past and the local as 
authentic (Heidegger, 1971). This nostalgic sense of community is a more complex 
multilayer phenomenon than it first appears, a “layer cake” (White, 1959) of 
sentimentality, melancholia, romanticism and nationalism, mixed up with layers of 
fear, racism, homophobia, sexism and the lost of hegemony. 
Stanley Cohen argues that the form of the sense of community that we have 
inherited comes more from the side of crime-control ideology (Cohen, 1985). This is 
the fundamentalist publicity of fear and security that has become implanted into all 
political discourse. This fear is manifested when individuals start claiming their own 
territory under a mythical feeling of collectivity. This tendency to privatize the 
communal space of dwelling for the sake of security is part of the ideas of defensive 
space supported by community architecture (Till, 1998). The architect Oscar 
Newman (1972) proposed in his theory of defensive space that architecture could 
design a way to protect the individual from crime by territorializing public space into 
the individual’s territory, a private community space as a defence from crime and 
violence. Therefore, community comes to be contextualized within the social frame 
of fear-security-control of one group to be protected from “others” who do not 
belong to the “community”.  
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This in a nostalgic look to an imagined past community as the provider of the ideal 
and desirable form of social control. Cohen said about it that the “impulse is 
reactionary and conservative, not in the literal political sense, but in always locating 
the desired state of affairs in a past which has now (usually just now) been eclipsed 
by something undesirable” (Cohen, 1985). The “something undesirable” in political 
discourse today is the addition to this imagined community (Anderson, 1983) of the 
“other”; from migrants, sexual non-conformists, non-heteronormative people, 
people of “colour”, and women, who are still left out of most political and social 
communities without equal access to power and rights. 
*** 
5.1.2. The myth of community. 
As markets forces and urban developments move into appropriating “vacant” lands 
on the rural-urban fringe, there is a need for instant place-making. To create a 
market appeal, the publicity element becomes necessary. The desire for 
“character’” by the new urbanism and development necessitates a strong sense of 
place, “community”, and “character” (Dovey, 2010). Community became a branding 
global formula for selling instant authenticity, place and security. In order to absorb 
the “vacant” lands into the territorializing order of capitalism’s commodities, such 
lands must first be tamed and colonized by mapping and narration (Said, 1993; 
Bhabha, 1994; Sassen, 2014). The sense of community thus became the formula for 
instant place-making. The sense of community accommodates and legitimates 
forms of cognitive mapping appropriations by naming of sites into a prescribed 
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order of things. Hence starts the weaving of a new narration, into the appropriate 
history to legitimate the imagined community as ever-present. 
The conflicts imagining a sense of community came from the old reliance on 
defining community as related to a form of homogenous human settlement. A form 
of constructed dwelling environment attached to a vernacular series of social 
relations, hierarchies, politics, architecture and art. A culturized set of behaviours 
and language codes that distinguish this population apart from any other. All of 
these developments are located and dependent on place. Being in place of a 
territorialized geography or an imaginary diaspora construction (Anderson, 1983; 
Sandoval, 2000; Escobar, 2001; Sassen, 2006). 
The persistent sense of community that is continually politically publicized has 
permeated as a truth in all social practices. Community embodies a sort of 
messianic attraction, where people will find the remedies to alienation, 
estrangement, rootlessness, loss of attachment, and disintegration of the social 
bond.  
This definition of community has become the de facto propaganda for all sorts of 
urban-renewal proposals and social art and architecture projects that claim to 
create, reinforce, or rescue a “sense of community” and promote “community-
building”. 
The publicity of community activism that calls for a return to community at first 
appears to be a sensible solution. This community activism has the tendency to fall 
into a Heideggerian nostalgia for the time when community was the romanticized 
fictional discourse of homogeneous community. The so-called “good old times” 
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were filled with dissension from the authoritative patriarchal heteronormative 
structure of the community. But dissension to the norm was and still is met with 
disdain, apathy, and abjection, often with extreme violence. Community, in the 
“good old times”, was not something that a person joined. It was instead, as Agnes 
Heller (1970) noted, that the person is born into a community. The inescapable 
community structured by values, morals and traditions dictated and culturalized 
from the patriarchal hegemony. 
Modernity was thought to bring individualism, secularization, and rationalism, thus 
opening the established structures of community and culture to release ordinary 
people from restraint and obedience, and from the traditional bonds of community. 
The counter-discourse of conservatism has been that modernity brought freedom to 
the individual that was instead unrest, loneliness, and anomie.  
Populist political discourse simplifies the sense of community into binaries between 
good and bad community. The “good community” is then the place of the most 
vulnerable social groups, what Cohen called the most labile social groups; instead 
of rebelling against the order of community, “they would all be able to learn the 
meaning of order, discipline and authority – the good community” (Cohen, 1985, p. 
119). 
The political conservatism has appropriated the iconography of the small rural 
village as “the good community” of graspable social, religious and moral 
conservative values of “anti-institutional sentimentality” (Beck, 1979). This is 
contrasted with the bad community greatly publicized via the negative: the sense of 
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urban confusion and degradation, the squalors of the big city, and the impositions 
and interference of the state in the private and public life of the individual.  
The conservative political agenda presents the salvation of the public from the 
interference of the state and the anomie of the “others” by their reintegration into 
the good community. From conservative politics, there is a resurgence of a 
tendency to look for a “Golden Age” of pre-capitalist “community control” (Cohen, 
1985). 
Both sides of the political spectrum, the left and right, and all the in-between from 
radicals to ultra-conservatives, have publicized their “mourning the end of 
community”. All have created their own disingenuous ideas, images and sense of 
what communities were in the “good old times”.   
All have posited their own vision of what a community should be for their own 
political purposes and economic gains. 
In this contentious, politically charged quest for community, artist and architects are 
seeking validation of their practices by intervening with communities, especially with 
those who are at the marginalized fringes of society; it is most necessary to 
recognize the superfluous role that a single artist or a small group of artists and 
architects can do to change a community. Even more important is to question 
whether or not the community needs the intervention of an artist or architect to 
solve what we imagine from the outside are their problems. 
Cohen wrote that “most attempts to recreate community in fact constitute evidence 
of the end of community”. Thus, we should start by questioning what is what we 
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think community is, and what purpose it serves, before starting a socially engaged 
practice. 
*** 
5.2. The marginalized. 
“For the embattled 
there is no place 
that cannot be 
home 
nor is” 
Audre Lorde. “School Note”. 1978. 
 
Edward Said wrote that “the history of the marginalized, the subaltern, in ‘literal fact’ 
is a narrative missing from the official story” (Said, 1988). The official story is the one 
that we know to be the story from the side of the victorious. The marginal from their 
subjectivity as the subaltern are the ones left aside history’s narrative. “History is 
our collective memory only if it is narrated through a multiplicity of voices” 
(Caffentzis and Federici, 2019). Otherwise, we remain blind to a world of 
connections and meaning. 
For the context of this research, marginalization is an imposed socio-political 
condition as well as a spatial reference of subordination, and a temporal dislocation 
away from the official narrative of history. Thus, the site of the marginalized is 
centred exclusively on the study of the site, where the practices of social art and 
architecture engage with the social – the people who live and dwell in this place. 
   
 191 
The place is the contested territories where poor migrants from rural communities 
landed at the borderlands of the city. Borderlands are the land invasions between 
the rural-urban divide. These are call borderlands because they act as a frontier and 
buffer zone between the reality of the metropolis, the urban centre and its 
progressive circles of expanding exurbia until reaching the borderlands that 
demarcate a porous frontier between realities. Beyond the last circle of urban 
development is where the borderlands start. The borderlands are dynamic social 
and physical structures that mutate with the social and economic movement of their 
inhabitants. These are the spaces where the migrant poor invade, appropriate, and 
settle. This represents the margin of the city and the limits of formal society and 
government. Of the margins, bell hooks said that “to be in the margin is to be part of 
the whole but outside the main body” (hooks, 1990). The main body of upper-class 
society lies at what is today a metaphorical centre. Modern capitalist society is not 
arranged in traditional concentric circles of power and influence, emanating power 
from the centre onwards to a subjugated periphery; instead, there are multiple, 
disparate and at times intersecting circles of power, subjugation, and habitation. 
The marginalized are not equated with a concrete condition of economic immobility. 
The marginalized traverse the metropolis as workforce and as consumer. The 
frontiers of the borderless are porous to the interest of capital. A condition of social 
camouflage is an imperative for the marginalized to transgress the imposition of 
borders imposed upon them by race, class and gender. Still, in this rapidly evolving 
social landscape of globalized consumer capitalism, an overview of what 
marginality has meant in academic writing is needed to properly contextualize the 
site and field of social art and architecture practice. 
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Marginality is becoming universal, wrote Michel De Certeau (1984) in the general 
introduction of his book The Practice of Everyday Life. He presented marginality as 
“a massive and pervasive cultural activity of the non-producers of culture”. De 
Certeau posited with these assumptions that marginality as “an activity that is 
unsigned, unreadable, and unsymbolized” had once only been “limited to minority 
groups” but is now a “universal” operation that characterizes consumption, together 
with the practices of appropriation that produced the “showy products” that a 
“productivist” economy needs for its articulation (De Certeau, 1984). These “showy 
products” that De Certeau spoke of are the items of recognition necessary for social 
camouflage. The “minority groups” to which he alluded are the groups without a 
fixed or properly defined place in the social edifice (Zizek, 2000). Thus the 
marginalized do not have a concrete defined place within the social construct of 
metropolitan urbanism. Their settlements and social conditions are taken as 
temporary. Although their dwellings might not move spatially, they progress in the 
structure of their temporal architecture au pair with their economic standing. These 
dwellings start with what appear as temporary constructions because of the nature 
of the materials available to them: recycled cardboard, and plastic. Subsequently 
the material of their structures change, to recycled and second-hand appropriated 
wood and corrugated metal, to eventually raw brick and mortar. Eventually, this 
dwelling will resemble the traditional house, with finished surfaces, glass windows, 
and second or third floors to accommodate the by then extended family. This site of 
marginality has metaphorically moved upscale and thus does not represent the 
limits of the borderlands anymore. The border has moved further away, repeating 
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the same cycle of land invasion, informal occupation, appropriation of lifestyle, and 
settlement dwelling in place-community. 
An early essay from 1928, "Migration and the Marginal Man," by Robert Park, who 
was one of the original members of the Chicago school of sociology, defined 
marginality as a state of limbo between at least two cultural life-worlds (Weisberger, 
1992). From a more contemporary position, Miranda Fricker (2006) argued that 
marginality is a moral-political position indicating subordination and exclusion from 
some practice that would have value for the participant (Fricker, 2006). 
Marginalization is an interrelated social process of relegating specific groups of 
people to the lower or the outer edges of the society, not only spatially but also 
morally and spiritually. “Marginalization operates as function, as cause and also as a 
social product” (Perlman, 1976, p. 40). This social product of marginalization works 
as an instrument of segregation by creating the logistical conditions to perpetuate 
the abject conditions of life by denying access and participation to the state’s 
infrastructure of education, power, water, sanitation and political participation. 
Marcia Tucker (1990) argued that marginalization is a complex and disputed 
process. Marginalization is a relational term; it is dependent on the spatial provision 
of what it is that is being marginalized from. Thus, a conflictual binary relation 
between a defined centre and a marginal periphery appears to be necessary. In the 
simplest terms: “Marginalization, that complex and disputatious process by means 
of which certain people and ideas are privileged over others at any given time” 
(Tucker, 1990). 
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Mari Jo Deegan in 2002 posited her concept of the marginal persona as anyone 
whose “perception of the self, experience of the world, and access to material 
resources do not fit” the “hegemonic” standard of “white, able-bodied, capitalist, 
and heterosexual men” (Deegan 2002, p. 108). Deegan’s treatment of marginality is 
as a social construction not a social phenomenon. Marginality is thus defined by 
Deegan as “any kind of isolation from or non-conformity to the dominant society or 
culture” (Goldberg, 2012). 
What it is continuously perpetuated in all these definitions is the dynamic between 
opposing forces – centre vs. periphery, inclusion vs. exclusion, majority vs. Minority 
– and all of these dynamics are present in the ways artistic and social practice 
operate (Tucker, 1990). 
*** 
5.2.1. Fashioning marginality. 
Marginality since early on in the 20th century has been romanticized as a source of 
creativity, from Thorstein Veblen (1919), Paulina Bart (1971), Patricia Hill Collins 
(1986), Chela Sandoval’s Chicano artivism (2008), Macarena Gómez-Barris’s artist’s 
decolonizing practices (2018), and many more. In contrast, Deegan’s perspective 
shows that the “dichotomized lives” of the marginalized are “intrinsically destructive 
to the marginal person” (Deegan 2002, p. 110) rather than being an inspiration to 
creative action and a profound “original” insight at humanity’s plight.  
The romanticism of suffering that the arts inherited from early modernism’s 
mythology of the artist has had the curious homogenizing effect of everyone from 
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white male artists, to feminist artists, to subaltern “minorities” artists supporting the 
romantic idealism of the marginal as a locus of inspiration. Artists practice the 
concept of “optimal marginality” (McLaughlin, 2001); instead of asking whether 
marginality leads to innovation and creativity, the practice remains interested only in 
qualifying the specific socio-political conditions under which it is likely to do so. 
Once located, inspiration can be mined and extracted from the site of the 
marginalized. 
Today the constructed image of “the marginal” is not at the margins, the edges, the 
borders, or outside of the centre. Instead, it has become a fashionable concept; the 
definition of a disenfranchised spatiality and an emotion oblivion has been 
translated into the locus of the past two decades of sociological, anthropological, 
architecture and artistic vanguardist discourse. Guy Debord stated that“ the image 
is the last stage of commodity deification” (Debord,1994 ); the fashionalization of the 
image of the marginalized is, thus, assimilated into a commodity asset for political 
populist discourse, marketable items of faux-gansta and inner-city style, and as the 
legitimizing context for social art and architecture practices.  Even the state’s 
instrumental bureaucracy appropriates the image of the “marginalized”. This image 
is the publicity instrument positioned at the centre of populism discourses and of 
the neoliberal public-private partnerships with the state. The image of the 
marginalized is now a common and necessary feature on discussions from 
government budget allocation to third-sector institutions and the re-definitions of 
the functions of the new neoliberal state. Art and architecture have not been 
immune to this discursive trend. From academia’s theoretical literature production 
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to artists’ statements of purpose and architects’ program proposals, the 
marginalized have become a must-feature to be represented in all proposals. 
Since the times when the marginal meant to be excluded, forgotten and otherwise 
overlooked, from Marx to Friedman, a metamorphosis of meaning and image has 
happened. The functionalist image of the marginalized has become a deictic 
definition. Fashion, political, social, communal, activist, and revolutionary, it has 
always been a relational definition, as most definitions are. But in this case, it is not 
from the relational sense that the meaning coalesces. It comes from the perspective 
of the narrator, the interpreter that has the power of epistemic truth. 
In this case to mean a deictic transformation in the usage of the term the marginal is 
a profound change to the legitimization of the image and sense of the marginality. 
The somatic sense of the world that is in use in academic theory and discourse is 
permeating towards a political populist discourse in which the marginal are laid as 
the beneficiaries of the welfare state. They are positioned as audience and 
munitions of neoliberal discourse against the modernist grand récits of the paternal 
welfare state. 
*** 
The white male Americo-European artist needed the fabrication of his own 
otherness to be able to partake of this creative force. By self-marginalization of self-
imposed exile in the exotic lands far away from the metropolis of his own; or by 
another type of self-imposed exile, partaking in social and political practices and 
behaviours deemed inappropriate or immoral in their own social class. From 
Gauguin in Tahiti to Picasso in the brothels of Paris, Hemingway in the hyper-
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masculinity of war, and Pollock in alcoholism, the attraction of the suffering of the 
marginal has been the creative locus of Western modern art. Culture conflict has 
been formulaically used as an impetus to creativity. Albeit that this creative impetus 
remains embodied in the metropolitan artist. The truly marginal artist is invited only 
as decorative legitimizing background. When he is, he is regularly paraded à la 
Basquiat, as object-exotic by dint of his negritude and addiction – the triple 
marginalization of race, class, and behaviour. The art market gobbles these subjects 
as novelties of urban lore. Once fashioned and commodified into the art-tourism of 
today’s marginalized artists of colour in metropolitan biennales, full of artists 
rendered marginalized by natural disasters, social disasters, class, race, gender 
non-conformity, poverty, addiction, mental health, etc. 
The feminist critic Barbara Christian (1988) first presented the situation of 
marginality in terms of value: “a group can be ignored, trivialized, revered invisible 
and unheard, perceived as inconsequential, de-authorized, ‘other’, or threatening, 
while others are valorized”. She continued to frame marginalization as an instrument 
of epistemic injustice and robbery. 
“Western dualistic frame which sees the rest of the ‘binary’ world as minor and 
tries to convince the rest of the world that it is major, usually through force and 
then through language, even as it claims many of the ideas that we, its 
‘historical’ other, have known and spoken about for so long. For many of us 
have never conceived of ourselves only as somebody’s other” (Christian, 1988, 
p. 70).  
The art Museums of the world metropolis are full of these examples of artists, under 
the pseudonym of inspiration, reproducing extractive capitalism’s functions of 
cultural appropriation, simulation, expropriation, and theft. 
*** 
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5.2.2. The body of the marginalized. 
“The good citizen when he opens his door in the evening must be banker, golfer, 
husband, father; not a nomad wandering the desert, a mystic staring at the sky, a 
debauchee in the slums of San Francisco, a soldier heading a revolution, a pariah 
howling with skepticism and solitude”. 
Virginia Woolf. Street Haunting, 1930. 
Agnes Heller posits that “in the ‘history hitherto’ of the human race, every person is 
a class-unit, that is to say, is the representative of humanity only in so far as he 
partakes in class possibilities, class value, class tendencies, and relays these in 
correlated form” (Heller, 1984, p. 28). Heller continues to state that not every person 
can be a “representative of humanity” as embodiment of universal persona. The 
individual is inescapably bound to the socio-political classification of class; first, by 
the culturization of the social class where she belongs in the general idea of the 
nation and culture; and second, the individual is bound by the hierarchical 
positioning of herself in such class.  Her class assignment is the position that the 
individual has attained by conflict or association; it is the social determinant. Hence, 
the “historical class” from where she comes from is a fateful endogenic continuity of 
a given socio-economic structure of self-reproduction. 
The same individual is also bounded by determinism as “class subject”; thus, her 
class also regulates and disciplines the limits of her individuality (Heller, 1984). 
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When Michel De Certeau spoke of the everyday life, of walking the streets of the 
city, of art and theory, of popular culture and place, he spoke from the position of 
the experience as “the ordinary man” (De Certeau, 1984), the only man he could 
attest as knowing, and the only man he knew – himself. De Certeau spoke in 
universalisms, the only language he knew; that is to say, of what he understood and 
felt as being the “simple fact of living” (Agamben, 2008). This is what De Certeau 
understood to be “common to all living beings” (Valencia, 2018); what De Certeau 
saw, felt and symbolically could represent as being. From his cognitive 
imprisonment as a white European male, he could only glance to the other. The 
other bodies were not represented in his myopic perspective of “everyday life”. 
De Certeau dedicated his book The Practice of Everyday Life (1984) to the common 
man. One may ask what this gesture meant. It is unlikely that anyone outside the 
educated elite will be able or want to follow the argument it presented (Helga Wild, 
2012). Women and the variations of the non-white European bodies remain silently 
at the margins of these theorizing. Edward Said (1986) said that “Foucault himself 
teaches, that in this case, as in many others, it is sometimes of paramount 
importance not so much what is said, but who speaks” (Said, 1986, p. 153). 
Agnes Heller (1994) wrote: “it was modernity itself that legally emancipated the body 
for the first time in history” (Heller and Feher, 1994, p. 16), This emancipated body 
came supported on the backs of the others’ bodies, the un-inscribed, the “othered”, 
the darker and the gendered bodies, whose unrecognized slave labour ploughed 
the grounds of modernity and capitalism itself.  
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The body of the marginalized is the disenfranchised body “enunciated as a 
metaphor sublimated by politics” (Valencia, 2018). It is the body categorized as 
political subject, but not an actor, and never agent. Kept in an “absolute existential 
precarity, reducing human beings to extreme vulnerability” (Valencia, 2018). 
Modernity and capitalism assigned the ownership of things – property – to the 
entitlement to be counted, to become a citizen. Without ownership – private 
property – the individual is socially and politically invisible. The individual is barred 
of legal personhood and citizenship. Without personhood, without citizenship, we 
lose the property rights to our own bodies (Said, 1986; Valencia, 2018). 
Marginalization and disenfranchisement are congruous partners. The conflated 
reality of the subdued bodies, the subjects of capitalism, globalization, debt, 
poverty and mass migrations from country to slum is not of “the controller” of their 
own bodies and less of their own life-world (Lugones, 2010; Segato, 2018a). 
The city-metropolis is a parasite that needs to be incessantly fed from its margins 
(Bennholdt-Thomsen and Mies, 1999). It is in the borderlands where all the bodies, 
labour, and material are reproduced. Without these borderlands the metropolis and 
life-world will cease. The borderlands are the fertile grounds of life to the city. These 
are also the places of uprising and revolution. These are the dangerous sites of 
insurrection. From the disruption of darker genes, the romance of suffering strolls 
the city boulevards in the bodies of the marginalized perverting the official history, 
universalist theory, love, and art. 
The Mexican feminist political philosopher Sayak Valencia asked that we stop using 
the concept of the marginalized subject in order to finally move beyond the political 
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simplifications of exorcizing idyll and to leave behind “conceptualizations and 
compositions that oscillate between the extremes of victimhood and heroism, 
sympathy and glorification” (Mezzadra., Chakravorty., Talpade., Shohat., et al, 2008, 
p. 239). 
Valencia has very wisely and very succinctly positioned her political critique against 
the intellectual romancing of suffering. What she called the critical glorification of 
difference – the academic institutional discourse from the First World and the “third 
world” has perpetuated this patriarchal romanticism. This patriarchal practice of 
romanticizing suffering has been perpetuated from the European theological canon 
and mysticism, and before that from the imaginary classical civilization of Greek and 
Roman myths. This represents a romanticism of the practices of survival in the 
“third world” that goes well together with the masculinist sense of adventure that 
colonization provided to the white male ego30; the conquest of bodies and lands. 
Valencia’s thoughts encompass a keen critique of the patriarchal systems of 
violence and gore in late capitalism, where new subjects are engendered in a violent 
system of consumption and subjugation, and where bodies are merchandise 
(Valencia, 2018). 
Silvia Federici (2019) stated that the “essential aspect of the capitalist project has 
been the disarticulation of the social body, through the imposition of different 
disciplinary regimes producing an accumulation of ‘differences’ and hierarchies that 
profoundly affect how capitalist relations are experienced” (Federici, 2019, p. 16). 
                                                
30 Being white did not have so much to do with skin colour as with the staging of a cultural 
imaginary, posits Castro-Gómez, Santiago. 2005. La Hybris del Punto Cero. 
Whiteness and masculinity are both performative identities that serve the male corporative 
structure of identity (Butler, 1998; Segato, 2018b). 
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The bodies of the marginalized are the disarticulated subjects of capitalism; this 
belongs to the market logic of hyper-consumerist capitalism and its ample menu of 
consumer options of identity and place. 
*** 
 
5.3. The monstrous. 
“What we assume of each other is what we get out of each other” (Bregman, 
2020). 
The construction of the monstrous has been a necessary representation to 
accentuate and validate the differences between them and us. The construction of 
national, tribal and individual identities, which are represented by ethics and morals 
that legislate over jurisprudence guarantees our social life. To guarantee the status 
quo of proper social life, a representation of abjection of what lies outside proper 
society is needed. Thus the monstrous is the fabrication necessary to reify our own 
existence as just, proper and good. 
Monstrosity has been presented in art and architecture as a closed argument in 
aesthetic value and on the spatial representation of the built environment. To deem 
something to be monstrous classifies its condition as abject and as threat to the 
society. This classification makes easy the intervention and removal of groups of 
people, ideas, dwellings, and any other social and aesthetic manifestation that 
diverges from the set norm.  
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Rutdger Bregman argued that a priory condition of Western capitalism towards the 
“other”, be it a distinct group of peoples, cultures, manners or ideas, has been “of 
negative expectations”; he called this a “nocivo” relationship of expecting the worst 
out of encounters with the unknown. “Humankind has built their institutions around 
these assumed truths”; hence, “people are a product of the institutions in which 
they grew up” (Bregman, 2020). Therefore, to start with an a priori “nocivo” notion 
of negative expectations yields negative outcomes. This intrinsic negativity is 
founded on the fear of the other, the stranger, the foreigner as figure of disruption. 
The prevalent idea that “civilization is a thin veneer” (Bregman, 2020) has been at 
the cognitive centre of institution-building in modern society. The construction of 
the modern state rests on the principle that humans need to be disciplined. The 
institutionalization of discipline and control is an old practice, from Catholicism’s 
treat of eternal damnation, to the construction of the architecture of institutions of 
confinement and punishment, of the prison, schools, and the modern police state 
(Foucault, 1972). John Adams argued in 1776, what became embedded at the heart 
of capitalism is the notion that all people are selfish, and that all men will be tyrants 
if they can (Adams, 1776). 
Another disciplinary instrument was needed to keep society within the regulated 
bounds of the social. The disruptive influence of the other – the stranger – had to be 
demonized into abjection and myth. Thus, enters the construction of the monstrous 
to identify those outside the norms of proper society. 
The construction of the monstrous present in art, literature and language is an 
intrinsic timeless theme and an apparent need of the human endeavour. It predates 
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organized civilization, and is spread worldwide throughout multiples cultures in 
myth, tale and practice. Hence, the assumption is that the theme of the monstrous 
is inscribed within the duality of parameters in the construction of identity and 
otherness; belonging and estrangement; good and evil; hegemony and marginality 
(Moraña, 2017). The monstrous as Mabel Moraña (2017) argued has a meaning that 
can only be understood in relation to its transcendence to the ambiguous, 
uncertainty, polysemy, doubt, mutation and re-signification. The monstrous is 
equally a designation of power and a metaphorical resistance to it; a subversion of 
power and an omen of catastrophe or enunciation of revolutionary social 
transformations. The monstrous is external, the foreigner, and the alien to the self. 
Nevertheless, the monstrous also dwells within the self, a threat from within to the 
social consciousness and certitudes of society. Such is the complexity of the 
monstrous, from transgressive to un-submissive; a metaphor to situate our singular 
character of existence, as good; in distinction to the unknown foreign outside our 
small perceived world.  
The monstrous is also degeneration from within, an impetus of moving beyond our 
constitution as “being”. The construction of our being depends of a tightly 
contextual frame that signifies the constituent of a culture and traditions. To move 
beyond the prescribed cultural forms represents the imminent threat to the whole of 
culture and tradition. The need for a disciplinary depiction of a social category of 
abjection arises from the cognitive need to categorize a gap of distinction between 
them and us. Monstrosity works beyond the abject; it encompasses the fear of the 
unknown with the abject of deformity and infection. The monstrous is an ideological 
figure, a Frankenstein of social dogma and conformity. The infectious nature of this 
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monstrosity is that it extends its abject character to the sense of foreboding doom. 
Thus, monstrosity is contra positioned with purification. The theological conflict 
between good and evil: vampire against the virgin, Frankenstein vs. science-reason, 
and King Kong vs. love (as inscribed by the white body). 
The social construction of the monstrous is reified in an antagonism that validates 
the purification of social space. David Sibley (1988) argued that “the purification of 
social space involves the rejection of difference and the securing of boundaries to 
maintain homogeneity” (Sibley, 1988). 
Fredric Jameson (1981) spoke of the “ultimate origin” of the ideologies of the 
society of consumer capitalism as still being centred by binary oppositions of what 
he calls the “master code of theocentric power societies”. Thus, it is presented that 
all positive and negative terms are “ultimately assimilated by the mind as a 
distinction between good and evil” (Jameson, 1981). This leaves society in a very 
simplistic binary to assimilate or understand all life experiences of the self and with 
other bodies; as threats to the value systems of their public persona. This limited 
presumption lends itself to a contraction of the self inwards towards the protective 
space of the private (Rudofsky, 1938; Chermayeff and Alexander, 1964), a defensive 
strategy of building literal physical walls, juridical walls, moral walls. Walls in urban-
planning segregation (redlining) and apartheid strategies that go from the tactile, the 
somatic and the semantic to name territories of exclusion. “Territory names a way to 
organize relations between space and power” (Medrazza and Neilson, 2019, p. 24). 
Exclusion from philosophical episteme, and hermeneutical walls for ethics that 
conforms behaviour within the juridical closed binary discourses of absolute right 
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vs. absolute evil; transmuted to the divinity of the eternal plight between “good” vs. 
“evil”. Therefore, this represents the construction of a narrative of ethics that 
sustains and defends the status quo of the dominant class; “Ethics itself which is 
the ideological vehicle and the legitimation of concrete structures of power and 
domination” (Jameson, 1981, p. 114). 
*** 
5.3.1. Naming the monstrous. 
“Every human act takes place in language. Every act in language brings forth a 
world created with others in the act of coexistence which gives rise to what is 
human. Thus every human act has an ethical meaning because it is an act of 
constitution of the human world. This linkage of human to human is, in the final 
analysis, the ground-work of all ethics as a reflection on the legitimacy of the 
presence of others” (Maturana and Varela, 1998, p. 247). 
There is a curious anecdote about Hernán Cortés’s arrival at the gates of the Aztec 
Empire’s capital of Tenochtitlan in 1519. It is told that when Cortés and his men 
entered the city, the Aztec emperor Moctezuma received them in the splendour of 
his court with music, dancers and a banquet. It is said that Cortés turned to his men 
and uttered, “What is this infernal noise?” Cortés was referring to the music being 
played in the palace. The story continues that, on Cortés’ return to Spain after the 
conquest of the Aztecs, he brought with him seven native Aztecs. When they were 
received in the Spanish crown’s court, music was playing by the sovereign’s 
favourite musicians. One of the Aztecs present turned to another and said, “What is 
this infernal noise?” 
Mikhail Bakhtin (1985) argued that “meaning in itself does not exist, it cannot be 
realized by itself; it only begins to exist in contact with another meaning, the 
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meaning that comprehends it. The nature of understanding is dialogical” (Bakhtin, 
1985, p. 366). 
In that sense all knowledge-making practices are suspect because in making 
something visible they draw on pre-existing categories, and in the process, 
reinforce them. They serve the institutions of society rather than any specific group, 
but in general they are more influenced by the elite, which tries to reproduce society 
in its own image (Wild, 2012). 
The Argentinian cultural critic Beatriz Sarlo in her book La Ciudad Vista (2009) 
indicates in her research working in the marginalized shanty towns (barriadas) 
surrounding the periphery of Buenos Aires, that the word “monstrous” has been for 
many years used to describe these informal settlements. Curiously, the conquerors 
of new lands have always characterized their subjects and their practices, cultural 
or tribal, as monstrous. The characterization of an aesthetic of monstrosity using 
race, gender and class has been key in the colonization of social and political 
hierarchical determinations and differentiation. 
A determinate monstrosity expands from the colonized subject somatic norm and 
behaviour to the architectural of its dwelling environment. It is seen as residing in 
filth. 
Sarlo posited that the term “precarious monstrosity” is used to describe the informal 
urban development of the marginal city. The site of barriadas, urban slums, shanty 
towns or the latest political term to describe the abject poverty in which millions live: 
human settlements, a politically neutralizing renaming of the slums, given by the 
state and thus pseudo-integrating them into the language of urban development 
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and renewal. The name is reminiscent of creating a sense of settler-colonization as 
permanent and with a future. 
The construction of the “place-images” (Shields, 1992, p. 47) comes about with the 
oversimplification and stereotyping of one or more traits and labelling the place as 
of belonging to certain nature. The monstrous is a categorization of a nature of 
being. 
Places and spaces are hypothesized from the world of real space relations to the 
symbolic realm of cultural significations (Shields, 1992, p. 47). Within the cultural 
signification, the necessary task of creating the accompanying meaning of place by 
what Shield called “the litter of historical popular culture –postcard etc. (cultural 
place-images)” is how the essential character “of the nature” of a place and its 
inhabitants is determined and organized into “spatial routines”31 and territorial 
divisions. 
 Nevertheless, these human settlements are judged to be a threat to the survival of 
the purity of the metropolis. They represent the permanence of illegal encampment 
on land invasions becoming informal permanent settlements. For the upper class of 
the metropolis, they represent an encroachment by the unsightly unsanitary nature 
that the settlements represent. They are deemed to be a monstrous display of 
precarious dwellings made of refuse. The informal settlements present a threat to 
private property, a disfigurement of the homogeneity of the architectural landscape 
of the metropolis, an invasion of unsightliness, disorganization and the informal 
                                                
31 Spatial routines are the inherited social behaviours that the marginalized adopt to move in 
the metropolis as subaltern citizens. A mode of social camouflage and invisibility to avoid 
confrontations with the authority forces. 
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aesthetics of the lower classes into the legitimate national culture, and a 
destabilizing intrusion to the hegemony of the metropolis’s economic and political 
power.  
The preoccupation of the metropolitan upper class is with the government officials, 
who are seen to be in a cohort with the populist practices of settlement informality 
and illegal land speculators. The official discourse of urban renewal and private 
property rights for the informal settlements are empty political rhetoric for re-
election campaign publicity. 
The response from the centre of the metropolis, the affluent middle to upper classes 
and the politicians that serve this constituency, is to view with extreme suspicion 
these human settlements and the politics that surround them. 
The discourse of temporality of the land invasions, informal settlements, and of the 
permanence of the on-site communities, the “precarious monstrosity”32 of the lives 
of the people dwelling in these human settlements are continuously to be thought 
as a social blemish from one side of the political spectrum – the metropolitan upper 
class – and as political capital from another side of politics. 
The materiality of these dwellings comes to the forefront as types of material 
designate a type “definitive incompleteness” (Sarlo, 2009), or a form of nascent 
permanence. From cardboard and plastic to wood and corrugated tin, to bricks and 
mortar, the temporality of informal settlements has become an issue as these 
informal settlements grow into satellite exurbs of the metropolis and become the 
                                                
32 Beatriz Sarlo judges as “precarious monstrosity“ the abject social conditions that are 
already constitutive of the city and not fleeting (Gago, 2017; 179). 
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economic power centres in the informal economy of the city and country. The “logic 
of the unfinished” (Sarlo, 2009, p. 179) manifested in these informal settlements 
maintains an instability that cannot establish clear, hard boundaries. The monstrous 
constructs the city, “the city of the poor”, with the ever-present threat that this city 
of the poor will spill over towards the metropolis, devouring it in its aesthetics of the 
monstrous. 
At issue is the confrontation between the image of the city and the structural 
composition of the city. Precariousness and temporality are tied together in the 
discourse of permanence and ownership, which is tied to the question of who has 
the right to the city (Lefebvre, 1968; Appadurai and Holston, 1996; Harvey, 2008; 
Mitchell, 2003; Soja, 2010). The parasitic city (Bennholdt-Thomsen and Mies, 1999) 
in the contemporary economies of consumer capitalism needs for its survival the 
exurbs of the city of the poor. The informal human settlements are preserved 
because these are the fields for extraction of cheap labour and a localized trapped 
consumer market. Therefore, the geographic confinement is maintained while 
simultaneously denounced as parasitic.  
The recognition of informality as a legitimate form of living promotes the articulation 
of demands and of organizational dynamics. The political empowerment and 
engagement of the residents goes from having no rights under informality, to 
acquiring rights as user and participants on the political. A “politics of place” 
(Harcourt and Escobar, 2005) starts with the composition of political collectives. 
When the informal human settlement becomes a proper name – a place – then it 
becomes a “site of enunciation, a way of marking or outlining a territory, but also its 
projection onto the city as a form of resisting confinement” (Sarlo, 2009, p. 187). 
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Such is the danger seen by the ruling class of tossing political power to the 
enormity of the populations growing in the peripheries of the city. If these 
populations attain political power the privileged political position of the ruling class 
could be at stake. Thus, the expansion of informality and the ever-continuous 
presence of temporality as a de facto status are favoured for the ruling class. 
Otherwise, with permanence of residence, ownership of property and with the 
formality of urban planning, social and political rights come to these disfranchised 
populations. Thus, to safeguard the continuation of political oligarchies, informality 
has to be kept as a monstrous character and a threat to civil society. 
*** 
 
5.4. Viveza criolla, the practice of informality. 
In the social tectonics of the site of the marginalized communities in Latin America, 
viveza criolla is an instrument of survival and a way of life. In all decisions and 
observations the artist/architect must be aware that the subjects living in 
marginalized communities are not passive observers, they are not a silent audience, 
users or consumers. Viveza is a vernacular modus operandi of the everyday life and 
social consciousness that enables behaviours of resistance by taking advantage of 
all cracks left on the hegemonic system. It signifies a silent and coded re-
signification between the sharp divisions of political alienation of the permanent 
political subjects – those who adopt and carry out the decisions –, and the others – 
the marginalized, who are permanently the political objects, solicited only for their 
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declaration of alliance to the decisions, and in appeal to their conformity to behave 
according to them.  
 
The artist/architect must be aware that the objects of their social practices have a 
distinct consciousness and practices of epistemic resistance to the oppressive and 
exploitative methods of the society that rules over them. These are manifested 
through language codes, and disruptive manners of social behaviours, and ethics 
that the marginalized have conceived in their everyday life to survive and even thrive 
in the imposed conditions of abject poverty, disfranchisement and marginalization. 
Artists/architects, social agents, and activists have to be aware of their prejudicial 
social baggage. The images and assumptions that NGO’s and other third-sector 
organizations have created of the poor as helpless, innocent and ignorant are not 
necessarily true.  
NGO’s and third- sector organizations depend on stereotyping poor marginalized 
communities and on the interpassivity33 of most people to support their presence 
and projects using the key words of participation, decentralization and 
associationalism (Kallman and Clark, 2016) to gain the trust and to appear to be 
inclusive and democratic. By the same token, both the words inclusive and 
democratic are part of the common lexicon of the third sector, the state and private 
                                                
33 Slavoj Zizek uses the term interpassivity to describe the belief and attitude present when 
people assume that they are actually participating and contributing – “making a difference” 
– by clicking a button on an online petition, adding their name or commenting on an online 
blog.  
Zizek explains: “You think you are active, while your true position, as embodied in the 
fetish, is passive” (Zizek, 1997). 
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interest, when the goal is to legitimized a project by publicness to generate trust 
and legitimacy by public. 
These communities have been violently repressed, alienated, expelled, and 
exploited for centuries. They have created ways of life that have permitted them to 
survive in the most of abject conditions of poverty and violence. 
The artist/architect must take into account viveza as the vernacular modus operandi 
of epistemic, economic, and political resistance of the disfranchised poor of Latin 
America, before constructing any design program on their social practices. 
*** 
5.4.1. The disruptive tactics of the marginalized: el vivo. 
“El vivo es el pícaro violento y curtido de malicia tropical”. 
(“El vivo is the violent rogue seasoned by tropical malice”).  
(Massiani, 1962). 
The pícaro is the rogue individualist that works at the margins of society’s systems 
and institutions of law and order; el vivo infiltrates, traverses and discontinuous the 
flow of rules and law towards his/her own advantage. 
Viveza criolla (Massiani,1962). is a term used informally across many countries in 
Latin America. It is used derogatorily by the upper classes to name what they call a 
vernacular amoral behaviour that belongs to the anomie of the poorest uneducated 
class. Viveza can be described as a type of rogue attitude and ‘laissez-faire feeling’ 
towards authority that common people exploit by taking illegal or inappropriate 
advantages by circumventing, bending, and/or breaking with the formalities of 
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proper social behaviour, and the rule of law. It is a form of informality that 
dominates the everyday life of the poor in order to survive in the “good” society that 
governs the social, legal and political life systems where they live. Asef Bayat (2010) 
called this “quiet encroachment”. He encountered the same social phenomena in 
Middle Eastern societies. Bayat described “quiet encroachment” as the “silent, 
protracted, but pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied, 
powerful, or the public, in order to survive and improve their lives” (Bayat, 2010). 
Viveza seems also to be an impulse of wisdom very connected to the organic being, 
something that acts and ends in a flash of intuition, leaving aside any trace of true 
comprehension and useful knowledge. El vivo is the individual who carries the 
implicit underlying sense of intentionality and a tendency to be strictly utilitarian. El 
vivo is an anarchist who rebels against the established order because he can better 
operate in this way (Massiani, 1962). 
Viveza, on the other hand, is taken by the lower classes of disadvantaged peoples 
as a wise ruse to trick the system, to take from the rich to benefit oneself. As the 
poor people see it, it is a kind of poetic justice. They see the upper class in 
perennial control of the government and jurisprudence by a continually reproducing 
system of legacy of social and political connections, where the “right people” inherit 
their social positioning within an oligarchy. The common people are clearly aware of 
how the rich, the well connected and the powerful manage the system to continue 
to enrich themselves by continually reshaping the rules of the system towards their 
own benefit. Legitimizing their own corrupt behaviours by manipulating the 
jurisprudence, and criminalizing the behaviour of the poor by creating laws, ethics 
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and morals that benefit them. Michel De Certeau posited something to this point, 
when he framed “The tactics of consumption, the indigenous ways in which the 
weak make use of the strong, thus lend a political dimension to everyday practices” 
(De Certeau, 1984, p. xvii). 
El vivo exists in all situations of marginality as the one who takes advantage of the 
colonizer. As a tactic of resistance, viveza relies on unbounded individualism, to the 
point of being anti-communal, selfish and self-serving at a cost not only of the 
hegemonic state but also to his own “community”. The relationship of el vivo with 
the community is complex as viveza is a tactic that can be individual and selfish but 
also communal. When electricity is “stolen” from the private or state utilities 
company to provide for the whole settlement, viveza can be seen as a way of 
“poaching”. As De Certeau presented: “Every life invents itself by poaching in 
countless ways on the property of others” (De Certeau, 1984, p. xii). When this 
“poaching” is done by the upper class, it is called appropriation, with an artistic 
demeanour of cultural enforcement of the normative ways of social absorption. But 
when it is done by the outsider – the marginal, the poor, the other, the darker-
skinned – then it is viveza and poaching. The illegality and immorality impressed in 
these terms of viveza and poaching are demonstrative of the abjection upper-class 
society has on the poor. The “poacher”, el vivo, thus becomes an agent of distrust, 
not a figure of rebellious resistance or romantic notions of revolution and 
empowerment. El vivo is described as a parasite of society, a person without civility, 
ethics and morals. The anomie of el vivo is further characterized as a social deviant. 
The abjection of el vivo by the upper class is sometimes shared by the people of the 
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poor communities, and on other occasions el vivo is celebrated as a sort of Robin 
Hood character. 
A response from the marginalized to the culture imposed by the “elites” that 
produces the epistemology of legitimization in the forms of the language, signs and 
symbols that they cannot read is in the “tricks in the arts of doing” (De Certeau, 
1984). These “tricks” enable the marginalized individual subjected to constraints of 
modern urban society to deflect them, to manipulate them to make use of them in 
reinventing her own everyday practice of being. 
*** 
 
5.4.2. The inferiority of race. 
There is a consciousness of inferiority ingrained by the processes of colonization 
into the colonized mind. These processes marked the populations of the colonized 
countries by racializing them into hierarchical categories of whiteness versus 
indigenous. These are categories of pureness that segregated the indigenous 
population from the settler populations.  
The colonizer imposed the social classification of “race”34 to all colonized peoples 
to forge what continues to be the actual pattern of power in capitalist society today 
(Quijano, 2000). This became the universal logic and method applied to all 
populations worldwide to legitimize the exploitation and extraction of resources, 
                                                
34 Quijano (2000) makes clear that he considers the division of society by gender to be the 
oldest system of domination. 
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labour and bodies from the colonized world. The Peruvian sociologist Anibal 
Quijano argued “race is surely the most efficient instrument of social domination 
produced in the last 500 years” (Quijano, 2007, p. 45). Quijano added that race 
became the categorizing instrument of the colonizer to produce “new historical 
social identities”: criollo, mestizos, Indian, black, mulatos, etc. Thus, “race became 
the fundamental criterion” that enabled the colonizer to construct a new map of the 
world’s population dividing the populations by “rank, places, and roles in the new 
society’s structure of power” (Quijano, 2000, p. 535). 
European science legitimized the superiority of the European race over all others 
(Vandana, 1999; Quijano, 2000; Puwar, 2004). The production of evidence became 
the cornerstone of historical truth (Spivak, 1988; Said, 1993; Bhabha, 1994). The 
new science of biology produced the necessary evidence for the foundations of the 
invention of race, and thus provided the justifications for the colonial domination 
over inferior races. 
In this new-world geography of power, the colonized were left with a pervasive 
consciousness of inferiority that infused all life experiences and relationships of the 
colonized in the colonial world-system of globalized capitalism (Quijano and 
Wallerstein, 1992; Grosfoguel, 2002). This has left an indelible mark in how the 
colonized thinks and feels of him/herself. There is no permanent way possible to 
describe how the colonized “feels of him/herself”, as its condition is dynamically 
dependent on the mutations of the world-system of globalized capitalism. Thus, 
here a Derridean sous rature, “under erasure” is needed. As Spivak wrote: “Since 
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the word is inaccurate, it is crossed out. Since it is necessary, it remains legible” 
(Spivak, 1988, p. xiv). 
The idea of how the colonized “feels of him/herself” is a transitory concept, 
especially as the meaning is so relational, as it evolves differently with every passing 
generation. Even more conspicuous is that this text is being written by “the author” 
of this thesis, who is inevitably characterizing all experiences of the marginalized 
from his privileged social positioning of a white male Latin-American petite 
bourgeois. From my perspective, there are no clear definitions to be stated as truths 
– and if one is presented as truth, it should be taken with suspicion. Fanon argued 
that in the process of colonization “the colonized acquire a peculiar visceral 
intelligence dedicated to the survival of body and spirit” (Fanon, 1963, p. 16). This 
character of survival is what is called viveza. 
In time viveza became an ingrained national practice of resistance against the 
colonizer. After the colonizers were gone these practices continue as part of 
everyday life and the larger project of coloniality35. To this, Sayak Valencia argued 
that the “ethics in the Third Word, more than a process, are an in situ action” 
(Valencia, 2018, p. 116). Thus viveza is part of a national character that is still 
                                                
35 Coloniality is a transposed method of representation. It explains the systemic organization of 
capital, knowledge, race, social and behavioral interactions between axial definitions of the global 
patterns between a hegemonic power and the subordinate subaltern global consumer (the 
colonized).  
Thus, coloniality is a continuation of the colonial forms of domination after the end of colonial 
administrations.(Grosfoguel, 2002) 
This term was coined by the Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano as part of the theory of the 
Coloniality of Power (Quijano, 1998) . It refers to a crucial structuring process in the modern/colonial 
world-system that articulates peripheral locations in the international division of labor, subaltern 
group political strategies, and Third World migrants’ inscription in the racial/ ethnic hierarchy of 
metropolitan global cities (Grosfoguel, 2002). 
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confronting its passage to modernity, while still carrying all the baggage left from 
colonization. 
But viveza in one form or another is a global way that the poor and disfranchised of 
the world deal with their everyday subsistence. Fanon wrote: 
“Deep down the colonized subject knows no authority. He is dominated but 
not domesticated. He is made to feel inferior, but by no means convinced of 
his inferiority. He patiently waits for the colonialist to let down his guard and 
then jumps on him” (Fanon, 1963, p. 16). 
*** 
It is necessary for the artist and architect who are working in the site of the 
marginalized to realize the power asymmetries already implicit by his/her own 
phenotype. The history of colonial relationships is imbued in the body of the artist 
and architect as figures of expert and professional agency, but principally as figures 
belonging to the phenotype of the colonizer; these links cannot be omitted. To omit 
historical differences and power asymmetries for the apparent sake of conviviality 
further sediments such asymmetries as an acceptable given reality. Artists and 
architects have the responsibility to be aware of the political history of the site and 
to the prejudicial advantages of their own phenotype. Otherwise, the audience of 
the marginalized will, as Fanon said, jump on him. 
This type of perspective error from the artist and the architect when intervening with 
their work in poor marginalized communities has the common detrimental outcome 
of the community not accepting the work as part of their place. The word 
“intervention” which is commonly used in art and architecture’s social practices 
does imply a de facto state of the site as wrong or ill and in need of an intervention. 
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Examples abound of projects being abandoned, vandalized and destroyed by the 
same people that they were supposedly built for. La Casa del Viento (2017), a 
project of social architecture designed to be a communal library by the atelier 
Arquitectura Expandida in San Cristobal, Bogotá, Colombia was burnt as result of a 
dispute between community members. In this particular case the architects of 
Arquitectura Expandida failed to recognize the political and social complexity of the 
community. The architects that composed the atelier Arquitectura Expandida are 
from Spain and Belgium; although by the time they designed La Casa del Viento 
they had been residing and working in Bogotá for a few years, they still maintained 
a romantic notion of the poor and marginalized community as needy, simple and 
naïve. Their work was seen by part of the community as an unwelcome 
“intervention” that favoured part of the community while not recognizing the political 
power of the community board.  
*** 
The site for artists and architects’ socio-spatial practices is an imaginary socio-
political construction of bits and pieces of stereotypes and beliefs about who the 
poor, disfranchised and marginalized are, what their needs are, and who should 
help them. The site is constructed as a landscape of necessity, an assemblage of 
social politics, and publicity, where the artist and architects are positioned as social 
catalyst and agents of good. From this perspective the artist and architect become 
colonizer agents from Americo-European ethical and moral positions. 
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Chapter 6. The syncretic practice. 
This chapter explores a critical deconstruction of artists’ and architects’ practices in 
the site of marginalized communities. This thesis posits that the methods and 
design thinking by which artists and architects intervene with their practices in the 
site of marginalized communities have risen from a syncretic relationship between 
art and architecture’s theory and praxis. This syncretic practice developed by artists 
and architects is beneficial for both disciplines but has not been critically 
addressed. The expanded field (Krauss, 1979) of their theory and design practices 
has not been critically assessed beyond the framework of spatial practice (Rendell, 
2006; Miessen and Hirsch, 2012). The lack of a critical assessment of the social 
tectonics of the site of practice perpetuates a colonizer’s attitude and prejudicial 
perspective embodied by the artist and architect as social agents. In this chapter 
the colonizer’s attitude of the artist and architect will be analysed and 
deconstructed into its formative elements, from traditional disciplinary practices of 
design thinking to the authoritative image of the artist and architect as expert, 
professional agent. As part of this deconstruction, it is also necessary to convey a 
critical analysis of the role of the public, the practices of participation, and place-
making strategies utilized by artists and architects in the design program of their 
social practices. This chapter concludes by mapping the epistemic errors in artists’ 
and architects’ socio-spatial practices and presenting guidelines for a 
transformative participation for socio-spatial practices that support and enable 
place-making. 
*** 
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6.0. Syncretism between art and architecture. 
The American historian Nancy Farris said that where creative tensions arise from the 
combination of two distinct perspectives, from those creative tensions new insights 
can continue to emerge (Farris, 1986). When these tensions become visible, models 
for new practices can be created for people to become participants in their own 
processes of social engagement. 
Art and architecture intersect inadvertently at times and purposely at others. The 
site of intersection lies on shared practices between their theoretical disciplines and 
on the site of their social practices. The site of the social is where these practices 
most often intersect and collide. Their divergences and alliances most often take 
form when dealing with participatory issues, agency, and authorship. It is from this 
site of turbulence that mixing, borrowing, appropriation, and reinvention between 
the social practices of art and architecture construed novel syncretic forms of 
action, tactics, agency, and dialogue. 
Art and architecture share a kind of conflictual appreciation between them. These 
two practices where disjointed by professionalization and artificial cognitive gaps 
imposed by academic disciplinary subdivisions. Nevertheless, in the site of the 
social both practices acknowledge their advantages and shortcomings. When 
artists and architects expanded their practices outside and beyond the traditions of 
the built object of architecture and the artwork, and moved outside the institutions 
of the gallery, museum, university, and design/artist’s studio, the blurriness between 
the boundaries of the two disciplines of art and architecture became entwined into 
an “accidental” syncretism as practice. Luca Tateo and Giuseppina Marsico (2014) 
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described syncretism as “an epistemological stance that is never rejecting any 
emerging or potential new idea because it belongs to a different “specie” or 
“perspective” (Tateo and Marsico, 2014). 
The Dutch visual artist and curator Jeanne van Heeswijk (2012) argued that we 
should stop thinking of autonomy and instrumentalization of art and architecture as 
oppositional features. Van Heeswijk states that nowadays “autonomy and 
instrumentalization are no longer opposite strategies” (Van Heeswijk, 2012, p. 78).  
Van Heeswijk in her own social artworks explores the syncretic space between art 
and architecture as instruments for social regeneration. Van Heeswijk describes her 
practice as “collaborative production”; long-scale community-embedded projects 
between people involved in processes of urban development that question art’s 
autonomy. An example of a syncretic practice is the methodology in her ongoing 
project based in Morocco, “QANAT: a training for the not yet” built together with 
artistic platform LE 18. The project is presented as a “training course and a 
platform” for people of Marrakech to “share memories and wishes and then develop 
new ideas, inspired by the traditional water culture” (Van Heeswijk, 2020). Van 
Heeswijk sees her work as a platform to strategically connect different actors to 
enable social change. 
The German architect and writer Markus Miessen notes that “the venturing out of 
both the notion of expertise and discipline is crucial in order to remain sufficiently 
curious towards the specialized knowledges of others” (Miessen, 2010, p. 196). The 
“specialized knowledges of others” that Miessen speaks of, come from the voices of 
the inhabitants of the site, the marginalized uneducated poor. To open the 
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specialized practice of architecture and art to these voices is to foment an 
epistemology of justice and solidarity that is never positioned as static or 
hegemonic. Thus, fomenting the construction of knowledge through the 
complementary views from professional and expert knowledge from architecture 
and art, together with vernacular knowledge from the voices of the inhabitants of 
the site – and hence creating a syncretic epistemology. 
*** 
Architecture as a multifaceted discipline has been tied to the construction of the 
social environment. The design of architecture’s spatial interventions, social 
engagement, and “social architecture” paradigms has been regarded as “a cure-all 
for the field of architecture: as an instrument, tool, or operating device that can 
transform, as if by magic, this loathed discipline into one that is relevant to the 
overall development of society” (Schneider, 2013, p. 250). 
This shift took hold in art and architecture social practices at the beginning of the 
1990s as ideas on participatory design, human-centred design, and a more 
inclusive pedagogy started to be developed and included in academic curricula. In 
the design and action for social participatory strategies is where art and architecture 
met in a syncretic relationship.  
Since the late 1960s, the ideas explored by Cedric Price, Paul Barker, Reyner 
Banham and Peter Hall in their 1969 article “Non-Plan: an Experiment in Freedom“, 
where they argued that people should be allowed to shape the environment they 
want to live and work in. This postulate went against the grain of formal architecture 
practice and pedagogy. Ideas such as Price’s “anticipatory architect”, in which the 
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general public could determine, control and shape their own surroundings, together 
with Price’s architecture of “calculated uncertainty”, were time-based urban 
intervention tactics that were influential in promoting alternative design practices in 
architecture and art. 
Other experiments on a new type of social architecture were simultaneously 
occurring: for example the inflatable forms designed by the Archigram group, and 
the utopian geodesic domes of Buckminster Fuller of 1968. Other groups as 
Superstudio’s Continous Monument, 1969, Ant Farm and the Merry Pranksters were 
taking transdisciplinary approaches from art, architecture and social activism in the 
utopian spirit of revolutionary social change at the end of the 1960s. During this 
epoch of the late 1960s, art and architecture started to share and develop a 
syncretism in their social praxis.  Situationism as an art praxis appeared as a plastic 
development from the ideologies and practices of the Lettrist International (1952–
57). Their critique of modern urbanism and architecture, together with the praxis of 
unitary urbanism, influenced the development of situationism until the writings of 
Guy Debord (1967) took situationism into a different social critique. Nevertheless, 
the beginnings of a syncretic practice between art and architecture had its modern 
origins in the social architecture and participatory art movements of the late 1960s. 
This syncretic practice continues as a feedback loop in the projects of socially 
engaged art and architecture that have become ubiquitous since the mid-90s. Both 
art and architecture settled their sights on these participatory socially engaged 
projects in the site of the most disfranchised. Artists and architects want to 
distinguish themselves as being “agents of change” for the betterment of life in poor 
and marginalized communities., and by the same token legitimize their practices as 
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a social good. 
The architectural historian, cultural critic and art writer Jane Rendell (2003) identified 
these spaces between art and architecture as places of the social, the place of 
dialogue and ongoing discussion. Rendell argues that the social space created by 
the intersections between art and architecture’s social interventions and projects 
converse into what Rendell coined as critical spatial practice (Rendell, 2003). 
Rendell saw these projects as located in between art and architecture, not 
completely belonging to either discipline but instead located in“a triple crossroads: 
between theory and practice, between public and private, and between art and 
architecture” (Rendell, 2006). What Rendell defined as critical spatial practice, 
becomes more of a critical theoretical perspective from where to identify 
syncretisms between these two practices. A place where the borrowing, 
appropriation, influence, and co-optation of techniques and practices between the 
artist and architect in the terrain of the social are amalgamated into a modus 
operandi for a social practice. 
Since the late 1960s, projects of syncretic nature between art, architecture, and 
social activism have been continuously reinvented. The works of the San Francisco-
based collective Ant Farm, 1968 (Chip Lord, Doug Michels, and Curtis Schreier), 
explored the intersection of architecture, design and media art, in a series of 
interventions aiming towards a critique of the North American’s capitalist culture of 
mass media and consumerism. Also the works of the artists’ group Anarchitecture 
based in New York, 1974 (Laurie Anderson, Tina Girouard, Carol Goodden, Suzanne 
Harris, Jene Highstein, Bernard Kirschenbaun, Richard Landry, Richard Nonas, and 
the architecturally trained artist Gordon Matta Clark). Their syncretic practice 
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combined a political critique of contemporary culture and architecture as a capitalist 
mode of production. Anarchitecture’s production of artworks remained limited to 
photographs, documentation and small temporal social interventions. Later on there 
were Gordon Matta Clark’s building carvings in the Bronx, New York City (1972–75), 
and the project Reality Propenies: Fake Estates (1973), which consisted of buying 
tiny slivers of unbuildable sometimes inaccessible and unseen land. Art critic 
Rosalind Krauss and Yve-Alain Bois described these land acquisitions as having 
“no use value whatsoever and only a purely nominal exchange value: these are fake 
commodities, fake real estate properties” (Krauss and Bois, 1997, p. 226). This was 
Matta Clark’s critique on the American dream of private ownership. Another project 
by Matta Clark, Food (1971–73), which was not part of Anarchitecture's oeuvre, was 
an artist-run restaurant. It was considered to be both a business and an artistic 
intervention. This work was a precursor of the type of social interventions where art 
and architecture blurred distinctions with social activism and everyday life. These 
types of projects will eventually coalesce into the socially engaged art and 
architecture practices of the 1990s that influenced today’s social practices.  
The syncretic practices resulting from the intersections of art, architecture, and the 
social has continued to blur the divisions between the social action of community 
activism and the social intervention of an artist/architect. The art critic Nicolas 
Bourriaud (2002) presented the artist’s role as a “social catalyst” for social action. 
Bourriaud celebrated the works of social action of artists like Rirkrit Tiravanija of the 
early-1990s, which involved cooking meals inside the gallery to feed the audience. 
 Art and architecture had been appropriating tactics and forms from community 
activism since the early 60s. Then, these appropriations were seen as artists and 
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architects being socially responsible and politically conscious of the effects their 
disciplines had on maintaining the status quo of capitalist society. A feeling of 
change towards the dismantlement of hegemonic power from the state and 
institutions of education was the driving force behind the works artists and 
architects explored during the 60s and 70s. A sense of a vanguardist transformative 
practice was what empowered artists and architects to seek with their works to 
change the capitalist paradigm of consumerist-driven audience towards a social 
engagement of a politically conscious public. Such practices denounced the 
mythical autonomy of art – the l’art pour l’art romanticism of the artist as a being 
independent of society. The social practices of art and architecture of the 60s and 
70s exposed that the “view that art’s independence from society exists only in the 
artist’s imagination” and “that autonomy is a historically condition phenomenon [... 
the autonomy of art] is a mere illusion” (Bürger, 1984, p. 35). 
 
The revival of early-90s social works as works of art created controversy within the 
establishment of art and architecture institutions. Many initially critiqued the 
syncretic practices as mere appropriations of social activism dressed as art, before 
embracing the new syncretic practices as means to re-legitimize the institutions of 
art and architecture. An example was artist Tania Bruguera’s work Immigrant 
Movement International (2011), which was applauded as an effective work of social 
art in solidarity with the immigrant community of Queens, New York City. The same 
work was also criticized as an opportunistic appropriation of the work that social 
activists do for immigrant communities. Another work that deals directly with the 
plight of immigrant communities comes from architect Sana Murrani’s Creative 
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Recovery: Mapping Refugees’ Memories of Home as Heritage (2018). These works 
navigate the social complexities of syncretic practices and the academic criticism of 
ethical vs. aesthetic considerations of the work (Bishop, 2006). Other works have 
also been critiqued as opportunist and exploitative of the social conditions of the 
people that are included as users/participants. The uncritical intervention of artists 
and architects in the site of marginalized communities has been described as 
colonialist in purpose and meaning (Dornoff, et al, 2018; Farago, 2020). 
*** 
6.0.1. Syncretism in technology. 
Nowadays, the use of advance digital technologies in art and architecture has 
become ubiquitous. Artist and architects have always been keen to take advantage 
of new materials, techniques and technologies to explore, and expand their own 
practices. Hence, the convergence of technologies between these two disciplines 
creates another intersectional modus operandi. As both practices feed off each 
other on the possibilities of technology, a novel syncretic site of knowledge and 
practices with digital, interactive, and telecommunication technologies emerged in 
the early 90s. 
Two distinct examples of these syncretic practices can be seen in the 
contradictions between the works of Dutch artist Daan Roosegaarde and architect 
Philip Beesley. Roosegaarde’s practice focuses on the use of technology to create 
works that can be simultaneously considered artworks and architecture. 
Roosegaarde develops projects that merge technology and art in urban 
environments. His works Van Gogh Path (2012), an illuminated sidewalk, and the 
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artwork Yes But Chair situate his practice in a way he describes thus: “the role of 
the artist is to be a happy infiltrator […] to connect with dreams, with craftsmanship 
[...] to make new things happen” (Roosegaarde, 2015). The public nature of the 
works, and the artist’s intentions for the works to be used as instruments for the 
social betterment of the everyday life of the inhabitants and transients of the spaces 
transformed by his works, place the works as social practice. On the other hand, 
Philip Beesley’s practice as an architect was transformed in the mid-1990’s when 
he started to construct large-scale interactive art installations (Palatine Burial 
Installation, 1996; Hylozoic Soil: Meduse Field, 2010). The positive publicity that his 
practice as an artist received was much greater than he got as an architect. The 
diminishing work for architects in the mid-90s, and the eventual economic 
meltdown of the early 2000s, meant for most architects an almost overnight 
disappearance of design and construction projects. Philip Beesley took the 
opportunity to use his architecture design training together with the use of CAD, 
CNC, and 3D printing technologies to design reactive, technologically driven, 
beautiful decorative quasi sci-fi organisms to be presented as art installations, what 
he named “responsive environments”. The lure of the new, together with the 
undeniable mesmerizing beauty of his installations, brought him fame as an 
architect/artist. Beesley’s work illustrates the vacillating perspective when trying to 
define and place in context for the works that result from syncretic practices. 
Beesley’s Hylozoic Ground work was defined as interactive architecture when it was 
published in Michael Fox and Miles Kemp’s book Interactive Architecture (2009). In 
another book, edited by Robert Klanten, Sven Ehmann and Verena Hanschke, A 
Touch of Code (2011), Beesley’s  Hylozoic Ground is contextualized as art.   
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The pairing of art and architecture with technology has not been free of criticism. 
The Italian architect Giancarlo De Carlo argued that “The very school for the 
preparation of architects was born out of an ambiguous coupling of art and 
technology, destined inevitably to generate a sterile species” (De Carlo, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the trend continuous as new technologies and new sites of practice 
offer the young artist and architect a place of their own to develop their own 
professional practice. 
The art critic and writer Hal Foster said, “Not long ago, a near prerequisite for 
vanguard architecture was an engagement with theory; lately it has become an 
acquaintance with art” (Foster, 2011, p. vii). Nowadays, Foster’s statement goes 
beyond architecture’s engagement with art as a necessary ingredient for a 
vanguardist practice. Today, it is a question not only of economic survival and 
panache of the architect, but more importantly of the legitimacy of the practice of 
architecture. When engineers are legally allowed to approve and sign architectural 
plans, thus threatening the hegemony of the architect as agent of expert 
knowledge, architecture finds itself in a race to deconstruct the practice and to 






   
 232 
6.1. The colonizer methodological gap. 
“You never look at me from the place from which I see you” 
(Lacan, 1978). 
 
The colonizer’s perspective is the colonizer’s own cognitive trap. For Fredric 
Jameson (1990), the whole of the everyday life is completely colonized, to the point 
that it is impossible to have “any direct cognition of the world”. It is as the picture in 
Lacan’s fisherman story (1978). The metaphor of the “tin” in Lacan’s story is not 
about what it is not seen by the “tin”; it is about what is not seen from the place of 
the colonizer – the agent, the artist, architect, who is the historical subject (the 
political subject). The ones who are “out of place in the picture” are the subjected 
inhabitants of the marginalized places (the political objects). 
The Lacanian gaze is about what we desire to see – appearance – and not about 
what is actually there. The question remains, from whose eyes are we seeing? 
Those of the colonizer or of the colonized? Is it that to gaze is only possible from 
the perspective of privileged power? Or is it that the marginalized can only be object 
to the gaze, never the subject? 
 “We gaze because we are lured by the medium to see what it is it wishes us to 
see, by covering what is actually there” (Geiger, 2003).  
 
Who chooses and manipulates the medium? The relationship between the eye and 
the gaze is political, engendered in power relations between the subject and the 
subjected. This is far beyond Marshall McLuhan’s (1964) subjectivity between of the 
message and the medium. When power relations are involved a Foucaultian sense 
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of translation and interpretation invade all intersubjective relationships. 
The colonizer’s gaze is what it is desired to be seen and to be made public, and 
invisibilizes what is actually there, physically and in context of social power 
relations. What it is seen by the eye is the colonizer’s construct of aesthetics and 
affects of his dominant culture. We are made to gaze because we are lured or 
confused (Baudrillard, 1981) by the universal desires of the medium of consumer 
society. To desire what it is, it wishes us to desire, to consume the appropriate 
items of social recognition and social camouflage (Leach, 2006). Not by coveting 
what is actually there, but instead by camouflaging the many alternatives that exist 
on the menu of choice, and only contextualizing as desirable the ones that are 
appropriate to sustain the status quo of the reigning hegemonic power.   
The perverse ubiquity of this myopic social perspective is why methodological gaps 
are evident in many projects that have been developed from what it is generally 
known today as socially engaged art and social architecture. These are initiatives 
where the role and purpose of the artwork or the architecture is supposedly created 
in participation or collaboration with the public. Nevertheless, the questions of 
social engagement, contested space, and cultural hegemony, especially when 
working with marginalized populations, are still undefined. The architect Teddy Cruz 
(2012) points towards this methodological gap when he questions how artists, 
architects and communities are going to create an effective project that could 
enable an institutional transformation, beyond the institutional patches that 
governments, NGOs and other third-sector organizations’36 sponsor for the 
                                                
36 Third sector organizations refers to NGOs, NPOs, CSOs, and INGOs. 
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temporary relief of social and economic problems affecting these communities.  
These organizations appear to fill a “social gap” left by neglect, corruption, 
bureaucracy and ineptitude of the state. As the state recoils from their social 
obligations and welfare of the “public”, the political space is open for instalment of 
third-sector organizations to fulfil the gap left by the state. These gaps left by the 
state, which are publicized as socio-economic need, are fulfilled by these actors not 
only at the socio-economic level but ideologically and politically as well. The gap is 
created by the cognitive blindness to the ineffectiveness of participatory and 
collaboration strategies in the design planning of social projects. From government 
agencies to independent artists’ and architects’ projects, the limited and prejudicial 
perspective caused by the experience error implicit in the colonizer’s gaze keeps 
government social agencies, planning boards, third-sector NGO’s and artists and 
architects in a self-referential feedback loop of self-congratulatory efficiency 
discourse. 
“I emphasize effective project because what we need is a more functional set 
of operations that can reconnect art to the urgency of everyday and the re-
thinking of its institutions” (Cruz, 2012).  
The institutions, Cruz is referring to the states’ legitimizing institutions of power: 
juridical, legislative and cultural institutions that delineate what is the proper allowed 
behaviour and what is not. These are the same bureaucratic institutional offices of 
the governments that are in charge to delineate the cultural, the health and the 
social relationships that are deemed appropriate and valuable. The same 
institutions that legitimize what is “good taste” and what is not, decide what is 
appropriate behaviour and what is not – in this way, legitimizing the taste, politics, 
morals and ethics of the ruling class. 
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*** 
6.2. The colonizer. 
Franz Fanon argued that it was “the colonist who fabricated and continues to 
fabricate the colonized subject” (Fanon, 1969, p. 2). The question that arises is: by 
intervening in theory and praxis with the social space dynamics of communities, 
especially in the case of poor marginalized and disfranchised communities, are the 
artist/architect, with their implicit agency in their role as professional expert, 
reproducing the ideologies and practices of subordination that have constituted 
these communities as marginalized? Henri Lefebvre posited that space is a social 
construction (Lefebvre, 1991). When artists/architects intervene in the social space 
dynamics of a community’s place, they are intervening in the socio-political 
dynamics of the community; and of the community’s relationship with the state, 
other private actors, NGOs, and third-sector organizations that are engaged with 
the management of the community’s infrastructure: water, waste disposal, 
education, electric utilities, health, and transportation. The place of influence that 
the artist/architect has as expert agents must be analysed with great care. The 
practices with which artists and architects engage with communities’ places of 
dwelling as sites for their projects and interventions must be carefully and 
intersectionally rethought. The design thinking of social engagement and 
participatory practices are to be constitutive of social life. Thus, it is paramount that 
the artist/architect, in their eagerness to collaborate with communities, does not fall 
into the epistemic ignorance of essentially reproducing the power dynamics that 
have exploited and sedimented the conditions of subordination of the marginalized. 
The power of expert knowledge that the artist/architect possesses does give them 
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an a priori hierarchical positioning within these communities. How the 
artist/architect chooses to utilize this power/knowledge axis lies in whether their 
practices reproduce the traditional monolithic interpretation of power as repressive, 
or reinterpret the power asymmetries between them and their audience/user. 
Foucault said that power “needs to be considered as a productive network which 
runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose 
function is repression” (Foucault, 1980). Hence the theory and praxis of participation 
and social engagement and collaboration from the design thinking perspective of 
the artist/architect must be engaged from an ecology of knowledge (Bateson, 1972) 
and an intersectional perspective (Crenshaw, 1991) in their design thinking. Lefebvre 
argued that “theory opens the road, clears a new way; practice takes it, it produces 
the route and the space” (Lefebvre, 1978). Hence it is important for the social 
practice to be engaged with socio-political theory. Otherwise, their role as agents 
for social engagement might be compromised by unwittingly becoming Albert 
Memmi’s (1969) third category of colonialism’s social actors: the interpreter agent 
between colonialism’s institutions and the colonized. 
*** 
When the artist/architect enters the field of the social, they are entering a field of 
contested definitions of epistemic authority and legitimacy. These definitions 
legitimize the asymmetries of power in society between class, gender, and race.  
These contestations are vectorized by the state and the upper class towards the 
reproduction of the condition of marginalization of these communities. Other 
contestations arise from the marginalized communities towards the state, and yet 
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others from the marginalized communities towards themselves. The artist/architect 
must be careful to know who they serve. Fanon said that when the colonized starts 
adopting the cultural means of the dominant culture, “He becomes whiter” (Fanon, 
1952, p. 18). 
The space in between the contestations of the site – the place of the marginalized 
community – is where the artist/architect is positioned by her practice. The liminality 
of such space makes it a site of paradoxical and dialectical configurations between 
the artist/architect and her praxis.  
These are turbulent spaces where the artist/architect must navigate where 
colonization has left a legacy of injustices between the colonizer and the colonized. 
These are the spaces of informal settlements and economies at the outskirts of the 
metropolitan city that Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen and Maria Mies (1999, p. 150) 
have named the “new enclosures” (p. 150) of capitalism. The Argentinian sociologist 
Veronica Gago (2017) has also identified these spaces as sites of informal 
commerce and dwelling. The Villa, Gago (2017, p. 187) posited is the site of the 
informal economic structure of the marginalized communities, but also a liminal 
space between the formal economy of the metropolis and the informality of the 
periphery.  Thus, the sites of informality are categorized by images of monstrosity 
fabricated and publicized from the ruling class to demonize these communities as 
threats to formal society; aesthetically by their informal architectural constructions, 
economically by their ever-growing power of their informal markets, and racially by 
their composition of poor indigenous migrants. Therefore, artists and architects can 
exploit the image of the benevolent colonizer, as in the “Manichean allegory”, where 
racial and cultural differences were transformed into “moral and even metaphysical 
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difference” (JanMohamed, 1985, p. 201) between the colonizer and the colonized; 
or they can act against it by recognizing the asymmetries of power of the sites 
where they chose to intervene. 
The artist/architect in their epistemic agency can transgress the colonizer/colonized 
dialectic, and attempt to pass over to the other’s side. Nevertheless, Ali Behdad 
posits that the “binaries of colonizer/colonized, sacrificer/sacrificed is illusory, 
however, because his identity is already inscribed in such a hierarchical relation” 
(Behdad, 1997, p. 207). Such is the conflictual position of the artist/architect when 
using the marginalized community as site for her practice. 
It is important to note that solutions to this dialectic of the artist/architect colonizer 
are often thought to lie in the geographic immersion of the artist/architect into the 
other’s community. Thus, appearing to legitimize the artist/architect's epistemic 
authority by camouflaging under the guise of the local. Nevertheless, the 
artist/architect as the hidden colonizer can finally penetrate the other’s space in 
what Behdad called “a climax to the érotisme des coeurs” (Behdad, 1997, p. 206).  
The reference here is to J. M. Coetzee’s 1980 novel Waiting for the Barbarians, 
where Coetzee charts out the violent topography of “colonial eroticism”. This time 
the artist/architect is not after the exotic body of the colonized but after the 
ideological legitimacy being close to these bodies gives her. By this closeness the 
artist/architect legitimizes her experience of social practices as being “good agents” 
of social change, instead of an extractivist colonizer.  The extractivist colonizer 
extracts from the site: legitimacy, knowledge, labour, and bodies that would be 
appropriated into the production of his own social capital. 
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*** 
6.3. The artist as ethnographer. 
The art critic and writer Hal Foster (1996) argued that there has been a sense of “old 
envy” between artists and anthropologists. There was a time in Western academic 
art institutions that the relationship of the artist with the world around them was 
thought of from the perspective of the artist as anthropologist. The artist as part of 
society, where she feeds from the observations of the everyday life of the “common 
man”. It was taught that the artist needed to experience “real life” via a romantic 
sense of adventure and discovery. Thus, on the road to new experiences, the artist 
will find their own artistic self, their call, their inspiration, and their purpose. The 
journey will help the artist construct her thematic context for the artist’s process. 
Foster continues to argue that “a new ethnographer envy consumes many artists 
and critics” (Foster, 1996, p. 181). From the early 1990s, the old attraction to 
anthropology has been turned towards the role of the ethnographer. The reason for 
this is that anthropology had begun to take on an image of an old discipline, 
reduced to passive observation, which had been lagging behind in its research 
techniques, reduced to text. The so-called “digital revolution” of the early 1990s 
brought the challenge of the end of the hegemony of text as the authoritative 
container of true knowledge. The explosion of the image-culture, propelled by the 
ubiquity of new digital telecommunications technologies, the Internet, and cheap 
digital imaging technology, found anthropology as well as many of the traditional 
humanities and social sciences disciplines at a misstep with contemporary culture 
and society. Anthropology moved to reinvent itself by turning to digital video 
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technologies and fashioning the image of the ethnographer as an active social 
explorer of contemporary everyday life. New practices of visual ethnography, 
sensory ethnography, digital ethnography (Pink, 2009a, 2009b, 2015) came to 
revitalize the new field of visual anthropology (Pink, 2005). Thus, left behind was the 
dusty images of the anthropologist working on a faraway field of native tribes or of 
the academic desk at an anthropology department. This new image of the active, 
technologically savvy social actor of the ethnographer participant-observer that 
favours the ethnographic present is very attractive to the artist and architect.  
Art, as distinct from architecture, has always suffered from an inferiority complex in 
terms of the intellectual context of the artist (Foster, 2011). The image of 
architecture as a knowledge discipline (Salama, 2015) and the architect philosopher 
has been a permanent sore in the artist’s ego. The image of the conceptualist artist 
as intellectual (Kosuth, 1993) is a very recent itineration to be included into the art 
market, to the point that it is not a widely popular image in academic art pedagogy, 
and is still resisted in many universities art curricula (Camnitzer, 2007; Elkins, 2009). 
Hal Foster published his article The Artist as Ethnographer in 1996, following Walter 
Benjamin’s conception of the artist’s authority into cultural politics, and his call to all 
artists to intervene as social agents by their means of art production into the 
revolutionary transformation of society (Benjamin, 1968). Foster signalled the 
“breakdown of restrictive definitions of art and artist” that were happening together 
with the social movements of feminism, multiculturalism, queer rights and civil rights 
(Foster, 1996, p. 184). 
The contemporary current of the 1990s for renewed social activism and politically 
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conscious art and artist moved artists to intervene in the expanded field of culture 
that was thought to be the exclusive terrain of anthropology. 
The ethnographic turn by artists entailed an epistemological shift in the artist’s 
function from object-makers to "facilitators, educators, coordinators and 
bureaucrats" (Kwon, 1997, p. 103). But it also conveyed a new energy and 
legitimization to Benjamin’s (1968) revolutionary artist and Bourriaud’s (2002) artist 
as social catalyst. The ethnographic artist demystifies the creative process by 
talking art to the “man on the street”, as a means for social change. 
This shift in contemporary art practice to artists using ethnography as an integral 
component in their social-art practice has opened a range of conflictual issues 
regarding the artist’s relationship with experience in the field, interpretation, and 
artistic representation (Desai, 2002, p. 307). The social practices of these artists are 
seen as nomadic. Increasingly, the movement of the artist becomes as fashion 
personalities of a growing international art world of museums, biennials and art 
fairs. The sites where these artists operate are more like an itinerary than a map of 
work. The site is defined by the publicity and the “network of social relations” that 
makes the community an attractive public site for the artist and its sponsors (Kwon, 
2004). For these artists their site can be from the banality of a billboard, to a 
disfranchised community, or within the institutional framework of the museum, art 
fair and biennale, or to the latest media fashion social cause and political debate. 
The socially engaged artist moves from vanguardist social agent to opportunist 
commentator of current events. The artist ethnographer becomes the artist 
colonizer when his socially conscious and politically committed art practices 
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become domesticated, assimilated and fashioned into the dominant market and 
culture.  
The opportunism of the artist is to embrace subcultural forms as subversive, thus 
appropriating the plight of marginalized communities as publicity. The 
artist/architect’s inclusion of the community “as active participants in the 
conceptualization and production of process-oriented, politically conscious 
community events or programs” (Kwon, 2004, p. 6) is nothing more than an artifice 
of legitimization by “in public” participation. 
Foster questions whether, in the rush for the ethnographic turn, artists, critics and 
curators “have dismissed – maybe too quickly – the aesthetic autonomy of art as 
retrograde” (Foster, 2002, p. 91). Many artists embraced the ethnographic turn as a 
means to challenge the elitist canons of the traditional art market and art 
institutions. Many artists thought that by changing their art process to projects as 
fieldwork in everyday life they were behaving revolutionarily, contesting the art-
market aesthetic hegemony. Creating socially engaged artworks with participatory 
design strategies of “engaging horizontally from subject to subject across social 
space” (Foster, 2002, p. 91). Nevertheless, such tactics became the latest 
fashionable vanguardist art form of socially engaged art to be festively received by 
the art world as a new breath of fresh air to revitalize and legitimize their “public” 
institutions, museums, biennales and art fairs. The exaltation of the new, as a 
necessary form of obsolescence design is ingrained in the art world’s reproduction 
of the commodification of art. 
The curator Miwon Kwon (2004) argued that some key words in art-world language 
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have been accepted, “embraced as an automatic signifier of ‘criticality’" (Kwon, 
2004, p. 1). In current social-art practices the mere inclusion of the words socially 
engaged, participatory, collaboration, community, and empowerment is uncritically 
accepted as legitimizing tenants of the practice. Instead of promoting their radical 
potential, this uncritical acceptance of these artists’ interventions, projects, artworks 
in the site of the social and the marginalized only keeps them open to co-option by 
institutional and market forces.  
Kwon keenly observed that these site-specific “social practices” of interventions in 
the site of marginalized communities had the potential to “exacerbate uneven power 
relations, remarginalize (even colonize) already disenfranchised groups, depoliticize 
and remythify the artistic process, and finally further the separation of art and life 
(despite claims to the contrary)” (Kwon, 2004, p. 6). 
To properly decolonize our social perspectives of value, and to avoid falling into 
culturalism and its accompanied nationalism and fundamentalism, it is imperative to 
deconstruct the language we use. As Audre Lorde said, “the master's tools will 
never dismantle the master's house” (1984). 
The search for a decolonized social practice starts by deconstructing the Western 
masculinized romanticism of discovery embodied in the image of the Robinson 
Crusoe artist (Said, 1993), he who creates his own world on terra nullius. The one 
who saves the savage from his own cannibalism by his civilizing intervention is too 
closed to the practice paradigms of social art and architecture. 
The first step towards this deconstruction starts with reading and seeing with 
suspicion the order of things in the world around us; to determine how knowledge 
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has been organized into closed epistemologies of domination and not open 
epistemologies of sharing. 
Then, we can start finding the epistemic errors sedimented in artists’ and architects’ 
practices. 
*** 
6.3.1. Epistemic errors. 
There are four recurrent epistemic errors in most socially engaged practices. Three 
are faulted to the artist/architect. The last is perpetuated by the forum of the 
institutions of art. The artist/architect embodies the “insider frame”, from which they 
often lack the cognitive distance to see from another perspective beyond their own, 
thus having what Linda Tuhiwai Smith called “the potential to see the trees but not 
the forest” (Tuhiwai, 2012, p. 210). The epistemic errors are in the practice, in the 
site, in the author, and by the forum. 
First epistemic error: The need for help. 
The need for help is the first epistemic mistake of the artist/architect’s perspective. 
The assumption of marginality and disfranchisement of poor communities, and 
hence their need of help from outside actors, is another of the colonizer’s own 
cognitive traps. This is what Merleau-Ponty called the “experience error” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962, p. 5). When the agent of epistemic authority – artist/architect – 
assumes her own perception of events and history as a priori truth, as her own 
knowledge is limited to the “horizons” of her own prejudices, her perceived truth 
becomes her own cognitive trap and epistemic limit. 
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This cognitive scenario is a very straightforward characterization of many of the 
practices that artists/architects working in very specific social environments of the 
“marginalized community” inadvertently use. The power asymmetries between who 
the artist/architect is and the population that lives on the site, and the epistemic 
imbalances between these two spheres of social reality, are the locus of this first 
epistemic error.  
The misunderstanding of the social dynamics of the site, about its cultural and 
political hierarchies of racial, ethnic, class, and gender, is the first epistemic limit the 
artist/architect is confronted with. 
These social dynamics determine the hierarchical positioning of who is the 
artist/architect and who are its public, its audience, and its users, thus the 
beneficiaries of the artist/architect’s work. 
These artists/architects benefit from the informality of these communities. This 
allows them to develop projects that would have been difficult or impossible to 
develop in other formal social arenas. The bureaucracy of formal government 
oversight in other more developed areas will hinder the artist/architect’s desires. 
Also, in a more formal social environment artists/architects without a developed 
professional career will have very little opportunity to create public works without 
the sponsorship of the official cultural institutions. Thus, many of these 
artists/architects come from better positions in society, culture, and education, and 
in many cases from other countries, usually more developed countries, and from a 
more privileged somatic norm. Nevertheless, without an established professional 
career and proper social connections, many of them will have little chance to 
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develop their professional careers in the places they come from. 
The origin of the artist, where she comes from and the decision that she makes 
about where to work in a place of a poor community, as well as her initial reasoning 
of doing good, positions her, the artist/architect, as saviour. Thus perpetuating the 
identity prejudice of the inhabitants of the site as helpless. This prejudice, which 
tracks people relating to social identity (Fricker, 2007, p. 27), does have socio-
political ramifications on how these communities are treated by the state and third-
sector organizations. The social consequences of this identity prejudice keeps 
reinforcing the cultural and social stigma of the poor’s anomie, giving reason to the 
policies that keep their communities marginalized and in a state of social abjection. 
The notion of helping sounds good initially but it carries with it paternalistic 
overtones. Paternalism legitimizes the colonizer’s mission civilisatrice when the 
artist/architect appears to be in the role of extractivist agent. Here they take 
advantage of their somatic and epistemic authority by parachuting into poor 
marginalized communities to develop their own projects using the social conditions 
of marginalization of the community to their advantage. First, by appearing to be 
agents of social good by helping the community. Second, by using the community 
as background for the construction of their own professional practice portfolio that 
will open new opportunities for them in the formal arena of the arts and architecture. 
It is a win-win situation for the artist/architect. For the community the result can be 
very different. 
Thus this sort of practices only reinforces the prejudices of the colonizer-agent, who 
views himself as the “active agent” and places the colonized-user into the “passive-
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audience” role of colonial continuity (Behdad, 1997). 
*** 
Second epistemic error: the assumption of community.  
The second error is the assumption of community. Often, a group of people are 
mistakenly defined as a community by the relative conditions of sharing a common 
place of dwelling, a particular phenotype or shared beliefs and traditions.  
Relating people by geographical territory, built environment, or intangible life-
spaces of a shared consciousness is another form of the colonizer’s cognitive trap. 
The intangible shared spaces can be from religious beliefs to national and diaspora 
ideologies of belonging. These can be profoundly discriminatory categorizations of 
race as community. These assumptions are made from “the experience error” of the 
outsider. 
These rigid categorizations of belonging to community are short-sighted. Also, it is 
erroneous to assume the condition of the homogeneous community and the “good” 
community. In Chapter 3, the definitions of community were critically examined 
from various perspectives. Community is a disciplinary category of belonging to a 
group. The structuring of community is discriminatory and excluding of those 
considered to be the outsider, the other. The artist/architect in their role of agents of 
change tends to buy into the established political discourse that community is 
inherently good, which is an unanalysed presumption that leads to a cascade of 
epistemic errors and injustices. 
One of the first epistemic errors is the romantic idealism of the pure community as 
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the good community. Richard Sennet presented this idealism as part of a “learning 
process” that is ingrained within all of us to feel “belonging” to “a shared sense of 
what we think we ought to be like, as one social being, in order not to be hurt” 
(Sennet, 1971, p. 41). 
Artists/architects share this precondition of judging what we ought to be like. From 
what represents a habitable space, a tenement, a construction of architecture, a 
proper lifestyle, and a dignified life, the artist/architect from their own social and 
cultural perspectives establishes a value judgement. It is from this value judgement 
that their social interventions take shape as a mission, and purpose. 
This idea of community, as defined by perception error, creates an illusory social 
parallelism. The artist/architect pairs his experience of his own social life, social 
class, citizenship and country to what he perceives should be the social norm of 
just lifestyle. The simplistic binary comparison between the artist/architect’s lifestyle 
as “good” and the lifestyle of the people who inhabit the site as ”bad” not only 
perpetuates their condition as marginalized but also legitimizes it.  
Although the artist/architect might arrive with good and noble intentions to help, it is 
very often the case that the “community” was not asked beforehand if they needed 
help – and, if so, what kind of help is needed.  
The plight of the marginalized is often romanticized by the artist/architect. The 
dystopian discourse of the disassociated, individualism, and lonely urban life is part 
of a popular political discourse that demonizes the urban-city and romanticizes a 
back-to-community ideology. This is the discourse of Benedict 
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 Anderson’s Imagined Communities (Anderson, 1983), those that never existed 
beyond the nationalism and culturalism of exclusionary policies. 
The artist/architect must be careful not to fall into these romanticisms. The other 
problematic when working with the idea of community is the nostalgia of 
community. 
The romantic nostalgia for the past is the desperate attempt to “reenchant the 
world” (Lowry and Duggan, 1998, p. 77). The problem lies in falling into a king of 
Roussonian nostalgia about utopianism of the noble savage and the better past, 
before the corruption of industrialized, technological present of the alone-together 
paradigm (Turkle, 2011).  
The artist/architect cannot deny their epistemic authority as experts. Thus, this also 
positions them as “teacher”. When the artist/architect utilizes the romanticized 
image of purity of the disfranchised, and places himself as protector from the evils 
of modern civilization, the artist/architect is assuming the role of the good-colonizer. 
The good-colonizer is the teacher-protector agent. It is a patriarchal paternalist 
position whereby this agent places himself in the role of teacher, thus opening a 
new emancipatory world of rights, technology and knowledge. Also, the good-
colonizer is the protector of the “innocent” vernacular culture that in their ignorance 
needs to be restrained because their innocence victimizes them. 
Therefore, an a priori assumption that a marginalized, people and community need 
to be saved is a colonizing predisposition. The presumption from artist/architect 
that they know what is best for the community, because of their position of the 
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educated expert, delineates their practices as actions of epistemic injustice towards 
the same people that they claim to help. 
The actions of the artist/architect might come from a true sense of goodness, but 
without a critical understanding of the social tectonics of the site, away from their 
own cognitive traps and experience errors, their practices are doomed to reproduce 
the same epistemic injustices to which these communities are constantly subjected. 
The utopianism of a pure community that existed before colonialism, 
industrialization, and globalized consumer capitalism is used as a political discourse 
from the reactionary right and also from the revolutionary left. It is a discourse easily 
moulded to accommodate both kinds of arguments, from racist exclusionary 
policies to arguments of romantic pre-colonial utopias free of patriarchy (Lugones, 
2010). 
The poor-good community paradox places the artist/architect in the disjuncture 
between the nobility of poorness – a romantic condition that somehow cleans the 
poor from the modern evils of private property, individualism, convenience and 
consumption – and the community that wants to join in the comfort of modern life of 
private property, individualism, convenience and consumption. 
 When the artist/architect becomes the evangelizer of community living, the artist 
becomes just another doctrine of top-bottom planning. When the discourse that 
comes from the artist/architect is the stay-in-community and live-in-community, as 
a de facto better model for modern life that should be emulated, there is an implicit 
denial of the community’s agency, when it is implied that the community is a 
homogenous whole, with a shared identity and voice. The many members of the 
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community that do not conform to the disciplinary image of the pure community, by 
ideology, sexuality and/or behaviour, are considered deviant and expelled from the 
territory. To assume that a community speaks for all its people is a naive response 
from a protected life of privilege, or a devious political schema. 
These romantic constructions from the position of agency of the artist/architect 
commodify a discourse – the life of the marginalized community – which positions 
the artist/architect in a place of epistemic authority to market such discourse for the 
benefit of legitimizing art/architecture’s social practices as a social good.  
*** 
Third epistemic error: perception. 
The phenomenologist and geographer Yi-Fu Tuan wrote: “So much emphasis can 
be put on the individual as a maker and perceiver that the external world loses its 
objective standing; reality ‘out there’ seems to be only a human construct” (Tuan, 
1982, p. 151). 
Our perception of true reality is constructed by the collection of events that directly 
affect us. Descartes argued that the requisite for knowledge lies in the absolute 
confidence in one's belief (Fricker, 2006). For even our closest experiences, though 
– the ones that we would characterize as “our reality” – we still need an epistemic 
interpreter to legitimize our perception as reality. Who, then, counts as an ideal 
epistemic agent? The interpreter, who experiences the world in this particular way, 
and not another (Pohlhaus, 2017). The assumption of the author as ideal epistemic 
agent is the next epistemic error in the artist/architect’s practice. 
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The artist/architect, by their condition as knowledge agents, experts and 
professionals, occupy a particular privileged social status of educated citizens. This 
status is more expansive if the artist/architect already belongs to a privileged social 
class with the correct somatic universal norm. This social positioning permits the 
artist/architect to freely explore within her social circle and transgress to other less 
privileged areas of society. Although this social status, by class, education, and 
professionalism carries within it the privilege of knowing, it also carries the “privilege 
of not knowing or of not needing to know” (Medina, 2013, p. 32). This is the effect of 
the epistemology of ignorance (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013). Miranda Fricker 
explains that this effect is born out of the colonizer’s authority to exploit, oppressed 
and extract from the colonized; thus the colonizer was never in any position where 
he had to legitimize his authority to others. Hence, the epistemology of ignorance is 
“a lack of investigation and study beyond one’s own domain” (Fricker, 2007). 
The epistemology of ignorance is most commonly called “white ignorance”. José 
Medina (2013) explains white ignorance as a “hermeneutical inability of privileged 
white subjects to recognize and make sense of their racial identities, experiences, 
and positionality in a racialized world” (Medina, 2012). The condition of “white” is 
not solely defined by skin colour; instead, it is part of a performative role within 
established power structures constructed by class positioning, economic power, 
family affiliations, and last a variable phenotype of “whiteness”. The artist/architect 
is positioned in an epistemic legitimacy of “whiteness”. 
Medina further explains other consequences of white ignorance: “the main 
epistemic vice that results from this privilege of not needing to know is a lack of 
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curiosity” (Medina, 2013, p. 32).  
This lack of curiosity is especially relevant when it comes to knowing about fields 
that have been presented as inconsequential, monstrous and abject.  This epistemic 
laziness means someone can feel that they don’t have to familiarize themselves with 
these domains, and they are ignorant about their ignorance (Medina, 2013).   
The artist/architect as a proper agent of change does not want to reproduce these 
conditions of epistemic laziness and epistemic ignorance in their own practices. The 
artist/architect cannot remain as a mere “neutral” interlocutor in the colonial 
situation. Otherwise, they are known as either someone who is compliant and 
belongs to the category of Edward Said’s beni-wewe (Said, 1989, p. 210). 
There is another epistemology at play in the site. It is the epistemology of extraction. 
The artist/architect extracts knowledge by using artistic euphemisms of 
appropriation and cultural influence. The artist/architect extracts valid context by 
pairing his own practice with the plight of his audience and users.  
The first thing to note about these examples is precisely their significance as 
personal observations. This is not to make any trivial point about their “subjective” 
nature.  
Paul de Man argued that "the act of anthropological intersubjective interpretation, a 
fundamental discrepancy always prevents the observer from coinciding fully with the 
consciousness he is observing" and that the "same discrepancy exists in everyday 
language, in the impossibility of making the actual expression coincide with what 
has to be expressed, of making the actual sign coincide with what it signifies” 
   
 254 
(Schulte-Sasse, 1984, p. xxviii). 
*** 
Fourth epistemic error: the forum. 
The German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1973) argued that we 
need the “in public” to legitimate. Habermas's view of the modern capitalist state’s 
tendency to periodically develop “legitimation deficit” is a fundamental problem for 
capitalist consumer societies and a threat to their survival (Plant, 1982). 
Nevertheless, this periodic “legitimation deficit” also provides the creative tensions 
needed to tweak the social order and production systems of society and its 
institutions. 
The forum is composed by the art institutions represented by museums, galleries, 
academies, and universities as well as the art market. The forum needs its own 
periodic “legitimation deficit”, to reposition itself in the hierarchical order of society, 
and to renew its social capital according to social and market fluctuations. Thus, the 
forum’s legitimization “in public” needs an audience of captive consumers to 
reposition their social function beyond their extensively criticized function of 
bourgeois banality. 
Anthropologist Victor Turner (1974) suggested in his studies of ritual social drama 
that social action requires a performance, which is repeated. “This repetition is at 
once a re-enactment and re-experiencing of a set of meanings already socially 
established; it is the mundane and ritualized form of their legitimation” (Butler, 1988, 
p. 526). This ritualized social performance is what keeps the authority of the forum 
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over the artist and architect as the de facto legitimizing agency. Hence the forum 
exploits the banalities of artists’ fashionable engagements with the social to create 
a new market that guarantees their own continuance as legitimizing authority. 
*** 
6.4. The public as a hypothesis. 
What is the public in contemporary society? According to the sociologist Richard 
Sennett (1978), the first recorded uses of the word “public” in English language 
related the idea of “public” with the common good in society (Sennett, 1978, p. 16). 
To question the field of the public implies the posing of a discussion to show the 
tensions that make the question uncomfortable. The apperception of the public is a 
contested field. The colloquialism of the term "public" has been related to 
democratic connotations. It paints an image of "openness", "accessibility", 
"participation", "inclusion" and "accountability" to "the people” (Agnew, 1987). 
Socially engaged art and social architecture unfolds and performs in the forum 
(Weizman, 2013) of the public realm; a critique of what actually is understood by the 
term public is therefore paramount for this discussion. Moreover, there are 
overlapping issues also to be critiqued when matters of public, publicness and 
publicity arise in the study of art and architecture. The representations that these 
terms are imbued with are varied and at times paradoxical. With each itinerant 
alteration subdued by social, political and cultural context, the significance of the 
public varies, be it by a relational or ontological condition in its agency or structure. 
The hermeneutics of the public are complex to say the least. Who are the public? 
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What is to the public? What is to be in public? The public sphere and public space 
are some of such issues that are inexorably tied to the first definition of public. 
Therefore, the following account will concentrate into defining how these terms are 
used in this research and arguments. 
The term public as a political concept it is not an unequivocal definition, and in its 
distinct applications in political contests, this term constructs and identifies distinct 
problematics, evaluations and distinctly different courses of action (Rabotnikof, 
2008). 
The political philosopher Nora Rabotnikof in her book En Busca de un Lugar Común 
(2005) posits some of the putative uses that the concept of public in the context of 
public space has embodied. First: public is what it is “common” to all. This also 
encompasses what it is represented by “general'’ interests over “particular” interest. 
Also, Rabotnikof includes the tension between the “general” and the “particular”, 
sometimes represented by the state and civil society. Second: public is what it is 
“visible” and “manifested”, contra posed by what it is “occult” and “obscure”. And 
third: public is what is “open” or “accessible”. Moreover, these conditions apply 
only to those whose citizenship or status allows them to be part of the public; they 
are remitted for those who fall outside the proper categories for belonging to the 
public. The categorizations of admittance are commonly defined by the constitution 
of a proper citizenship by class, gender, race, sexuality and behaviour.  
Hannah Arendt (1958) writes on the meaning of public as signifying that everything 
that appears to be in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the 
amplest publicity possible. Arendt writes that the presence of others who see and 
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hear the same as we do, assures us of the reality of the world. Arendt views the 
public space as a “stage” for the “performances of the individual”, where such 
“performances” are constitutive of the formation of the individual in society and a 
“protection” against the impermanence of human existence.  Individual human 
existence is constructed by the publicness of the individual. The appearance in 
public of the individual reassures reality beyond the individual’s own imaginary to 
check to an “outside reality” that affirms the reality of the individual’s identity 
(Arendt, 1998). 
Andrea Thuma (2011) interprets Arendt’s position as follows: “Humans appear 
before others in order to be recognized. Through acting in public, which means 
becoming visible to the others around her, the subject’s identity is exposed and 
revealed. This “revelation” of identity cannot happen in isolation, it cannot result 
from self-reflection alone. Only the eyes of the others can truly disclose one’s 
identity from all possible sides” (Thuma, 2011). Following Arendt’s position on the 
subject, Thuma argues that this “disclosure’” of publicity “makes” the subject. And 
in doing so, “Becoming visible to others through action not simply means revealing, 
but also performing an identity. It is the performance of a public identity, a ‘public 
self’ which is constructed in this space” (Thuma, 2011). 
Jerome Kohn argues that “Human reality is appearance” (Kohn, 2000). This leads to 
the exclusiveness of the public, as membership of the public is permitted by the act 
of performing publicness as recognized by our social piers. Hence the invisibility of 
the others who do not belong to the public of social peers, and are thus not 
recognized as being public or as being in publicness. The rhetoric about “the 
   
 258 
public” justifies exclusions and expulsions as natural. 
The art critic Rosalyn Deutsche (1998) argues that exclusions have to be enacted to 
maintain and homogenize the public, and thus public space by “expelling specific 
differences are dismissed as necessary to restore social harmony” (Deutsche, 1998, 
p. 58). In theory, public still means people; in practice, public means government, 
(Quilligan, 2012). Hence Walter Lippmann’s 1927 admonition that the public was 
just a phantom (Lippmann, 1993). According to Lippmann, “citizens cannot be 
reasonably expected to form themselves into a responsible, well-informed public”. 
Hence, “the public in this ideal sense is a hypothesis contrary to any possible fact” 
(Lippmann, 1993). 
Therefore, there is no public, just an audience. Since to be a public is deemed to 
have some agency over a common field. If there is not a common field, it has been 
replaced by a variety of self-interested private overlapping smaller fields. Agency of 
a public is nullified according to James B. Quilligan, who posited: “Public no longer 
signifies a community’s authority to manage its local resources and express its own 
social or ecological demands; ‘public’ now means the central governing authority to 
whom we have surrendered the control of these resources, which then meets our 
demand through conventional private markets” (Quilligan, 2012). And the audience 
remains as mere conglomerate of consumers (Debord, 1994; Rosler, 1987) of the 
neoliberal political spectacle of leftovers between government and private interest 
to make all common goods into private goods. 
Thus, the public is reduced to the social welfare client. Participation of the public in 
society is reduced to voting (Fraser, 1989). Habermas called this the reduction of a 
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“culture-debating” public to a “culture-consuming” public (Habermas, 1989, p. 160). 
*** 
6.4.1. The fiction of public space. 
Who is permitted entry into the public space, or the public sphere; or excluded from 
these? These are issues articulated through power relations. 
Don Mitchell argues that for city planners and government officials, public space is 
constituted as a “controlled and orderly retreat, where a properly behaved public 
might experience the spectacle of the city” (Mitchell, 1995, p. 115).  
As a point of departure, it can be argued by a somehow controversial statement 
that there is no such a thing as public space. That all space is divided between 
private space and government-owned/administered space. Government is defined 
as the conglomerate of bureaucratic institutions that administer the day-to-day 
structure of hegemonic of power and monopoly of violence of the state. Therefore, 
the idea of a “public” space that is a site administered, regulated and disciplined by 
the government’s bureaucracy is different from the ordinary use of the space of the 
state in sociological and political terms. Although not immensity different, the space 
of the state is about social and political mapping, control, and the fabrication of 
geographical and ideological boundaries (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Soja, 1989; 
Sassen, 2006). 
The characterization of the ongoing privatization and the commodification of public 
goods is concomitant with the ideological transformation of governments as 
entrepreneurs, and with the emergence of the so-called public/private alliances that 
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have emerged as economic solutions for indebted nations. The enterprising nature 
of debt manufacture and administration by a whole range of private corporate 
multinational interests has diminished enormously the traditional role, agency and 
the fiscal capacity of the state. In contraposition, the role of the private – and, to a 
limited extent, that of NGOs and third-sector organizations – has increased 
(Banerjee, 2001). 
Since there is no “public” and every piece of earth has been mapped and 
territorialized as private good or as government-managed good, en route to be 
privatized away from the common good, the problematic about understanding 
public spaces diverts from the colloquial use of the word and ideas surrounding the 
public, publicness, and access. 
Public and publicness represent two very distinct concepts. Both delineate 
representations of belonging and having access to a space in common: a public 
space, public building, public park, etc. In our minds, following common language 
we assume that it means belonging to the public; in short, belonging to us. 
Publicness does not appear in common usage as much but still it resonates to us 
as something to do with the public – again, us – and therefore with the same 
relationship of openness and accessibility. We cannot be more wrong about these 
statements. 
As artist Vito Acconci observed, “the words public space are deceptive” (Acconci, 
1990). Acconci talks about public being more of a condition rather than an actual 
architectural space. He points out that almost unconsciously we assume that the 
meaning of public and its relation to public space is an openness to people, and 
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access to gather on and within a demarcated space designated as public. That just 
the fact of calling a space public functions as a separation, a segregation of spatial 
access within a city. Between the public space and the rest of the space, such 
space is the private space. He theorizes further about two kinds of public space. 
The first is the one that is already designated by the state as public; and the second 
is the one that is made public by occupation. The former was government-owned 
space that has been legislated to have a public access. But openness of access 
does not qualify a space as public, or any other endeavour that it is called to be 
public. If we follow Acconci’s theorization on public space, then the condition of 
public is an agreed condition by which the people who gather in such space and 
venues behave as a public. Such is a space made public by occupation, the 
collective act of being and performing a public. What he continues to allude to is 
that public space is an agreed and very small portion of the state’s controlled 
space. Publicness is then a legislated condition with an attached temporality 
imposed in such definition.  
Rosalyn Deutshe (1998) also comments on the case for public space by defining it 
not so much as a spatial category of location but instead as one defined by the 
performance of an operation by the people in such space. Thus, any site has the 
potential to be transformed into a public space. Nevertheless, the performative 
action over the site is dependent on the publicness of the actors. 
Publicness is a social condition dependent on the construction of the public 
persona. Publicness has been romanticized as a quality that we once had but have 
lost, and must somehow retrieve (Habbermas, 1989). Richard Sennet argued that 
this loss was a result of the epoch of consumerism, mass media, and the expansion 
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of the state into the intimate space of the family (Sennett, 1974). Nowadays, our 
publicness is reduced to a virtual presence on the imaginary manufactured pseudo-
realities of social media, where there is no need of a “public” per se. If anything 
remains of a public it is what American critical theorist Nancy Fraser posited in 
1989: that public participation has been reduced to the mere act of voting. But this 
time it is reduced to a digital ageographic “click” as participation and enunciation of 
subjectivity. As the architect and urbanist Michael Sorkin (1992) argued about the 
public places manufactured to live our lives, “this ‘place’ is fully ageographic” 
(Sorkin, 1992, p. xiii). 
*** 
6.5. On participation. 
“From Cairo to Instagram to Occupy Wall Street. Participation really is the new 
opium of the people. If everyone took part in everything, everything would turn out 
perfectly fine – or so preaches the holy doctrine of participation. And sometimes the 
exact opposite holds true” (Miessen and Grassegger, 2011, p. 21). 
The artist and architect want to be “agents of change”. As such they all seek to 
change the life of their users and audiences for the better; and in doing so, to 
transform their own lives for the better too. 
There is a generalized interest in the idea of participation as an instrument to 
generate emancipatory practices to solve social inequalities and old injustices 
deemed to have been enacted to disfranchised groups. The English architect Cedric 
Price made his critique clear: “it’s almost as if everything is justified because the 
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audience can participate” (Price, 2010). 
 From government-sponsored social-welfare initiatives to community projects, to 
arts funders, art institutions, and academia, participation has been contextualized 
within the frameworks of democratic access and citizenship. Especially in the case 
of communities and groups of people that are seen by the government, academic 
institutions, and third-sector organizations as having traditionally been left outside 
the social project of democracy. 
Participation and participatory engagement are equated with social engagement in 
the political field. Thus, participation has become necessary elements in most 
political discourse from the left as well as the right. Participation has also become a 
necessary element in most mission statements from all kinds of cultural institutions. 
From government-sponsored cultural institutions, to private museums, galleries, 
universities and art programs, participation, as a social emancipatory practice, has 
been located at the centre of their social purpose and benefit to society. But, more 
often than not, participation is used as a token to placate and pacify the public and 
to protect the status quo. 
Participation is often understood as an alternative form of access, a means of 
empowering the user (Miessen, 2010). Claire Bishop (2006) argued that participation 
as a practice has the potential to transform the viewers out of the role of mere 
observers and into the role of active producers, as a means to produce new social 
relationships (Bishop, 2006). Her naïve perspective is conducive to attest to her 
theoretical positions celebrating participatory arts in the context of art institutions. 
On the other hand, the architect and writer Jeremy Till (2006) argues, “The word 
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participation has recently become as overused as that other catchphrase of 
contemporary politics, sustainability” (Till, 2006, p. 1). He adds that “The trouble is 
that in their overuse ‘participation’, ‘community’ and ‘sustainable’ have become 
more or less meaningless” (Till, 2006, p. 1). The overuse of participation in political 
popular discourse is constantly paired up with the idea of community. In both 
images that are discursively painted on participation and on community, the same 
cognitive gaps abound between the colloquialism of the image on our social 
consciousness and the actual form of what a community is, and what participation 
is actually used for.  
Participation is being used as an apparent quick-fix to the accusations of elitism 
and discrimination to cultural institutions, to government, to the private board rooms 
of corporations. “Participation works as a form of differential inclusion” (Mezzadra 
and Neilson, 2011, p. 67) as it is instrumentalized to serve as a social facade of 
inclusion while maintaining the social hierarchy, epistemic authority and political 
control of the ruling class, government and private interest. 
The publicity that participation has received as a necessary part of every public and 
private act has created a new fertile ground to be exploited by all types of 
government agencies, cultural institutions, artists, architects, and markets. 
It can be said that there is now a market of participation. From product design, to 
participatory democracy ideals, some authors are suggesting that there is a 
“seismic shift in cultural production” being driven by this new ethos to participate; a 
move from “sit-back-and-be-told culture” to a “making-and-doing culture” 
(Gauntlett, 2011). 
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*** 
6.5.1. Participation as token and placebo.  
The usual idea of participation as an individual engagement in the creation of a 
polity, where everybody that is included will participate in the creation of a 
consensus in the sense of Rousseau’s democracy, is far from what it actually 
means in practice. Both participation and democracy have become tokens and 
placebos of contemporary society, as neither includes the direct action of the 
individual. Architect Meike Schalk presents participation in the traditional context of 
the institutionally governed planning process as prescribed tokenism. (Schalk, et al, 
2018). From Sherry Arnstein’s ladder of social participation (1969), Joseph Beuys’s 
social-sculpture dictum “everybody is an artist” and his ideas of “A SOCIAL 
ORGANISM AS A WORK OF ART” (Tisdall,1973), the experience economy’s 
customer-participation strategies (Pine II and Gilmore, 1998), the audience 
involvement spectrum (Brown, Novak-Leonard and Gilbride, 2011), to  human-
centred design techniques of effectiveness and efficiency, and community-
architecture models (Wates and Knevitt, 1987) of the 1980s trying to reinterpret the 
power relationships between the architect and the community.  Even Gillian Rose’s  
"Broken Middle” theory of a place where users and architects alike "confront 
themselves and each other as particular and as universal" (Rose,1994). In all of 
these, participation strategies, methodologies, and plans abound. They all serve the 
purposes that they were designed to achieve. Meike Schalk (2018) posits 
participation as a “prescribed tokenistic manner in institutionally governed planning 
process.” (Schalk, et al, 2018; 299). But none are really participatory to the full 
extent of what the word could mean. Each form has had at one time its followers 
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and detractors. As Rose once stated, “general law that one day’s utopia becomes 
the following day’s dystopia” (Rose, 1992).  
Neoliberal and globalization policies, attitudes, and fears have shaken the traditional 
forms of state government and citizen participation; the concept of participation has 
been exploited and brought forward as a legitimizing tool for the state and other 
types of third-sector37 organizations to count on the interpassivity38 of people. These 
types of projects use the key words of participation, decentralization and 
associationalism (Kallman and Clark, 2016) to gain the trust and to appear to be 
inclusive and democratic. By the same token, the words inclusive and democratic 
are part of the common lexicon of the third sector, the state and private interest, 
when the goal is to legitimize a project by publicness, and to generate trust and 
legitimacy by public participation. 
It is said that the subject gets to know her world and her place through praxis. If the 
praxis is of the individualistic consumer culture, which nowadays represents the 
normative of the individual, what is then left of the democratic political public sphere 
(Mouffe, 2002). Further disintegration by moralizing and juridification of all political 
discourse has rendered the interest on participation of the “public” into a fatalistic 
apathy. 
Carole Pateman argues that "participation, as far as the majority is concerned, is 
participation in the choice of the decision makers. Thus the function of participation 
is solely a protective one” (Pateman, 1970); and the political participation of the 
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public is reduced to voting. The idea, nowadays, that a representation of 
participation and democracy can be achieved through architecture or social arts 
practices is often thuddingly naïve (Till, 2006).  
Participation brings a space of discomfort to the artist and to the architect, both of 
whom have been trained in disciplines that promote the individuality of the creative 
self and the construction of a singular ego following the mythology of originality and 
the masterpiece. Participation positions the artist and architect in an unfamiliar 
social field – the community.  
The first misnomer that confronts the ideas of participation starts with the belief that 
community refers to a homogeneous group of people. People who share common 
social, cultural and political values are seen as a group that can easily achieve 
consensus on topics that affect them all as a community. The reality is that the 
purified model of a community (Macintyre, 2007) remains a neo-Aristotelian utopian 
fantasy that works only as romantic propaganda for reactionary political campaigns. 
The reality is that the diversity or “impurity” of the peoples that compose the 
“community” thwarts any easy attempt to reach consensus. Thus, from the start, it 
appears that any kind of participatory strategy is to remain only as a theoretical 
framework, unless there is a restructuring of the power relations between the artist 
and architect and the community.  
Participation should constitute the first step towards a society where all people can 
become the historical subject but does not necessarily guarantee that each 
individual will directly participate in the administrations of such entity. This kind of 
direct self-management can happen only within an organization that guarantees an 
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equal power-footing for all of its members. Direct-participation on any social 
enterprise or community can properly happen only in an arena constituted by 
individuals with equal social, cultural, economic and political capital. Not exactly 
constituted as a society of equals; but between individuals of equivalent power, 
who share equivalent influence between them. It is then that direct-participation can 
take place without the direct coercion of power. Only then can a structure of 
agonistic participation (Mouffe, 2000) be properly put to work. In other words, a 
space for open conflictual participation can happen only if it is possible to neutralize 
the social and cultural hierarchical structures that nullify direct-participation as a 
social practice. Mouffe argues that consensus can be reached beyond the 
imaginary ideals of complete agreement. Mouffe calls it “conflictual consensus” 
(Mouffe, 2000). She presents that already in pluralistic democracy there is a 
demand of the citizen that requires of her an “alliance to the values” of the “ethico-
political principles” of the society. Nevertheless, even if the consensus she posits 
already exists through many different and conflicting interpretations, the issue of 
citizenships falls in between the realization of this theory. Citizenship does not mean 
the same to all social actors, as there are people who do not have the same rights 
and powers of a citizenship that guarantees them opportunity to be a social actor, 
and instead they remain mere objects of democracy and never a subject. Therefore, 
this concept could work only in a socially just and equal society.  
Following on from Mouffe’s concept of “conflictual consensus”, Markus Miessen 
(2010) argued that “Any form of participation is already a form of conflict” (Miessen, 
2010, p. 122). This is because there is a social and political environment already in 
existence, in whatever site one would choose to work in; and all political and social 
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environments have within them many conflictual forces that wrestle for their own 
good. Hence, any form of participation in this site would most probably be in 
conflict with some already existing party or ideology.  On the other hand, Schalk 
proposes a “critical participation” to challenge the scripted planning process with 
the inclusion of “engaged citizens” with the hope of “repoliticizing the discourse on 
possible urban futures.” (Schalk, et al, 2018; 299).    
Lars Lerup argued (1977) that participation in these conditions becomes a 
“managerial solution”. He posited that there is a “symmetry of ignorance” between 
the “professional” – the artist/architect – and the “user” – the public, the community. 
By this he meant that neither one (the “professional” nor the “user” ) knows each 
other’s needs (Lerup, 1977). It is an a priori assumption by the professionals that 
they know what the user needs. (This is what I have called the colonizer’s 
perspective.). On the other hand, there are the needs of the professionals, which 
they are also expecting to fulfil. The user’s needs are agglomerated by the simplified 
statement of the need for a better life. The same could be said of the professional’s 
need for a better professional life. This would include the building of a professional 
portfolio of social and community works, which would hopefully open the doors to a 
successful professional career. 
If artists and architects really want to be true “agents of change” for a community, 
they have to start by accepting that they carry with them a colonizing perspective. 
Their view of the social landscape is a narrow perspective from their own lenses of 
epistemic privilege and authority. Thus, the first step is to accept and discard some 
of the epistemic authority of their professional title and social status. This act of 
epistemic solidarity starts by letting go of some of the control of the project while 
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still maintaining their ability to envision, but without the colonizing imposition. This is 
very hard to do, as the epistemic divide is not only personalized by the agents of 
change but is also kept by their “social training” (Pateman, 1970). Hence the 
position of the artist and architect requires twofold demystification: first of his own 
myth and second of the social training pedagogy that the community has received 
throughout their lives. Sometimes it is easier for the artist and architect to let go of 
this hierarchy of social values, than it for the community. 
*** 
6.5.2. The market of art participation.  
Art participation has been redefined in the following way: “as people increasingly 
choose to engage with art in new, more active and expressive ways”. In this 
redefinition there is an overt mention of a new market. “This movement carries 
profound implications, and fresh opportunities, for the nonprofit sector” (Brown, 
Novak-Leonard and Gilbride, 2011). Also, this so-called “new movement” of 
participatory arts opened a new range of new funding sources for arts institutions, 
museums, private and co-operative galleries to redefine their roles as socially 
relevant in their “communities”. 
Jeremy Till argues: “In architecture, participation is now a necessary part of most 
public planning processes, but much of it remains token” (Till, 2006, p. 1). 
This new market of participation helped enormously to reshape the social mission of 
the art museum from the highly criticized elitist definitions of “museums as the 
mausoleums of art” (Adorno, 1967) and their role into what Theodor Adorno called 
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the bourgeois  “neutralization of culture” (Adorno, 1967, p. 175). Museums have 
been seen as elitist cultural protectionist institutions. The artist Andrea Fraser (1986) 
pictures the museum as “a temple to the fetish commodity” in her performances at 
the exhibition Damaged Goods at the New Museum in New York City, during the 
summer of 1986. She called attention to the “subtle inversions” of the museum’s 
elitist cultural protectionism: “while the museum claims to protect works of art in the 
name of the public, it actually protects them from the public” (Owens, 1987). 
 Museums specially had benefited of this new market for participatory arts. This 
“cultural shift” had allowed the traditional museum to tweak its social-cultural 
presence from the formative institution into a new performative institution. Museums 
are presenting themselves as instruments for place-making and community-
building. The appearance of art-education programs and outreach community art 
programs has helped the museums with a social facelift to revalidate their 
governmental subsidies of public funds, and to continue to maintain their status as 
legitimate cultural institutions. 
This revitalization of the museum’s authority to aggregate a “new” meaning to art 
has continued to cultivate a symbiotic relationship with the new art forms of 
participatory arts: dialogical art, relational aesthetic art, new genres such as public 
art, socially engaged art, etc. 
This alliance with the participatory arts has had the expected result of the 
institutionalization of these art forms. Walter Benjamin in 1935 argued that “the 
greater the decrease in the social significance of an art form, the sharper the 
distinction between criticism and enjoyment by then public. The conventional is 
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uncritically enjoyed, and the truly new is criticized with aversion” (Benjamin, 1968, p. 
234). The intervention of the museum in legitimizing these participatory art practices 
has had the detrimental results of fashioning their initial vanguardist intent into the 
convention of enjoyment, and spectacle. 
The language that the institutionalized forms of participatory arts now use in their 
project description and intent is more reminiscent of a market-analysis report than 
of a vanguardist art practice. The institutional narrative of the origins, or the need for 
participatory arts, starts with the economic crisis of 2008, and “the pervasiveness of 
social media, the proliferation of digital content and rising expectations for self-
guided, on-demand, customized experiences have all contributed to a cultural 
environment primed for active arts practice” (Brown, Novak-Leonard and Gilbride, 
2011, p. 5). This market analysis of an art form is troublesome. First, by trying to 
confirm if it is economically productive, and second, by checking if it is culturally 
accepted. This type of value analysis of art also appropriates into its social 
discourse the cultural diversity and cultural ecology by-line of a new type of 
bourgeois populist politics. In this discourse emerges a new artist, who accepts, 
integrates and celebrates all forms of cultural practices into her own practice. The 
official institutional discourse of the new artist and the participatory arts assumes 
that participation implicitly conveys socially conscious integration and 
desegregation. In the competitive marketplace of art institutions, it is seen that the 
institutions that still maintain the “consumption model of program delivery” – the 
traditional museum model – are to lose influence against the institutions that have 
embraced hybrid modalities that include the traditional role of museum 
spectatorship as well as the “community-based creative expression” of participatory 
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arts practice (Brown, Novak-Leonard and Gilbride, 2011). 
The growing body of art practice around participatory engagement also reaches 
into architecture practice. It has been analysed that the more participatory these 
practices become, the more attendance they generate. Thus, what Benjamin 
presented as “the distinction between criticism and enjoyment by then public” holds 
to be very true, as these participatory practices tend to become more conciliatory 
and simplistic in their inclusiveness discourses that serve to the common 
denominator, and less vanguardist and critical with complex social discourses that 
are beyond the intellectual understanding of the common people. The marketability 
of the participatory arts and architectural practices has been a success with 
museum and planning boards, but has converted the initial revolutionary qualities of 
the first participatory art and architecture movements into palliative forms of social 
entertainment. 
*** 
6.5.3. For a transformative participation. 
The issue of aesthetic taste comes at the centre of this debate. Whose aesthetics 
and taste are important? What is the role of the experts, as embodied by the artist 
and architect? Should they be the guides of the common people? The problem 
arises that, most of the time, the important issues of social occupation of space and 
politics of place are often imperceptibly bypassed, mainly because they are not 
thought to be important factors in the traditional design pedagogy of art and 
architectural practice. When these pedagogies mostly see the political as 
background of social landscape, and not as conceptual framework, then it is not 
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surprising that the judging of designs is seduced more by shape and colour, and 
focussed less on the potentials of social dynamics.  
Can there really be devise a “true” model of participation in art and architecture 
practice? The question that Markus Miessen posited in 2010 is very relevant and 
difficult to provide a single universal answer to. “How can one move away from 
romanticized notions of participation into more proactive, conflictual models of 
engagement?” (Miessen, 2010, p. 122). 
All forms of true participation, if there is such a thing, depend on the particular 
social and historical conditions of the site. The only way that the artist and architect 
in their role as agents of change could move away from romanticized notions of 
participation is by having not only a deeper intersectional understanding of the 
site’s social tectonics, and the economic political conflicts entangled in the history 
of the site, but also a critical purview of their own personal historical and socio-
economic political conflicts. Without a critical intersectional perspective of all the 
social elements and dynamics necessary to constitute a proper participatory 
practice, where all voices and experiences are considered, together with a critical 
recognition of the power asymmetries between the artist/architect and its 
audience/users, the artist/architect will keep repeating the cognitive mistake of 
thinking about their own practices as a device that can be parachuted to any place 
as a solution to complex social problems. 
*** 
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6.6. On place-making device.  
Artists and architects design and build things. These things can take the shape of 
tangible objects and structures; furthermore these things can be intangible designs, 
situations, organizations, events and performances. Artists and architects derive 
their practices from this canon of building and designing. To speak of place-making 
as an activity related to a practice is to speak of the spatial and social intervention 
of artists or architects in space by means of a device. This device can take the form 
of architecture, an artwork, a situation, or an activity designed at the centre of a 
practice. The device functions as a social catalyst that is meant to transform space 
as in the sense of “open space” of Cartesian terra nullius into a place as in the 
sense of a location interwoven into the social-communal consciousness and 
narrative of a community. Such devices are designed to achieve this objective by 
triggering a scripted practice of place-making. The idea of a place-making practice 
is a parachuting strategy of landing a device on “open” space, thus unfolding a 
series of events by which the “open” space of terra nullius is transformed into what 
the designers claim to be a proper place. Who are the designers? And for whom is 
this place-making designed? These are contrapuntal questions that have to be 
answered from an intersectional perspective, where place is a relative and relational 
concept and not a fit-all definition. 
Place-making as a practice in architecture is always connected to landing a device, 
much like the July 20, 1969 Apollo lunar module landing on the moon (Fig.2). This 
metaphor is relevant because it describes the same colonizer’s logic of place-
making. The stipulation that landing – or, in the case of the artist and architect, by 
parachuting a practice as an intervention in a community – triggers place-making is 
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a short-sighted enterprise. After the artist and architect leaves the site, the 
assumption is that the device will continue to have the transformative effect on the 
community.  On some occasions this place-making practice has had the desired 
effect of creating a long-lasting communal place. Such was the case with the 
artwork/architecture of La Perla Bowl (2006) (Fig.3), which was designed by artist 
Chemi Rosado-Seigo as an art intervention into a derelict abandoned space in the 
marginalized community of La Perla. This work has proven effective in the long run; 
others have been more akin to the Apollo lunar landing – left forgotten after the 
initial attention and publicity, and now existing only in the archives of museum 
exhibition catalogues and professional portfolio publicity material. 
 
 
Fig.32. Lunar module. The Moon. 1969.       Fig.33. La Perla Bowl. La Perla, San Juan. Puerto   
Rico.2016. 
The conquest of space starts by claiming discovery over terra nullius and then 
performing occupation by colonization. Gaston Bachelard had argued that we do 
not live in a homogenous, empty space (Bachelard, 1964). Instead, Foucault 
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posited, we live inside a heterogeneous space full of relations that delineate a 
multiplicity of sites (Foucault, 1984). Foucault, in “Of Other Spaces: Utopias and 
Heterotopias” (1967), claims “our own era […] seems to be that of space”. We are, 
he suggests, “in the age of the simultaneous, of juxtaposition, the near and the far, 
the side by side, and the scattered”.  
A place-making device is characterized as an object or event, a tangible thing or an 
intangible occurrence, or a spectacle that stands to facilitate or trigger a social 
response of a sense of place. Ideas of what is place and placeness are structured 
around a political discourse of community-making. The de facto uncritical 
assumption by government, artists, architects and cultural institutions that 
“community” is a good thing is derived from the simplistic dualism that limits place 
experience (Massey, 1997) to localized, stabilized concepts of identity, culture and 
community (Dovey, 2010, p. 3). This leaves outside the possibilities of 
understanding place as a dynamic, globally connected process of a “global sense of 
place” (Cresswell, 2006; Massey, 1997; Peet, 1998). 
Place-making device is the idea of a parachuting colonizer practice that lands, as a 
metaphorical lunar module, upon a space and by its mere presence creates a series 
of interrelationships between the inhabitants of the space –the site, and the agent of 
the artist/architect. The device-event acts as a kind of Heidegger’s bridge. It is 
cause for a new relationship with the site’s social tectonics, natural environment, 
and surrounding architecture and with the inhabitants that traverse such space. 
Beyond Heidegger’s dictum, to dwell is to be on place (Heidegger, 1971). 
The assumption goes that place and the sense of place can be reproduced by a set 
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of local interventions imbued in the occupation of a territory. The idea of a soft 
occupation of an existing territory previously deemed unusable, abandoned or 
socially inadequate can be achieved by inserting a physical occupying architectonic 
structure or art structure, or an intangible social event that, together or apart, will 
create the conditions for people to gather around the architecture/event, and create 
relationships of community bonding. The image of the lunar module is quite fitting 
to illustrate this representation of place-making as an alien occupation of space with 
the intentions of creating a place. This occupation and transformation of place is a 
gentrification strategy, under the guise of art and architecture social practices, 
public-art, art-washing, urban renewal, and community-building. The soft-
occupation strategy to create new attractive places for a manufactured sense of 
place is sold as a modern convenience lifestyle by urban developers and land 
speculators. 
The manufacture of place, as a social and economic strategy of social cleansing, 
pacification and beautification, entails the massive expulsions of those deemed not 
to be the approbated dwellers of these new places. David Seamon (1979) called the 
environmental experience of everyday life “the sum total of peoples’ firsthand 
involvements with the geographical world in which they live” (Seamon, 1979, p. 15). 
When this experience is of the manufactured place, these places are exclusive 
constructions of “place insideness” (Cresswell, 2004; Horan, 2000; Massey 1997; 
Relph, 1976) that generates parochialism, xenophobia, racism, and all kinds of 
narrow-minded protectionism ideologies. The market ideology of place 
manufactured by occupation and gentrification is based upon the social tenet that, 
regardless of the historical time or the geographical, technological, and social 
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situation, people will always need place. The certitude of this canon that drives the 
production of non-places (Augé, 1992) disguised as “place” by decorative art and 
architecture interventions of place-identity are driven by market forces that continue 
to rely on the publicized idea that people’s need to identify with place is a 
necessary integral foundation of being a human being (Casey, 1993; Malpas, 1999). 
This has been turned into the “necessary” human desire for private property as the 
legitimizing quality for citizenship and rights. 
Lucy Lippard (1997) posited that every landscape is a hermetic narrative, and thus 
“finding a fitting place for oneself in the world is finding a place for oneself in a 
story” (Lippard, 1997, p. 33). Place can be many things simultaneously. For some it 
is belonging, intimacy, familiarity, security, affection, and love. For others the same 
place means exclusion, anonymity, violence, abjection, and hate. 
The trick then is to see how people weave stories in and out of place to construct a 
sense of identity. Lippard argued that it is local knowledge that distinguishes every 
place from every other place. “Inherently in the local is the concept of place a 
portion of land/town/cityscape seen from the inside, the resonance of a specific 
location that is known and familiar” (Lippard, 1997, p. 8).  
Don Mitchell posited that “‘place’ travels with people” (Mitchell, 2001, p. 278). When 
people’s movements are determined by expulsions from their own places by the 
alienating logic of extractivist capitalism, place-making is forcefully transformed 
from the ontological ground to mere location (Malpas, 2008). Place-making has 
become a formulaic design program for real-estate developers and market 
speculation. From strategies of participatory design, to community design 
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paradigms for creating a “sense of place”, art and architecture’s design pedagogies 
have been complicit in designing parachuting colonizing practices of place-making.  
The assumption is that a homogeneous participatory design formula can parachute 
as the lunar module on “alien land”, and by its mere presence colonize the sense of 
place of this “alien land” into the appropriate models of the occupier/designer. This 
assumption is the a priori imperative of urban-renewal strategies. 
If art and architecture’s practice uncritically follow capitalist consumer ideology of 
commodifying nostalgic ideologies of place-making into market-based imperative, it 
will thus reduce art and architecture’s social purpose to an instrument for 
gentrification and expulsion. Nevertheless, as Foucault stated: “where there is 
power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1978). Insurgent practices of citizenship 
(Holsten, 1998), agency and occupation from the experience of marginalized 
communities are permeating into the social practice discourse of art and 
architecture.  
*** 
6.6.1. Heidegger’s place-making device, the bridge. 
The architecture work of El Potocine, (Fig. 4) designed by the Atelier Arquitectura 
Expandida in Ciudad Bolivár, Bogotá, Colombia is a work of social architecture that 
has been successful in design function as a place-making device. Commissioned 
by the Ojo al Sancocho community organization, and built in 2016, together with 
Arquitectura Expandida and members of the surrounding community, El Potocine 
keeps on functioning as a community cinema and gathering place. This project, 
together with La Perla Bowl, shares the elements of communal construction and 
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communal absorption after the artist and architect have gone away. Both projects 
have created a sense of place around them that has integrated both projects into 
the everyday narrative of their communities. Heidegger’s (1971) metaphor of the 
bridge is a keen description of how these projects have intertwined with the life of 
the community. 
Heidegger presented a bridge (Heidegger, 1971). He argued that the bridge acted 
as a thing that allows people to gather – unavoidably and forcefully – sometimes by 
placing them in need of it.  
The bridge as a built object and built thing carries the significance of its physical 
presence as an influence over the parameters of people’s experience of everyday 
life. By allowing people to cross the water at that spot, the bridge changes the 
patterns of people’s everyday lives, and establishes new ones related to its physical 
and social presence.  
The bridge becomes the place-making device that creates the “spirit of place” or 
“genius loci” (Norberg Schulz, 1980) related to the Heideggerian view of place and 
dwelling as the primordial ground of being-in-the-world. Although Kim Dovey 
argues that “genius loci” reduces to essence and ignores the social constructions of 
place identity (Dovey, 2010;4). 
Heidegger also suggested that the bridge might affect how an individual understood 
their situation. The bridge didn’t just alter possibilities for life experience; it mediated 
between people and the world around them. He felt that the bridge, as a 
Heideggerian thing, allowed people to negotiate and renegotiate their relationships 
with the world. People near the bridge, who cross it regularly or live near it, come to 
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feel that they somehow understand it. It becomes familiar; through its familiarity, 
people created a sense of “insideness” and belonging. The bridge offers people 
opportunities to relate themselves to the world around them. For Heidegger, the 
bridge “holds up” the individual.  
The bridge as a place-making device is intellectually significant because its 
presence allows people to understand the world around them in a particular way. It 
also generates a cognitive framework of the types of relations, behaviours and 
identities that are proper and authentic to this place.  
The place-making device can be thought of as a colonizing device as its presence 
structures a proper way of being-in-place. The device/thing creates a representation 
framework of the nature of the relationships of the place. Hence, everything around 
it is colonized in terms of relational meaning to the author’s perspective of the 
device/thing. Everyday life experience now acquires a new sign and meaning to 
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Chapter 7. Towards a critical epistemic practice for art and architecture. 
This chapter presents a theoretical framework for the development of a critical 
epistemic practice for art and architecture. Such process necessarily starts by 
looking inwards into the practice to the critical contestation between ethics and 
aesthetic values, before assembling methods, experiences, and designs from social 
and public art and social architecture to assemble a functional set of epistemic 
operations, tactics and a critical decolonial perspective. The epistemic injustices 
and colonial thinking that permeate art and architecture practices must be 
recognized. Then comes the critique of how this knowledge is created, legitimized 
and disseminated to the communities where artists and architects are intervening 
with their socio-spatial practices. Only then can there be understanding of the 
consequences of epistemic injustices and silencing that these communities have 
been subjected by the socially engaged spatial practices of artists’ and architects’ 
initiatives and interventions. This chapter concludes by arguing how a proactive 
participation guided by radical solidarity and beginning with acknowledgement of 
other voices and experiences is fundamentally necessary to develop a socially 
sensible practice that confronts the epistemic errors in artists’ and architects’ socio-
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7.0. Epistemologies of interpretation. 
“Knowledge gives power, more power requires more knowledge, and so on in 
an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control” (Said, 1979, p. 
36).  
When Edward Said posited these thoughts about the perspective of the colonized 
interpreting the world of the colonizer, he was describing the power asymmetries 
that dominate the modern social relationships of culture, sexuality, economy, and 
politics. The dynamic relationships of how complex social structures are 
constructed between epistemologies of dominance and the dominated. Said 
questioned the legitimacy of an epistemic practice when he asked the simple but 
nevertheless profound question of any knowledge: “Who writes? And for whom is 
the writing being done? And in what circumstances?” (Said, 1983, p. 135). In this 
questioning of epistemic legitimacy, Said raises the awareness of “a politics of 
interpretation” imbued in every human communicative exchange (Said, 1983, p. 
135). The social organization of knowledge in modern Western capitalist society is 
thus interpreted from within such politics of interpretation. Interpretation has been 
delegated to the forms of epistemic authority to the agency of the narrator (Bhabha, 
1994; Said, 1993; Fanon, 1963; Spivak, 1988; Mignolo, 2000; Puwar, 2004), and the 
author (Barthes, 1977; Benjamin, 1968; Foucault, 1969; Segato, 2018a; Lugones, 
2007; Lorde, 1984). This creates a social dependency of interpretation between the 
“public”, the “common” people, and knowledge; and therefore, also creates a 
dependency on what Said called “the cult of expertise and professionalism” (Said, 
1983, p. 136). This dependency creates the epistemic gap between 
creators/producers of knowledge and the consumer/audience of all the products of 
such knowledge. 
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The artist/architect in their role as expert and professional is agent of epistemic 
authority. As producer of knowledge, she is the de facto interpreter, and the 
intermediary between the common people and higher knowledge –theological, 
mystical, philosophical, and scientific (Shiva, 1993; Wallerstein, 1997; Amin, 2009). 
From the social positioning of the artist/architect as agent of epistemic authority, it 
is necessary to have a critical perspective of their inherited prejudicial “view from 
the centre” (Foster, 1996), and of the effects their social practices have on the 
communities that form the site. If the intention is to decolonize the social practices 
of artist and architects, then a critical revision of the cognitive gaps and errors left 
open by traditional Western academic art and architecture pedagogy is needed. 
Only then can artists and architects propose practices of social sensibility and 
solidarity with the people that constitute the site and audience/user of their 
practices. 
This starts with the “experience error” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) of the artist/architect’s 
social practices, which is founded in the amalgam of social, political, cultural, and 
gender power dislocations between what Edward Said (1993) and Homi Bhabha 
(1994) called the site of enunciation. This is the site from where the speaker – the 
author – as the agent of epistemic authority, creates the narration. The authoritative 
knowledge of the narration is embedded in language and history, thus is in the 
history of modern capitalism built by privileging the sites of enunciation of the 
cultures, knowledge, and epistemologies produced by the Western developed 
countries (Spivak, 1988; Mignolo, 2000). Legitimate knowledge creation always 
responds to the speaker’s – the author’s – “desires and needs as well as to 
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institutional demands. Knowledge as such is always anchored in historical, 
economic and politically-driven projects” (Mignolo, 2001, p. 142). 
The validation of epistemologies, Vandana Shiva (1993) argued, has been founded 
in the construction of modern science as the locus of epistemic authority and is 
complicit with the legitimizing Eurocentric knowledge as truth above all other 
knowledge coming from inferior cultures. Shiva posits that the addition of the 
“scientific” label creates a sense of “sacredness or social immunity” to the Western 
production system of valid knowledge. “By elevating itself above society and other 
knowledge systems and by simultaneously excluding other knowledge systems from 
the domain of reliable and systematic knowledge, the dominant system creates its 
exclusive monopoly” (Shiva, 1993, p. 4). The postcolonial feminist philosopher 
Sandra G. Harding (1986) described the sacrosanctity of Eurocentric scientific 
knowledge:  
“Neither God nor tradition is privileged with the same credibility as scientific 
rationality in modern cultures [...] The project that science’s sacredness makes 
taboo is the examination of science in just the ways any other institution or set 
of social practices can be examined” (Harding, 1986, p. 30).    
Shiva and Harding illustrated the site of enunciation of the author, legitimized by 
“Western science” but also legitimized by geopolitical location (Mignolo, 2009) and 
the proper somatic norm (Puwar, 2004; Segato, 2018b). Walter Mignolo adds to the 
creation of this epistemic subject of Western science and knowledge by arguing 
that, once upon a time, it was a de facto assumption between scholars that the 
knowing subject was neutral, “transparent, disincorporated from the known and 
untouched by the geopolitical configuration of the world in which people are racially 
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ranked and regions are racially configured” (Mignolo, 2009, p. 2). Hence, making 
“true” Western knowledge and values the universal condition of true knowledge.   
Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherrie Moraga (1983) had argued against the neutrality of 
Western universalism and the geopolitics of power. They argued that we always 
speak from a particular location within a particular power structure (Moraga and 
Anzaldúa, 1983). The “experience error” comes from the site of enunciation of the 
author. The author cannot escape from her own prejudicial perspective of class, 
gender, sexuality, racial hierarchies, spirituality, linguistics and geopolitics of the 
modern capitalist patriarchal world-system (Grosfoguel, 2008; Wallerstein, 2006). As 
Donna Haraways (1988) has stated, our knowledge is always situated. The site of 
situated knowledge is what Enrique Dussell (1977) referred to as the “geopolitics of 
knowledge”. 
The “experience error” is thus located within these “geopolitics of knowledge”. First, 
our knowledge is always partial; second, our knowledge production is riddled with 
the prejudices of the author’s social values; and third, it is dependent on the 
geopolitics and body-political location (Puwar, 2004) of the subject that speaks – 
the author. This is what Ramón Grosfoguel (2008) differentiates as the locus of 
enunciation (Grosfoguel, 2008). 
From the privileged perspective of epistemic authority embodied in the role of the 
artist/architect, the endeavour of their social practices situated in the site of the 
marginalized carries with it the disjuncture of epistemic injustices between the 
artist/architect and the object of their practices. Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012) posited 
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that being the objects of research inevitably perpetuates the colonial relation: “being 
researched is synonymous with being colonized” (Tuhiwai, 2012, p. 102). 
The prejudices in social research, Charles Mills (1997) posited, start with colonialist 
assumptions that non-white persons are categorized in a manner that “morally, 
epistemically and aesthetically establishes their ontological inferiority” (Mills, 1997, 
p. 118). The darker the skin the lower the individual falls in the categories of 
epistemic inferiority of Western philosophy and science. How much of this 
prejudicial perspective still permeates the position of epistemic legitimacy assign to 
the subject of research? 
Tuhiwai Smith argued that the image of the marginalized has been used as a 
metaphor in the social sciences and humanities to frame social inequality, 
oppression, and disenfranchisement within a socio-political construct of power. The 
metaphor of the marginalized, Tuhiwai Smith adds, has been used together with 
“other similar concepts such as borders, boundaries, bridges, centre–periphery, and 
insider–outsider to demarcate people in spatial terms as well as in socio-economic, 
political and cultural terms” (Tuhiwai Smith, 2012, p. 259). Tuhiwai Smith also 
presents that anthropology, when referring to the daily life of the marginalized, has 
recourse to utilize the term “liminal” to signify the interstices between formal society 
and informality where the marginalized dwell (Tuhiwai Smith, 2012). The 
pedagogical theorist Gloria Ladson-Billings uses this term in this way: “thus the 
work of the liminal perspective is to reveal the ways that dominant perspectives 
distort the realities of the other in an effort to maintain power relations that continue 
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to disadvantage those who are locked out of the mainstream” (Ladson-Billings, 
2001). 
Hence the site of the marginalized navigates between the formal and informal order 
of society. The margin is thus a site of the borderlands (Anzaldúa, 1987), an 
attractive site for academics, researchers, activists, and politicians as well as for the 
artist/architect. This site offers a variety of socio-political positions and ideological 
posturing that the author can exploit. bell hooks wrote about the margins as site for 
the radical possibility of “choosing the margins” as a site of belonging as much as a 
site of struggle and resistance (hooks, 1990). Hence, the site of the marginalized is 
the locus of confluence and disjuncture between many social discourses, from 
governmental populist political discourses, to third-sector agents’ and institutions’ 
discourses of social empowerment and community-building, to social activism from 
native as well as foreign agents. This site is fertile with fashionable participatory 
discourses of emancipatory politics, social empowerment, self-management, and 
ecological development, together with the discourses of resistance, localism, and 
culturalism, framed under the political umbrella of community. 
The site of the marginalized thus becomes the site par excellence for epistemic 
extraction of indigenous forms of resistance – social, political, sexual, ecological, 
and economic – by all kinds of agents, from academia, government, third sector, 
and artists and architects. 
*** 
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7.1. Epistemic practices.  
The purpose of an epistemic practice is to create knowledge. Knowledge is a 
complex and dynamic social process that groups together all kinds of cognitive 
interactions by which humanity constructs and structures what is known about the 
world and beyond.  
Miranda Fricker (2008) defines epistemic practices as ways, methods and 
behaviours that are socially articulated as the proper means to create what we 
know. The first stage of this knowledge construction is by the construction of a 
testimonial narrative. The trust that we bestow on such testimonial narratives is 
what legitimizes them as sources of knowledge. The authority of enunciation and 
site of the speaker reify trust as truth. Fricker argues that on our everyday epistemic 
practices, we convey knowledge to others first by telling them, and second by 
making sense of our own social experiences through this narrative (Fricker, 2007). 
Gregory J. Kelly (2008) argues that epistemic practices are constituted as a 
particular set of social practices. Kelly defines social practices as a “patterned set of 
actions, typically performed by members of a group based on common purposes 
and expectations, with shared cultural values, tools and meanings” (Kelly, 2008, p. 
99). Kelly continues to define epistemic practices as “the specific ways members of 
a community propose, justify, evaluate, and legitimize knowledge claims within a 
disciplinary framework” (ibid, p. 99). 
The way that Kelly organized his definitions of social practice and epistemic 
practice as dependent – the former on “common purposes” and “shared cultural 
values” and the latter on “members of a community” and “a disciplinary framework” 
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– is agreeable only from the short-sighted perspective of universal values, pure-
community and homogeneous culture. As we have seen before, such claims of 
homogeneity and consensus in the participation in a community and culture as a 
form of legitimization is fraud. The structures of knowledge creation within 
regimented disciplinary frameworks, as well as membership on a community and a 
culture, are all exclusionary social structures. The epistemic and hermeneutical 
limits of the structures that Kelly speaks of intrinsically limit what kind of knowledge 
can be accommodated in an inclusive process. The producing, evaluating and 
communicating of knowledge is therefore a hierarchical and exclusionary task of the 
process of power.  
Kathryn Pyne Addelson (1993) argued that “who makes knowledge makes a 
difference. Making knowledge is a political act” (Addelson, 1993, p. 267). Thus, in 
Western capitalism’s distribution of power, the patriarchal socio-economic and 
political organization of knowledge benefits by always supporting a discourse of 
male cognitive authority and epistemic superiority and dominance. Miranda Fricker 
(2007) addresses power as the “socially situated capacity to control other’s actions” 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 4). Therefore, knowledge production keeps on supporting the 
classic disciplinary “father knows best” misogynist social-behaviour dictum. 
Addelson asks: “who made the public knowledge?” (Addelson, 1993, p. 266). The 
legitimation by publicity of male-dominated epistemologies, and the fabrication of 
sedimented patriarchal epistemic practices using Western science and theology “to 
conceal political purpose: to support a dominant elite (all men, or higher-class white 
men of developed nations)” (Addelson, 1993, p. 267), has been the agenda of 
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traditional Euro-American philosophical traditions that place themselves as the true 
representatives of experienced reality (Pohlhaus, 2017). 
In traditional philosophy, knowledge has always been defined as the locus of power. 
This locus has been located on the bodies of upper-class white men of developed 
nations (Puwar, 2004; Segato, 2018b). Knowledge has been the tool used to 
legitimize the domination of upper-class men over all others, including upper-class 
women, and from there on to all lower classes and subaltern others. The structuring 
of a social organization into a subordinate class system is crucial to the 
instrumentalization of knowledge as the “universal” tool of domination. Addelson 
posits that to undermine the hegemony of the dominant elites and the structures of 
epistemic legitimacy that support them, it is necessary to understand “knowledge 
as a dynamic social process, not as a product to be justified, as traditional 
epistemologies have done” (Addelson, 1993, p. 269). 
Addelson hoped to dismantle the epistemic power dynamics and the structures of 
academic thinking that sustain the asymmetries of epistemic authority. Addelson 
searched for a change in the architecture of the institutions of academic knowledge 
and in the existing social organization of knowledge. Such changes, she found, 
needed to start by first changing our own practice (Addelson, 1993, p. 270), our 
own everyday living within the structures of power; and by understanding and 
challenging how we acquiesce the design of our everyday living. 
An epistemology that captures the truth and provides a method that legitimates the 
knowledge-makers is an academic fallacy. No single interpretation of truth can 
claim correctness over all others. There isn’t a single truth; there are as many truths 
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as people in a site. Paul B. Armstrong (1983), in his article “The Conflict of 
Interpretations and the Limits of Pluralism”, quoted Nietzsche’s contention that 
there is no truth but only an array of interpretations (Armstrong, 1983, p. 341). The 
point is not to find a universal solution. Instead, it is to recognize the multiplicity of 
ways to map an epistemology – one rooted in the social and dynamic organization 
of knowledge, aware of the politics of interpretation and experience errors 
embedded in the creation of any knowledge. The experience error might be 
impossible to steer away from; nevertheless, if we are keenly aware of its presence 
and effect in our practices, then we might be able to learn from it instead of being 
directed by its cognitive prejudicial perspective. Then, maybe, this conscious 
knowledge of our epistemic limitations would allow knowledge-makers to do their 
work sensibly and responsibly: taking into account the particular geopolitics and 
body-politics localized in the specific sites of intervention and thus avoiding 
theorizing scripted practices as one-size-fit-all solutions. 
*** 
7.1.1. Epistemic injustice. 
Who has voice and who doesn’t? This question is at the centre of the social and 
political structuring of epistemic injustice. It is based on the same asymmetry of 
power that Franz Fanon (2004) wrote about in 1961. Albert Memmi (1969), Edward 
Said (1993), Homi K. Bhabha (1994), and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) all 
spoke about the epistemic and hermeneutical injustices of the colonized subject. All 
of them analysed and critiqued the situation of marginalization imposed on the 
practice of everyday life and identity consciousness of the colonized subjectivity. 
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The locus of the legitimization of colonization lays on the constructions of epistemic 
differences of subordination. These are the same social, cultural, gendered, and 
biological fabrications that support the superiority and domination of one people 
over another. 
Epistemic injustice refers to those social practices of unfair treatment that relate to 
acknowledgment of knowledge, understanding, and participation in communicative 
social practices between people (Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus, 2017). Epistemic 
injustices can therefore be understood as epistemic in at least three senses. First, 
they wronged particular knowers as knowers, for example by suppressing or 
doubting a knower’s testimony as truthful or accurate (Dotson, 2011) or by making it 
difficult for particular knowers to know what it is in their interest to know by denying 
the knower’s agency (Fricker, 2007). Second, they cause epistemic dysfunction, for 
example by distorting understanding or hindering inquiry (Kidd, Medina, and 
Pohlhaus, 2017). And third, these epistemic injustices reveal their perverseness 
through their normative use in our academic and institutional epistemic practices. 
Thus a normative systematic pedagogy of epistemic injustices is accomplished. 
Miranda Fricker writes about epistemic injustice (2008) as an instrumental part of 
what she calls a dysfunction in our epistemic practices. She identifies two forms of 
epistemic injustice. Fricker theorizes both as “a wrong done to someone specifically 
in their capacity as a knower” (Fricker, 2008, p. 1). The first Fricker calls a 
testimonial injustice; and the second a hermeneutical injustice. Fricker explains that 
testimonial injustice happens “when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated 
level of credibility to a speaker’s word” (Fricker, ibid). Hermeneutical injustice is 
defined by Fricker as occurring “at a prior stage”, before testimonial injustice 
   
 295 
happens. Fricker positions this happening “when a gap in collective interpretive 
resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense 
of their social experiences” (Fricker, ibid).  
The foundation of testimonial injustice lies in what Fricker calls the identity-
prejudicial credibility deficit (Fricker, 2007, p. 28). This is the social prejudice 
attached to people in their social identity and on their own assumptions of value of 
their own self. Thus, the pernicious influence of identity prejudice negatively affects 
the hearer’s credibility judgement of the speaker (Fricker, 2007). 
Identity power is the way in which society categorizes who has the epistemic 
credibility for speaking, and thus who has epistemic authority. In the structuring of 
identity power by the classic colonialist trifecta of power39, history-language-
knowledge, the subaltern categories of the populations thus remain as mere 
audiences and consumers to the exercise of knowledge creation, citizenship and 
democratic participation. The systematic instrumentalization of testimonial injustices 
as means for oppression and exclusion constitute the central case of how epistemic 
injustices belong to the political scheme of social justice. 
The condition of epistemic injustice depends upon the collective conceptions of 
which social identities are at play. The ethical considerations in question result from 
who society deems epistemically responsible to take charge of their own 
subjectivity. Society periodically defines children, people under legal age, the 
                                                
39 Trifecta of power is the hegemonic production of history, language and knowledge by the 
dominant class of a society, or by the conquering state over its subjects. The narrative of 
history is written from the site of enunciation of the victorious in the language that they 
fabricated to place their knowledge as truth. 
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demented, the senile, and at one point in recent history women and people of 
colour as objects without epistemic capacity and hermeneutically lacking the means 
to properly understand the meaning and consequences of their own actions and the 
world around them (Grosz, 1993; Puwar, 2004). Therefore, their operations of social 
power in epistemic interactions are limited to stigmatized assumptions of 
epistemically disadvantaged subjects. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) uses the 
term epistemic violence for the claims to know the interests of subaltern persons 
that preclude the subaltern from formulating knowledge claims concerning their 
own interests and speaking for themselves (Spivak, 1988). Because the experiences 
of the subaltern, the colonized, and the marginalized are recognized only as 
“subjugated knowledge”, not a true form of knowledge. Michel Foucault (1980) 
described these as “a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as 
inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low 
down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity” 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 82). 
This disjuncture of knowledge represents the site of the marginalized. Patricia Hill 
Collins describes as “controlling images” (2000) the pernicious stereotypes that 
constitute and maintain of the identity-prejudicial credibility deficit of the men and 
women who are situated as the silenced centre of epistemic violence. They are the 
illiterate peasantry, the tribal, the migrants, the lowest strata of the urban sub-
proletariat (Spivak, 1988). 
Therefore, it is an institutionalized systematic epistemic exclusion and silencing 
from the participation in the creation of people’s own subjectivity. It is a form of 
colonizing power that embeds into its subjects a prescribed set of social behaviours 
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legitimized by the institutions of power as a sedimented practice of their own 
making. All of these are permitted under the guise of tradition and culture, thus 
perpetuating marginalization as a social phenomenon that is created and 
perpetuated by epistemic and hermeneutical injustices. Fricker calls marginalization 
a moral and political subordination and exclusion from some practice that would 
have value for the participant (Fricker, 2006). It is a mild way to represent the socio-
economic and political disfranchising that marginalization causes. The subjects of 
marginalization are condemned to a life of exclusion and oppression without access 
to a non-prejudicial educational system and instrumental recourses for 
opportunities for a better life. 
We should beware of thinking about education as a universal de facto liberating 
force. Paulo Freire, together with Henry Giroux and Roger Simon, warned us about 
schooling. They understood the traditional schooling of the state’s institutions to be 
part of the production and legitimation of social forms and subjectivities, organized 
around sustaining the relations of power and meaning. Pedagogy can either enable 
or limit human capacities for self- and social empowerment (Freire, Giroux and 
Simon, 1989).   
*** 
7.1.2. Hermeneutical injustice. 
Miranda Fricker (2006) described hermeneutical injustice as: “the injustice of having 
some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective 
understanding owing to a structural prejudice in the collective hermeneutical 
resource” (Fricker, 2006, p. 100). José Medina’s (2017) description of the same 
   
 298 
social phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice is: “the phenomenon that occurs 
when the intelligibility of communicators is unfairly constrained or undermined, when 
their meaning-making capacities encounter unfair obstacles” (Medina, 2017, p. 41. 
In both definitions the authors agree on the same cause for this problematic: a 
deficit of collective hermeneutical resources, and/or of meaning-making capacities. 
Both items appear to mean the same. Fricker in 2007 pinpointed this problem as a 
“gap in collective hermeneutical resources” (Fricker, 2006, p. 6). This gap is the 
empty space left without the shared tools of social interpretation and creation of 
meaning. These tools are as the emblematic publicized, access to emancipatory 
and non-discriminatory public free education, literacy, health services, housing 
rights, and just, fair working conditions and pay. The less emblematic and little 
publicized shared tools of social interpretation are the hidden patriarchal, racialized, 
genderized, classist, heteronormative tools for the identity-prejudicial social 
structure of modern capitalism. It is Fricker who argues that it is “no accident that 
the cognitive disadvantage created by this gap impinges unequally on different 
social groups” (Fricker, 2007, p. 6). Hence, the marginalized are also the 
hermeneutically marginalized, as they are left outside, again, as only spectators and 
consumers, and never participants of the creation of the social meanings that shape 
the world they live in.  
Medina has called this effect “epistemic death”. He described it as both testimonial 
and hermeneutic exclusion from the production of meaning and knowledge. 
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This effect renders the subject unable to be her own interpreter of her own social 
experience. This marginalized subject is thus unable to claim her own site of 
enunciation, of self-knowledge, and of her own narrative. 
*** 
7.2. Epistemic extractivism. 
Artists’ and architects’ social practices have been fraught with problems when it 
comes to their interventions on the site of poor marginalized communities. These 
sites have become attractive for professional advancement in the career of mostly 
young and upcoming artists and architects since the early 90s. The seductiveness 
of adventure to work on the field, away from the traditional studio practices, 
together with the embodiment of becoming a “revolutionary artist” (Benjamin, 1968) 
or agent of social change, was hard to resist. Many artists and architects launched 
their professional careers on the back of the publicity that their works gained 
because of the site of poor marginalized communities. This includes artists like the 
duo Jennifer Allora and Guillermo Calzadilla with their artworks and interventions in 
Lima, Perú (Tiza (1998)) and in Vieques, Puerto Rico (Land Mark (Footprints) (2001–
2002); Under Discussion (2005); and Returning a Sound (2004)); Chemi Rosado-
Seigo’s artwork-intervention La Perla Bowl (2006); French artist Francis Allÿs, who 
moved a dune in Lima (When Faith Moves Mountains (2002)); architects such as 
Alejandro Aravena with his ‘incremental housing’ public housing in Chile (Villa Verde 
Housing (2013)); architecture collective Arquitecture Expandida’s community-
architecture interventions in Bogotá, Colombia (2016). Their work has been both 
praised and criticized because of the site of intervention that they all choose to work 
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in: the poor marginalized communities. These artists and architects were praised 
when their work has been understood as helping the community fulfil a need for the 
betterment of their everyday life. They have been criticized when the same work has 
been regarded as opportunist and self-serving to the interest of the artist and 
architect before the needs of the community (Lippard, 1997; Bourriaud, 1998; 
Kester, 1995; Kwon, 2002; Bishop, 2006; Lima, 2013; Gómez-Barris, 2017, 2018). 
Many art critics, historians and curators have engaged in paradoxical performances 
supporting their ideological ethics in terms of how they measured the effectiveness 
of socially engaged practices against the criticism of other critics. There have been 
publicized debates and antagonisms between critics and historians about what 
actually constitutes a proper social practice. The debate between British art 
historian and critic Claire Bishop (2006) and the art historian and critic Grant Kester 
(1995) is one that illustrates the subjective differences on what constitutes a proper 
social practice. Other debates between curators, historians and art critics abound, 
including from Nicolas Bourriaud (2002), Steward Martin (2007), and Nario Lima 
(2013); the ethics vs. the aesthetic merits of social practice are popular 
confrontations between well-known figures. The cultural critic Macarena Gómez-
Barris (2017, 2018) has praised works that she deems environmentalist and 
decolonial artworks made and performed by indigenous artists from Ecuador to 
Chile. Gómez-Barris assigns these types of works and artists as creating a social 
practice from a decolonial gesture (2017, p. 110). Nevertheless, contradictions 
appear in her ideology of ethics when measuring these projects against other similar 
artworks made by different artists. Contradictions and paradoxes often appear and 
are expected in the subjective practice of art and architecture criticism.   
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Nevertheless, by the mid-90s this sort of social practice applied on the site of 
marginalized communities had become the new fashion for a so-called neo-
conceptualism of vanguard practices. The public attention that these types of works 
generated became the political mouthpiece for art institutions, government social 
agencies and third-sector organizations to claim a renewed social purpose and 
function. Community-building, collaboration, participation, and democratic, 
emancipatory, and social engagement, became the keywords representing the 
social function of these institutions. Artists and architects thus became 
instrumentalized as social agents of change. 
The traditional model of social practice refers to works, interventions, and actions of 
art and architecture in which the artist, the audience, and their interactions with one 
another are the medium. In this definition the artist/architect plays the role of the 
social catalyst, the protagonist that liberates the public from their subordinate 
condition of passive observer audience and consumer of the social spectacle 
(Debord, 1995). 
The romantic image of the artist as catalyst that Nicolas Bourriaud (2002) cultivated 
in his notion of relational aesthetics revives some of the utopianism of Benjamin’s 
“revolutionary artist” (Benjamin, 1968). This image is embedded in the artist as an 
agent of change in the whole of human relations and their social contexts 
(Bourriaud, 2002). Bourriaud argues that in such practice “the artwork creates the 
social environment in which people come together to participate in a shared activity” 
(Bourriaud, 2002, p. 113). Works ranged from menial actions such as artist Rirkrit 
Tiravanija cooking phad thai for an audience in Paula Allen Gallery in New York in 
1990, to large-scale projects such as artist Chemi Rosado-Seigo building La Perla 
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Bowl in 2006 – a community pool/skateboard bowl in the marginalized community 
of La Perla, San Juan, Puerto Rico. Both these examples illustrate what became the 
modus operandi for art and architecture’s social practices, as inspired by 
Bourriaud’s definition: “the role of artworks is no longer to form imaginary and 
utopia realities, but to actually be ways of living and models of action within the 
existing real, whatever scale chosen by the artist” (Bourriaud, 2002, p. 113).  
The international boom of these social practices for the last twenty years has left a 
large theoretical literature and many examples of in-site practice (Lacy, 1995; Miles, 
1997; Finkelpearl, 2000; Kester, 2004; Miessen and Basar, 2006; Thompson, 2012; 
Phillips and Erdemci, 2012; Kupers, 2013; Kelley and Kester, 2017). In the rush of 
art and architecture to claim a new site of praxis, together with the academic and 
cultural institutions that legitimized such practices, many questions remained to be 
asked. 
Some of these questions that remained to be constructed are about the 
commodification of art and architecture’s social practices, and the role of the 
artist/architect as agent of social good or of epistemic extractivism.  
These questions remain unanswered in the contested field of art and architecture’s 
social function. The rhetorical discourse that was opened on art and architecture’s 
social practices, social engagement, participatory practices, and social effect 
opened an implementation gap. 
Stanley Cohen (1985) argued about the existence of what he called an 
“implementation gap” between rhetoric and reality. Cohen posited that the rhetoric 
itself was becoming the problem. (Cohen, 1985, p. 115). Hence, the problematic 
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facing the field of art’s and architecture’s social practices appears to be that most 
of the work remains settled in the rhetoric of a fashionable social-welfare discourse, 
and very little is being questioned in the praxis. 
*** 
7.2.1. The rhetoric of the implementation gap. 
The positive publicity that art and architecture’s works of social practice have 
received has become its own rhetoric of purpose. More attention has been placed 
on the productions of publications, and to the archive of these practices, than to a 
critical revision of their effects on the sites. 
The publicity of emancipation, solidarity, participation, and socio-political 
empowerment of the social practices has remained only as illustrative proposals of 
intent for museum catalogues, art and architecture magazines and dossiers of 
theoretical literature. The actual fate of the praxis has remained murky in terms of 
whether or not these practices had their publicized effect or simply reproduced the 
same process of power asymmetries, epistemic authority, and knowledge and 
labour extractivism.  
In the rush to be ‘the good guy”, the socially conscious artists and architects have 
unwittingly been used as agents for the same colonizing system of oppression and 
segregation that they were initially intended to challenge and change. 
Artists’ and architects’ projects and interventions seen as artivism (Sandoval and 
Latorre, 2008) were appropriated by the state and private interests and became 
examples for strategies of art-washing, urban pacification and beautification under 
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the guise of urban renewal (Foster, 2013). Art and architecture ended up opening 
these sites to gentrification and expulsions (Deutsche and Ryan, 1984; Zukin, 1987). 
*** 
7.2.2. Epistemic prejudice/epistemic ignorance and excuse. 
The artist/architect suffers from a goodness prejudice. This prejudice is identified as 
the condition where the artist/architect positions himself as an epistemic agent of 
authority under the illusion of a Roussonian discourse of “the noble savage” 
towards the marginalized communities with whom they are working. The goodness 
prejudice is a two-part phenomenon. First, it is the manifestation of the epistemic 
prejudice of the artist/architect’s romantic paternalist assumption of the poor as 
goodhearted; the poor and marginalized that have been wronged, oppressed and 
exploited by the evil rich and powerful. Second, the artist/architect’s unwittingly 
colonizer attitude of paternalist protectionism toward the poor, with the poor 
characterized as needy. The hermeneutical injustice of an a priori assumption is that 
the marginalized poor need help from outside agents, as they are unable to 
decipher the ways of modern society’s institutions codes and languages. Thus, the 
artist/architect positions herself as interpreter, protector and saviour by being 
translator and interpreter of the knowledge of what should be a just and proper 
lifestyle for the marginalized poor. Here lies the locus of testimonial prejudice to 
which artists’ and architects’ social practices are cognitively blinded.  
These processes happen because of the lacunas of epistemic ignorance in the 
design thinking of these projects. We have to be aware that ignorance is not a 
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simple lack. It is often constructed, maintained, and disseminated and is linked to 
issues of cognitive authority, doubt, trust, silencing, and uncertainty (Tuana, 2004). 
Even well-meaning artists/architects who are creating works to stop epistemic and 
social injustices often unknowingly stumble into the paradox of epistemic injustice 
that Kristie Dotson had warned of: “when addressing and identifying forms of 
epistemic oppression one needs to endeavour not to perpetuate epistemic 
oppression” (Dotson, 2012a, p. 24). Epistemic oppression occurs in the works of 
social practice when the particular knowers – the community – are precluded from 
making an impact, not just with shared epistemic resources but also on shared 
epistemic resources. That means when the artist only envisages the community as 
audience, and as a “participating contributor”, as long as it doesn’t diverge from the 
artist’s/architect’s program and tools. 
Artists/architects are not immune to the prejudices of social identity affecting the 
people in the site, and thus they tend to doubt the context of their credibility. These 
situations where the artist/architect is acting as an epistemic agent of authority – 
researcher/expert/professional – in marginalized communities have the propensity 
not to fully trust the testimony of the speaker (the community). This testimonial 
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7.3. A critical epistemic practice.  
A critical epistemic practice is a way of creating and gathering knowledge while 
being very conscious of the methods of how this knowledge is intersectionally 
created and gathered.  
This practice encompasses an assemblage of knowledge that should allow the 
artist/architect to gain a critical perspective of the social tectonics of the site from 
an intersectional position of self-criticism. A critical perspective means: to form an 
understanding of the social and political dynamics of a site and the individuals who 
dwell in this site, based upon the intersections of the intersubjective elements that 
constitute the social structures that allocate power on a particular social group over 
another. It is the understanding that all epistemologies are subject to a colonialist 
trifecta of power. Such are the trialectics of the production of history, language and 
knowledge by the hegemonic power. 
Intersectionality should be used as a personal behavioural imperative that allows the 
artist/architect to examine and navigate the world around them with an awareness 
of their own prejudices and cognitive lacunas. This means that artists/architects 
need to create their own aesthetic of inclusion of heterogeneous social contexts 
and narratives (Collins, 2017; Crenshaw, 1991). By initially being conscious of her 
own prejudices – of race, gender, class, religion, spirituality, sexuality, and politics – 
the artist/architect can then self-critically take a critical perspective of the site’s 
social tectonics in a dialectical relation with her own prejudices and not directed by 
them.  
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It is necessary to understand that in any critical understanding of the social field, no 
definitions can be taken as fixed. The social field is a transformative dynamic space 
where uncertainty is an inevitable part of any on-site practice. No single social 
praxis could claim to avoid errors and injustices, but a critical perspective can at 
least avoid repeating known errors and injustices. What a sensible and just praxis 
aims to do is to start localizing the interstices in the practice that are socially 
contested. The contestation lies when authoritative meanings, which are the 
established and sedimented definitions from the colonizer’s universalist ethics and 
values, have been adopted as the status-quo in the social practice of the 
hegemonic authority – the state, academic institutions, and upper-class society. 
The challenges to these sedimented meanings and definitions arise from decolonial 
and indigenous experiences of intersubjective encounters; where meaning is 
elaborated collectively, rather than in the space of individual consumption 
(Bourriaud, 1998). 
According to Ngũgĩ  wa Thiong'o (1986), decolonization consists of the search for a 
liberating perspective aimed at facilitating self-understanding. Thus the need for art 
and architecture’s social practices to be decolonized of the traditional 
institutionalized academic epistemic models of disciplinary knowledge based on 
Americo-European universalism. 
The artist’s/architect’s social agency will always be handicapped if their 
understanding of the social tectonics of the site remains limited to the pedagogy of 
the traditional academic design thinking. Because of this, the social practices of art 
and architecture are riddled with prejudicial preconceptions of universalist ethics 
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and values that produce all kinds of epistemic injustices. The sites where these 
injustices are reproduced, most of the time unintentionally, are the sites where these 
definitions are constructed self-referentially to signify the site and legitimize the 
practice: 
The site is assembled by: 
–The community. 
 –The marginalized othered. 
The practice is composed of: 
–Social practice. 
 –The concept of participation. 
 –The social agency of the artist and architect. 
The forum is constructed by: 
–The museum, gallery, biennale, and other legitimate cultural institutions and 
academia.                    
–The audience of knowledgeable public of the educated classes. 
 –The market. 
 –The archive.  
Within each of these sites, many definitions have been explored and challenged 
from an alternative decolonial perspective. Part of the process of self-criticism of 
the social practice rests in the capacity of the artist/architect to delink from the 
former authoritative meanings imposed upon their practices by traditional 
disciplinary pedagogy and the market.  
Delinking means that you do not accept the options that are available to you; “That 
another way is possible” (Mignolo, 2001, p. 135). 
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A delinking from the traditional pedagogy of the disciplines of art and architecture is 
necessary in order to create a sensible social practice of epistemic justice, and 
radical solidarity. Radical solidarity is defined by José Medina (2013) as a departure 
from the proposals of radical democracy towards “the direction of ethics and a 
politics of acknowledgement” (Medina, 2013, p. 267). It is not an easy task and 
requires the artist/architect to acknowledge other possibilities that discern away 
from their own position of epistemic authority. This includes other ways of life and 
experiences distinctly different to theirs, even though these might go against their 
beliefs, ethics, and values, and also might be in conflict with their way of life. This is 
a tricky social enterprise that requires an openness to interactions “indefinitely” and 
with “heterogeneous others” (Medina, 2013). It also requires a critical position 
between dialogue, participation, and agency, a position that the artist/architect 
needs to navigate between Bakhtian’s notions of dialogue (Bakhtin, 1981) and 
Mouffe’s agonistic notions of participation (Mouffe, 2008). 
The purpose of this critical epistemic practice is to guide the artist/architect to 
conduct their practices with a conscious epistemic responsibility (Medina, 2013). 
Thus permitting the artist/architect to deconstruct their own normative practices of 
art-making and architecture; hopefully being aware of the epistemic injustices in 
their design thinking and avoiding testimonial silencing and epistemic extractivism 
in their social practice. Epistemic extractivism is a baleful consequence of on-site 
practices of external social agents such as anthropologists, ethnographers, artists, 
architects, and tourists. The unwitting appropriations and naive impositions that 
these agents have on the life structures of these sites compound what Vandana 
Shiva (1993) called “the fate of local knowledge systems”. Shiva argued that with 
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the interference of external agents who bring authoritative epistemic systems that 
displace the local systems, these local knowledge systems throughout the “third 
world” are been conquered and displaced by “the politics of disappearance”. Which 
means that, from the perspective of the extractivist colonizer to the benign social 
agent in a quest to help the disadvantageous communities – according to their own 
prejudicial perspective error – both sides shared the epistemic ignorance of 
purposely or accidentally imposing their own politics of life as the better alternative 
for these “disadvantageous communities”, without first being open to a “politics of 
debate and dialogue” (Shiva, 1993). 
Miranda Fricker asked a contrapuntal reading of power (Said, 1993). Fricker argued 
that “wherever power is at work, we should be ready to ask who or what is 
controlling whom, and why” (Fricker, 2007, p. 14). 
The questions are not about how rights are adjudicated, or who speaks and who is 
denied to speak, Who is trusted and who is not, Who interprets, for whom and why. 
Who is the audience, who is the public and who gets to be the speaker. It is by now 
clear that the structures of power are established through the multiplicity of 
heterogeneous means and ways that globalized capitalism exerts on all of us. There 
are no mysteries left hidden in the why of the patriarchal hierarchical order of our 
everyday lives. What is left open is the opportunity to deconstruct the patriarchal 
authoritative design order of society. This task is possible only when we start with 
our own deconstruction and redesign of our own everyday life. 
*** 
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7.3.1. Proactive participation. 
Markus Miessen (2010) and Jeremy Till (2011) coincide in their critique on 
participation and participatory practices in art and architecture. They both argue 
that participation as an all-encompassing solution to issues of power asymmetries 
in design practices, together with concepts of collaboration, democracy, 
empowerment, and citizenship, are fraud – with misconceptions arising from the 
part of the author of the practice: the artist/architect. Both agree that “consensus is 
an impossible term” (Till, 2011, p. 1).  
Till questions if any kind of participatory program could be instituted. Both Miessen 
and Till agree with Chantal Mouffe’s (2005) agonistic pluralism. Mouffe believes that 
artistic practices could still contribute to an emancipatory project in resistance to 
capitalism’s neoliberal policies. Nevertheless, all evidence to the contrary is 
apparent in the roles that art institutions and artists are happy to take into the art 
market’s commanding dogma of professionalization, production, and 
commodification. 
Till’s question of the participatory practices is: “What is missing is the voice or 
presence of the other side – of the insider, of the people, of the agonists” (Till, 2011, 
p. 2). By the agonists, Till refers to Mouffe’s agonistic model of participation 
(Mouffe, 2016), where the agonists are the people inhabiting the site. 
Miessen presented at the end of his book The Nightmare of Participation (2010) in a 
single sentence a possible solution to the conflictual dialectics of participation. He 
posited that a “mode of proactive participation” could become meaningful if only 
three ingredients were presents: attitude, relevance, and responsibility (Miessen, 
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2010, p. 251). In his work The Epistemology of Resistance (2013), José Medina 
explores the paradigms of epistemic injustices that marginalized groups experience 
and the tactics of epistemic resistance they create. Medina noted that the absence 
of these same three elements was constitutive in the pervasiveness of systemic 
epistemic and hermeneutical institutionalized injustices. What Medina posited as 
resistance to these injustices is the development of a socially sensible practice 
(Medina, 2013, p. 297) of radical solidarity (Medina, 2013, p. 267), and responsible 
agency (Medina, 2013, p. 121). 
Till (2011) returned to Miessen’s very short theoretical contribution and expanded a 
bit more on these concepts. Miessen introduces “three positions with which modes 
of proactive participation can become meaningful: attitude, relevance, responsibility” 
(Miessen, 2010, p. 251).  
Attitude: Till presents this concept as being constituted by two mutually dependent 
sides: generosity, and curiosity. Till states that the presence of both is required in 
the mindset of the social agent – the artist/architect – to enable “openness to the 
issues and desires of others” (Till, 2011, p. 3). Miessen frames this as an imperative 
to “remain curious towards the specialized to the knowledge of others” (Miessen, 
2010, p. 196). Both are speaking about the necessity to create and access mutual 
knowledge, and thus they frame generosity as “a willing acceptance” of knowledge 
coming from both sides of the site; from the people who inhabit the site, and from 
the agents who intervene with the site. Curiosity is framed as the willingness of 
“being surprised by that knowledge” (Till, 2011, p. 4). 
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Relevance: What denotes the importance of any given project is framed within its 
own declared intent. Relevance is a highly relational definition. In the case of these 
social practices, they are tied to the forum of audience/users and to the publicity of 
the institutions that legitimate such projects. It could be, as Till argues, that the 
relevance of the project “is only found when it is informed by the multiple voices of 
insiders” (Till, 2011, p. 166). On the other hand, it might not have to do anything with 
the voices of insiders; instead, the project’s relevance can be – as it often is – 
dependent only on the publicity that legitimates such project as valuable. The 
voices of insiders, together with participation, remains scripted scenography for a 
choreographed mission statement that fits into the institutional pseudo-populist 
discourse of community-building, horizontal practices, and participatory 
democracy. 
Responsibility: The first question that arises about responsibility is: To whom is it 
that we owe responsibility? Zygmunt Bauman (1996) posits that “the individual 
responsibility for the Other has failed” (Bauman, 1996, p. 35). Till presents that the 
“Other” has become the “standard term for the alternative and the forgotten” (Till, 
2011, p. 166). Till perdures the romanticism of social responsibility that architecture 
owes to “the people”. When he makes statements such as: “The others that I refer 
to here are therefore not those on the fringes, but the multiple voices that go into the 
making, occupation and reception of the spatial environment. It is spatial agents’ 
responsibility to act for and on behalf of these others” (Till, 2011, p. 166). Till is 
appropriating from the system of architecture’s professional ethics “codes of 
conduct”. As a system of expert knowledges, techniques, and functions, Till 
positions architecture as receptacle of epistemic authority and as morally obligated 
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to help the disfranchised and marginal. The problem here lies on the assumption of 
help. From the position of epistemic authority of the architect/spatial agent, Till 
refers to an almost moral obligation of the spatial agent to help. The question that 
remains to be answered is: Who needs help, and from whom? Hence, this is a 
slippery argument to define. It is very easy to fall into colonizing paternalist 
discourses of epistemic authority, where the expert – architect/artist/spatial agent – 
knows best. 
Thus, the architect’s/artist’s/spatial agent’s interventions appear more to be a sort 
of mission civilisatrice occupation for the good of the inhabitants of the site. 
The marginalized in the systems of social practice are not explicitly denied a voice. 
Their role as speakers of their own experience is accepted into the program of the 
architect/artist/spatial agent. Nevertheless, it is not trusted as valuably equal to the 
expert, technical, professional knowledge that these agents bring with their 
professional practices. The role of the native speaker is silenced away from 
universal knowledge and relegated to the position of the vernacular; historically and 
culturally interesting for contextually framing the agent’s practice. The vernacular is 
appreciated within the frame of tradition and local culture, but it is deemed 
ineffective, technically deficient, and anachronistic. The local vernacular knowledge 
and technique are thus judged by architect/artist/spatial agent as important from 
the side of culture, but inefficient to solve the modern technical problems of the 
marginalized. 
The question remains, then: Who has the moral aptitude, ethical rectitude, and 
technical proficiency to determine who needs to be helped? 
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The determinant cornerstone of responsibility thus lies in whether or not the 
responsible subject is deemed to be a moral subject. Whether this subject has the 
capacity to judge itself and others depends on the epistemic authority that this 
subject has been bestow with. If this responsible subject, as Bauman posited, is 
“trusted with the capacity of making moral judgments, and consequently considered 
to be moral subjects – that is, persons capable of bearing a moral responsibility, not 
just a legal one, for their deeds” (Bauman, 1996, p. 2). Thus, the power asymmetries 
that determined the whole of our social relations seem to be inescabable. The 
problematic of responsibility thus coalesces into the same power dynamics of who 
has the agency of epistemic authority to determine the social positioning of others. 
*** 
 
7.3.2. A socially sensible practice.  
Medina argues that to develop a critical practice that consciously decides to break free of 
epistemic injustices, ignorance, silences and prejudices, it is necessary to include three 
constitutive concepts: social sensibility, radical solidarity, and responsible agency. 
These three concepts that Medina develops, if brought together with Miessen’s and 
Till’s concepts of attitude, responsibility and relevance, might be used as 
foundations for a critical epistemic practice. 
Social sensibility: Starts with the social relationality of experience and the self. 
Medina argues that epistemic injustices arise from the different forms of blindness 
and what he calls meta-blindness that are related to this social relationality.  
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Social relationality comes to be a concept that Medina adapts from William James’s 
1909 ideas of relationalism (James, 1977).  According to such, “nothing can be 
understood in and by itself, but rather in relation to other things, in a network of 
relations” (Medina, 2013, p. 298). To be social sensible thus entails to understand 
that the sense of self that we possess is dependent on the interactions and 
dependencies that constitute our sense of one’s life. This awareness to the 
transformative qualities of the social composition of our identities, which are never 
fixed to stable truths, but instead are relational to the context of whether a narrative 
constitutes a truth to whom and during what temporal frame. The entanglement of 
all the possible variables that can constitute our personal identities is understood as 
issues of diversity. Thus, Medina posits, “the others are essential to the self, for it is 
in networks of relations that individuals and groups are formed” (Medina, ibid). It is 
interesting that the system of relationality that Medina posits following James bears 
relation to Ludwig Von Bertalanffy (1928) general system theory, which he later 
extended (1951) to include biological systems. Von Bertalanffy described that “a 
system is characterized by the interactions of its components and the nonlinearity of 
those interactions” (Von Bertalanffy, 1972). Niklas Luhmann (2013) also argued on 
system theory, following Talcott Parson’s (1951) argument that the social domain is 
a system that cannot only be reduced to biological or psychological elements 
(Gilgen, 2013, p. ix). Parson characterized a social system as “a plurality of 
individual actors interacting with each other in a situation […] and whose relation to 
their situations, including each other, is defined and mediated in terms of a system 
of culturally structured and shared symbols” (Parson, 1951, p. 5). Social sensibility 
thus depends on an awareness of the intersubjective, relational, interconnected, 
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dependent and ever-changing open and unfinished character of our social self and 
personal identity. Only then can we position ourselves in context to see other lives 
in fair judgement. 
Radical solidarity: The simplest definition of a radical solidarity starts by 
acknowledging that other lives and other experiences, even the ones that are 
contrary and even antagonistic to ours, are present and are deserving of epistemic 
authority. Even though these other social imaginaries may come from persons that 
we deem epistemically inferior because of education, class, race, gender, politics or 
religious affiliations. The task in hand is as Medina posits: the process for achieving 
a radical solidarity starts by opening ourselves to a critical awareness of the limits of 
our own social imagination. As a social task of elucidating that in a pluralistic 
approach, there are other ways to imagine society, removed from our own vision. 
We should start by claiming responsibility for the things that we are able to imagine, 
as well as for our limitations in what we are able to envision (Medina, 2013, p. 267). 
Thus, radical solidarity, Medina posits, is “the cultivation of an ever-expanding 
accountability and responsiveness to indefinitely many others, which is required by a 
resistant epistemic agency” (Medina, 2013, p. 302). 
Radical solidarity, Medina had argued, can only be attained in a “radically pluralistic 
social sensibility” that allows everyone to interact with agency without having to 
“sacrifice our differences” (Medina, 2013, p. 306). 
Responsible agency: José Medina (2013) states that our own beliefs about the 
world can be formed and understood only in the context of what our own 
background of existential certainties allow us to support. Thus, the construction of 
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our place as responsible epistemic agents is limited to the immediate scope of our 
known experience. The responsibility that the artist/architect as an agent of their 
own social practices assumes is divided in two parts. First is the epistemic 
responsibility as qua knower and learner. Second is the ethical and political 
responsibility as qua agent (Medina, 2013). The balance between these two 
positions is a complex struggle within the artist/architect. To achieve a position of 
responsible agency in their own social practices the artist/architect has to explore 
within their own practice and persona their position as social epistemic agent. 
Medina offers a few questions to start this process. He starts by asking if there are 
particular epistemic obligations to fulfil as a responsible agent. He continues with 
four questions to the agent to answer for herself: 
–Does acting responsibly require that we know certain things? 
–Can our ignorance be, in some respects, not only an epistemic failure but 
also an ethical and political one? 
–Can our ignorance stand in the way of our being (or becoming) good people 
and good citizens? 
–Can our responsibility as subjects of knowledge have implications for our 
responsibility as ethical and political agents? (Medina, 2013, p. 121). 
These are the tools to explore for what could be a critical epistemic practice for art 
and architecture. Nevertheless, the plurality, temporality and dynamism of the social 
field and the artist’s/architect’s ontological diversities defies these thoughts towards 
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a critical epistemic practice as a formulaic fix-all toolbox. Thus, these thoughts 
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8.0. Conclusions. 
This chapter closes the thesis with a summary of the theoretical narrative of the 
development of a critical epistemic practice for art and architecture social-spatial 
practices. The research findings and contributions to practice are presented in a 
narrative through the contribution to knowledge, followed by a critical reflection on 
the thesis, the limitations of the research, and possibilities for further research. 
Throughout the thesis a question started to coalesce, what does a decolonized 
paradigm of socio-spatially engaged art and architecture practice look like? 
The thesis assembled a critical epistemic practice as method and practice to 
decolonize the socio-spatial practices of artists and architects in the sites of poor 
marginalized communities living in informal settlements at the fringes of Latin 
American cities. The thesis introduces the artist and architect to a critical decolonial 
way of thinking about their place and function in society as socio-spatial agents. A 
critical epistemic practice is not only an instrument and method for a practice; it is 
also a means to expand and transform the artist and architect’s social perspective 
and critical thinking.  
A critical epistemic practice is based on the idea of a constant questioning of the 
way we do something – practice – and how we came to legitimize the way we are 
doing this practice – patriarchal design. It starts with deconstructing the ways we 
think about doing – artist/architect as colonizer – and follows with questioning how 
we are thinking about something as we are doing it – critical epistemic practice. 
Thus, it is a dynamic system and not a discipline structure of repetition that aims to 
achieve a static known goal – the masterpiece. It is a cumulative and iterative 
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practice of experiences that constructs an array of knowledge from many voices 
and different methodologies of working and making – Practice as process. 
*** 
8.1. Compressed summary of the theoretical narrative. 
The research continued by asking the question of why many socially engaged art 
and architecture projects seemed to disappear not long after the artists or 
architects had completed and left the site of the project. Many of these projects 
became abandoned or disused by the community where they were built, and now 
exist only in the many archives of art and architecture’s literature concerning these 
socio-spatial practices. 
The thesis commenced by positing that the “crisis” of art and architecture in the 
21st century has resided in questions of legitimacy of purpose (Chapter 4) and has 
been more prominently emphasized by the lack of space for artists’ and architects’ 
professional practice. The limits of the abstract space of the art market, to the 
crowded social space of professional practice, emphasized the actual reduction of 
tangible geographical space as site for incoming artists’ and architects’ practices. 
Artist Dan Graham was quoted by art critic Claire Bishop (2006) as having said that, 
“all artists are alike. They dream of doing something that’s more social, more 
collaborative, and more real than art” (Dan Graham, quoted by Claire Bishop, 2006). 
Nowadays the artist still desires to be something more relevant in society. The 
problem is that young artists and architects cannot find a space in which to 
transcend the pigeonhole of their disciplines.   
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Social space might reproduce, transform, and constantly multiply; nevertheless, 
access for artists and architects to tangible geographical space have been 
truncated by privatization, legislation and jurisprudence of all nooks and crannies of 
space in Western developed cities.  Public accessibility to space and the city 
remains within a tightly regulated scripted legislation of approved behaviours 
(Chapter 5). The formalization of a structured public life in the modern developed 
city has insured the stability of the status quo of a proper way of life. Nonetheless, 
this formalization and structuring of everyday life has left very small opportunities for 
artist and architects to explore beyond the boundaries of the Global North’s modern 
legislated city. The lack of space in the modern city for new works, especially by 
young artists and architects, is further impinged by the mythology of permanence 
attributed to works of public art and architecture. The permanence and social value 
imbued to public artworks and architecture becomes the problem of permanent 
occupancy of space (Chapter 3). Also, new artworks and architecture are further 
deterred by the hermetic constitution of “image ideology” (Hadjinicolaou, 1974, p. 
96) of globalized taste that the institutions of art and architecture cultivate and 
follow.  
Image ideology constitutes a trend of formal and thematic elements that nowadays 
dictates which artworks and architecture are deemed valuable. This reproduction of 
conceptual and aesthetic trends has limited creative experimentation. Together with 
the lack of space, image ideology has required artists and architects to adopt a 
nomadic sense of practice, constantly migrating to where they can find an open 
space in which to develop their practices. 
This “lack of space” has prompted Western artists and architects from developed 
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countries to explore the openness of informality that the underdeveloped countries 
can offer them as sites for their self-professed professional exiles (Chapter 5). 
The move of artists and architects towards the site of informality in the undeveloped 
borderlands of cities in the Global South, together with an array of participatory and 
collaboratively practices of inclusion, eventually legitimized and appropriated into 
the image ideology of the institutions of art and architecture as a new art form of 
socially engaged art.  
By now, artists and architects had positioned themselves within the popular 
contexts of social spatial engagement and participation, as socio-spatial agents of 
good and as radical cultural workers (Chapter 4). Artists and architects exploited 
this image of the artist/architect as socio-spatial agents, radical cultural workers to 
accentuate the publicity and marketability of their social projects and interventions. 
While many of their practices, projects and interventions that they devised ended up 
reproducing the same extractivist strategies of colonizing capitalism (Chapter 7). 
The two examples presented as failed projects in the case studies of the thesis, 
Escalera como Protesis (2013) and La Casa del Viento (2010), both by Arquitectura 
Expandida, reproduced the colonialist attitude40 of the artist and architect embodied 
as expert agent of epistemic authority, who intervenes in a community to “solve” a 
perceived problem from the artist/architect’s own experience error. However good 
their intentions, they reproduced the epistemic errors in their site analysis to convey 
a prejudicial perspective of the social tectonics involved in the two sites. Therefore, 
                                                
40 Colonialist attitude: see, 6.2. The socio-spatial agent (artist/architect) as colonizer. Maybe also add 
page numbers to all these! Or add page numbers in between the brackets where you refer to them in 
the text. 
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the design thinking for these projects was plagued from the start with 
misconceptions of epistemic ignorance41, scripted and tokenized participatory 
practices. (Schalk, 2018). Thus, it was not surprising that the community saw both 
projects as alien parachuting devices42 brought into their communities for the self-
interest of the architect. 
*** 
The socially engaged works initially listed at the beginning of the thesis’s research 
objectives (Chapter 1) informed the research’s answers to the initial question 
coalesced by the thesis: what does a decolonized paradigm of socio-spatial 
engaged art and architecture practice look like? Followed by: 
1-What are the cognitive gaps present in the design thinking and 
practices of many artists and architects working as socio-spatial agents in 
marginalized communities? 
2-Why does a number of socio-spatial projects in marginalized 
communities tend to reproduce capitalism’s colonizing extractivist 
practices? 
3- What are the reasons behind the success and failure of socio-spatial 
projects? 
At the outset of the research, these questions were thought to be addressing 
separate problems. Nevertheless, they proved to be part of a single recursive 
                                                
41 Epistemic ignorance: see, 7.2.2. Epistemic prejudice/epistemic ignorance and excuse. 
42 Parachuting devices: see, 6.7. On place-making device.  
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problem embedded in the traditional patriarchal design practice of artist and 
architects. The thesis argues the nexus of the problem is located in the colonialist 
attitude present in the social practices of artists and architects (Chapter 6). 
These original questions are strung into a single narrative of epistemic errors 
present in patriarchal design thinking of the projects and interventions artists and 
architects create in the site of marginalized communities (Chapter 6). Therefore, it is 
clear that the correlation between projects that were abandoned and became 
disused is centred in the colonialist attitude. The projects that did last and are still in 
use by the community are correlated by the absence of colonialist attitude. Instead, 
these projects present a design practice intertwined with the communities’ 
necessities and non-tokenized participation. The artists and architects who 
designed these projects were conscious of the community’s social tectonics, 
history of disfranchisement, and social, economic, political, and epistemic 
marginalization (Chapter 5). This knowledge allowed the artists and architects to 
design from a perspective of solidarity and with awareness of their own epistemic 
prejudices and injustices (Chapter 6). 
The correlation between failed projects lay in artists’ and architects’ utilization of 
parachuting practices (Chapter 6), imposing their own agency of epistemic and 
expert authority over the vernacular knowledge and techniques of the community; 
see Escalera como Protesis, and La Casa del Viento (Chapter 2). The projects 
deemed successful, because the community still uses them many years after the 
artists and architects have left, relied on an attitude of openness to the many voices 
of the community. The artists and architects designed these projects with the 
community in mind, and in partnership and co-operation with community members. 
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In the case of La Perla Bowl (2006), artist Chemi Rosado-Seigo had been a resident 
of the site, the marginalized community of La Perla, for a few years while he was a 
student at the nearby School of Visual Arts of Puerto Rico. He was known and well 
liked within the community; this allowed him an inside knowledge of the social 
relations within the community. Although the community initially saw his actions as 
the working of an eccentric young artist, they very soon took a liking to the project 
and even an attitude known in Puerto Rico as “hay bendito”, which roughly 
translates as an empathic sorrow towards him and his project. Thus, members of 
the community helped the artist by informaly participating in the construction of La 
Perla Bowl, donating their labour, materials, and even food to the artist and his 
collaborators. Helping the artist with the construction of La Perla Bowl is different 
than participating with the project. Meike Schalk has called this type of informal 
participation, “uninvited participation” . Helping is a free action (Schalk, et al, 2018)
taken by members of the community towards a person – the artist – whom they 
deemed in need of their help, both physical and epistemic. This is an assertive 
action of the epistemic authority these members of the community have over the 
site. The artist, by accepting and welcoming their help, recognized the community 
members’ vernacular knowledge and techniques; furthermore, the artist’s role as an 
agent of epistemic authority was not lost, and instead it was accommodated as an 
idiosyncrasy of the artist as an intermediary between the community and the art 
world. In conversations with Chemi Rosado-Seigo (2016), the artist alluded to his 
lack of a definitive plan and program when he started to build La Perla Bowl in 
2006. Chemi retrospectively understood that the openness of his process and his 
humble attitude gave him a degree of credibility with the community. This, he points 
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out, was why the community allowed him to build and later on co-operated with 
him, helping to finish the project. Nowadays, not many users of La Perla Bowl know 
who Chemi is, although he continued for a few years to engage with other projects 
in La Perla, with La Perla Portrait Kite Festival and workshops in 2013 and 2015. 
Although Chemi’s process and practice were open-ended, this actually became the 
key factor that permitted his practice to evolve by making (Ingold, 2013) throughout 
the years and that led him to finalize La Perla Bowl. Later it aspired that La Perla 
Bowl has taken in the life of La Perla’s community; something which was almost 
unrecognizable in Chemi’s initial aspirations in 2006. Nevertheless, this project 
remains as an example of an open practice where the artist unintentionally created 
a sensible practice in solidarity with the community during the process of making 
and building an artwork. 
*** 
The other successful project, El Potocine (2016), a self-managed community movie 
theatre, relied on the close relation between Ojo al Sancocho, the local community 
organization, the community of Potocí, the neighbourhood where the project was 
built, and Arquitectura Expandida, the architecture collective Ojo al Sancocho asked 
to help design and build El Potocine. 
Ojo al Sancocho acted as an intermediary, facilitating the close relationship 
between the members of Arquitectura Expandida and the community.  
Arquitectura Expandida’s members Belgian architect Harold Guyaux and Spanish 
architect Ana López Ortego had learned from their mistakes in previous failed 
projects of social architecture. Architect Harold Guyaux designed the failed 
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project/intervention Escalera como Protesis (2013) in La Perla, San Juan, Puerto 
Rico. They also designed and built La Casa del Viento (2010) (Chapter 5) in the 
district of San Cristobal in Bogotá, Colombia, which was burned down the same 
year as a result of a dispute between community members. Their previous 
experiences of failure gave Arquitectura Expandida an insight into their own 
problems in their practice.  
During conversations that I had with Ana López Ortego and Harold Guyaux (2018), 
they pointed to the co-operation with and proximity to members of Ojo al Sancocho 
as having allowed them to be aware of the community needs, conflictual history 
with the government and internal politics. This knowledge, they said, was crucial in 
developing a design and a construction methodology that would integrate the co-
operation of the surrounding community in the building process. Ana López Ortego 
argued that participation is a simulation and it needs a rupture with consensus in 
order to work. Thus, their methodology was based upon “tactical provocations”. 
Ana posited that the learning experiences with the communities in previous projects 
(Casa de los Vientos) where a form of creative resistance. From these experiences 
their methodology was developed including a participatory strategy of self-
construction and self- territorial diagnostic to define the local social, material 
framework and needs. 
Arquitectura Expandida created a design that utilized local materials and vernacular 
building techniques familiar to the community. The community co-operated with the 
construction of El Potocine because they saw it as belonging to their community. In 
this project it is again seen that participation was not a scripted part of the project’s 
design or construction program. It resulted instead out of the open sentiment of the 
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community to help build something they felt was their own.  
The members of Ojo al Sancocho, Carolina Dorado and Angie Santiago saw this 
project as a legitimizing action of the community against the government’s 
discourse of violence over informal settlements. They argued that the lack of 
resources in their community of Potoci actually generated and cemented social 
relations of cooperation and participation. Nevertheless, they pointed out that 
without a clear hierarchy, participation resulted in self-denial. Nonetheless they 
agree that the necessity to make visible the community through this project was a 
key part of the territorial resistance of the community against the government and 
land speculator’s interests.  
*** 
8.2. Thesis contribution to knowledge. 
The thesis started by asking, what does a decolonized paradigm of socio-spatial 
engaged art and architecture practice look like? Thus, stating the following research 
objectives: 
 1- To influence the design thinking of the socio-spatial agent (artists 
and architects) away from academic patriarchal design thinking 
and practices. 
 2- To contribute to decolonize the working paradigms of art and 
architecture socio-spatial practices. 
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 3- To propose a critical epistemic practice of solidarity and a sensible, 
socially responsible socio-spatial practice in art and architecture.  
Each of the thesis’ objectives proposes a distinct contribution to practice and 
pedagogy in art and architectural education.  
1-To influence the design thinking of the socio-spatial agent (artists and 
architects) away from academic patriarchal design thinking and practices. 
An important contribution this thesis has presented is an inward look towards how 
artists and architects construct a perception of their socio-spatial practices and 
themselves as social agents. How we, as working artists and architects come to 
achieve agency over our public, and how this agency influences our perceptions 
and practices in the social realm. 
The thesis presents a critique of the traditional idea in art and architecture academic 
thinking of the site as open space delinked from socio-political conflicts. The site is 
constituted by complex and intertwined social, cultural, and political constructions 
of the city, the community, informality and the marginalized as a social category of 
abjection, monstrosity, and extractivism (Chapter 5). 
The thesis presents the flaw representations of the site in traditional patriarchal 
pedagogy as linked to the construction of the artist and architect’s agency and 
social persona. From these problematics, relations and contested ideas, the thesis 
follows an intersectional approach to enquiry guided by decolonial feminism’s 
socio-spatial critique of race, gender, and class to deconstruct the hegemonic 
patriarchal colonialist structure of academic patriarchal design thinking and 
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practices. Such is a necessary addition to socio-politically recontextualize art and 
architecture’s socio-spatial practices away from the recursive epistemic errors, 
especially when intervening in the site of the marginalized (Chapter 7). 
2-To contribute to decolonize the working paradigms of art and architecture 
socio-spatial practices. 
The thesis argues the starting point of decolonization is to rethink epistemic agency 
(Mamdani, 2020). Also necessary is to be aware of what we distinguish as 
community knowledge; culture and traditions are framed by universalisms of 
Americo-European centric production of knowledge (Chapter 6). 
The thesis posits that art and architecture’s socio-spatial practice had migrated to 
the sites of the marginalized community in order to regain their social legitimacy 
(Chapter 3). Furthermore, it analysed the shortcomings of traditional scripted and 
tokenized forms of participation models and the extractive attitude of art and 
architecture’s socio-spatial practices in marginalized communities in Latin 
American’s cities by pointing towards the misconceptions and the cognitive gaps in 
the artists and architects’ commodification of their own practices. (Chapter 4). 
Following Pierre Bourdieu’s (1985) position, the dominated cannot constitute or 
mobilize themselves as a group unless they are capable to question the categories 
of perception that articulate the social order. Such categories produced by the 
same order, impose their recognition and thus submission to such order. Whereby 
without the epistemic and hermeneutic tools to decolonized themselves, the 
reproduction of epistemic universalisms continues. This includes artist and 
architects, unable to challenge the hegemonical categories that dominate traditional 
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academic pedagogy and aesthetics, without a critical understanding of their 
methodologies, which will in return risks reproducing traditional patriarchal design in 
their practices. 
The research proposed that a syncretic practice exists between the two disciplines 
of art and architecture. Such a syncretic relationship has helped art and architecture 
revive their socially engaged spatial practices. Nevertheless, this syncretism has 
also sunk both disciplines into reactionary colonialist and extractivist practices. 
These relationships have perpetuated asymmetric relations of power between the 
artist and architect as social agents and their public as audience and users. 
Whereby, the many authoritarian roles that the artist and architect embody in the 
site reduce the public and participation to tokenized definitions (Chapter 6). 
Nevertheless, the thesis proposes a space of self-reflection and self-criticism of the 
artists and architect’s socio spatial practices and social positioning as social 
agents. Through these processes the artist and architect become aware of how 
their prejudicial perspective is created and how their social influence and power is 
used over their audience and public. The aim of the thesis is to contribute as an 
ethical and self-reflective framework that guides the artist and architect through 
these processes (Chapter 6). 
3-To propose a critical epistemic practice of solidarity and a sensible, socially 
responsible socio-spatial practice in art and architecture.  
The thesis presents the idea of a critical epistemic practice as its main contribution 
to knowledge (Chapter 7). This practice encompasses the gamut of ideas, attitudes 
and practices to decolonize the working paradigms of art and architecture practices 
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(Chapter 6). The thesis mapped the main epistemic errors that have contributed to a 
recursive ineffective socio-spatial practice of artists’ and architects’ projects and 
interventions in the sites of poor marginalized communities (Chapter 5).  
The thesis proposes that a critical epistemic practice could be achieved following a 
practice of critical pedagogy and proactive participation (Chapter 7). The thesis 
argued that in many cases the cognitive gaps left open in traditional patriarchal 
design pedagogy have pushed the socio-spatial practices of artists and architects 
into a paradoxical situation in their research methodology. Many researchers start 
their investigation with a priori array of conclusions about their subjects. Thereby 
the research methodology leans towards corroborating the already known 
conclusions. The pioneer electronic music artist Suzanne Ciani (2021) said in an 
interview for a Netflix documentary, “We know what we are familiar with… we try to 
make sense of the universe based on what we already know.” The sociologist 
Sharon Hays (1994) argued the same situation, “The choices that agents make are 
always within the realm of structurally provided possibilities.” (Hays, 1994; 64). Thus 
are the limitations in traditional patriarchal design pedagogy outlined in the thesis as 
cognitive gaps (Chapter 1) and epistemic errors (Chapter 6) 
The thesis contribution is in the form of a methodological framework for a 
pedagogical instrument outlining a methodology for critical modes of participation 
and intervention. The methodology argued in the thesis for socio-spatial practices 
has been used as theoretical and historical framework for the initial course of a new 
minor between The Fine Arts Department and the School of Architecture in the 
University of Puerto Rico. During the spring semester 2021, I designed, led and 
taught the course ARTE-ARQU 3110 Introduction to the relationships between Art, 
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Design and intervention contexts. The course presented other ways of “knowing 
and doing” (Grosz, 1999) following the thesis research. The course opened a space 
for critical discussions on practice and intervention towards creating alternatives to 
scripted and tokenized participatory practices (Schalk, 2018) towards constructing 
an ethics of encounter (Frichot, 2019). Furthermore, the critical discussions 
expanded towards ethically re-defining the artist’s and architect’s interventions 
away from colonialist and extractivist methods of reducing others instrumentally as 
“mere means” (Karatami, 2005), whereby these interventions will not only be forms 
of temporal “localized resistance” (Swyngedouw, 2016), but moreover move art and 
architecture practice towards transformative forms of practice.43  
*** 
8.3. Critical reflection on the thesis. 
The thesis asked the question: What are the cognitive gaps present in the design 
thinking and practices of many artists and architects working as socio-spatial 
agents in marginalized communities? The research found the locus of the cognitive 
gaps present in socio-spatial practices in the traditional patriarchal pedagogy that 
keeps reproducing colonialist and extractivist attitudes in art and architectural 
design thinking. 
 The research explored the foundations for a decolonized paradigm of socio-
spatially engaged art and architecture practice and how this praxis could be 
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achieved; through these processes the artist and the architect can liberate 
themselves from traditional misguided patriarchal design methodologies. The 
thesis’ contribution to knowledge radiates beyond the instrumentation of a critical 
epistemic practice for decolonizing the individual working paradigm of artists’ and 
architects’ socio-spatial interventions. The research becomes more valuable as a 
theoretical foundation for a decolonizing pedagogy in design thinking and art-
making and more crucially, in the overall formation of the artist and architect’s 
social perspective. We might never be able to see through the eyes of other, but this 
should not be a reason to continue a closed self-reflexive, and self-congratulatory 
practice. Edward Said wrote, “no one writes simply for oneself. There is always an 
Other; and this Other willy-nilly turns interpretation into a social activity” (Said, 1983; 
137). Therefore, it is not surprising that in the site of the social-spatial practices of 
art and architecture, interpretation, purpose, pedagogy and professional success 
remains the crux of contingency. 
The site of their practices became a background for the publicity of their 
professional achievements. Markus Miessen (2010) noted that “Many practices in 
the art world rarely produce more than one-liners and postings, and nestle in the 
relative freedom and luxury of a superimposed happy-go-lucky bubble, in which 
participation has become nothing but an esoteric self-awareness program” 
(Miessen, 2010; 251). Hence, the socially engaged spatial practices of artists and 
architects in the site of marginalized communities in cities of the Global South had 
been exercises of epistemic ignorance, simultaneously being lauded by the 
institutions of art and architecture as revolutionary practices of selfless humanistic 
endeavour. The practices of artists Jennifer Allora and Guillermo Calzadilla in Lima, 
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Perú – Tiza (1998) – and in Vieques, Puerto Rico – Land Mark (footprints),“Under 
Discussion” (2005), and Returning a Sound, (2004) – had been regarded as 
vanguard works of social practice by the institutions of art and the art market. 
Nevertheless they have also been regarded as opportunistic artworks that 
piggyback their social legitimacy on the protests already happening in these places. 
The artwork Tiza was an intervention by the artists placing oversized metre-long 
chalk bars on the street outside the Peruvian Municipal Palace of Lima during a 
workers protest. The aim was that protesters would use them to write their 
grievances against the government. The theatrics of the oversized chalk were 
attractive for the photo documentation of the work. Nevertheless, the workers 
protesting could not use them whole to write; they had to break them into small 
pieces. 
Allora and Calzadilla’s other works in the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico were during 
the protests (1999–2003) to evict the US navy from their base in Vieques. The 
struggle against the US navy had its origins in the early 70s. Activists and 
community members who had led the struggle since the 70s were leading the 
protests in 1999, fighting the appropriation and use of one third of the island as the 
navy’s bombing range. Allora and Calzadilla publicized their presence and 
participation in the protests. They made various artworks in Vieques, and 
contextualized their practice within the social and political struggle of the protests. 
Their artworks became known to the people of Vieques and to the people who 
participated in the protests only later, through newspaper articles and online 
exhibition catalogues. 
The artist Francis Alÿs’s work When Faith Moves Mountains (2002) took place in the 
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informal settlements outside Lima, Perú. This artwork has been extensively 
publicized as a socially engaged work. Nonetheless the artwork did not include any 
meaningful participation or engagement with the community beyond Alÿs’ use of 
the community as free labour and social backdrop. The art world’s celebrated this 
work as a social catalyst (Bourriaud, 2002) and as an example of art’s function as an 
instrument for social change. 
The principal impact of these practices has been the revitalization and legitimization 
of the Western institutions of art: museums, biennials, art fairs, academia, and the 
art market. Beyond that, to think that these works had any meaningful impact in the 
communities where they took place is naïve. I had the opportunity to be present and 
participant of the demonstrations that took place in Vieques from 1999 to 2003. 
During this time, the work of Allora and Calzadilla was unknown to the people in 
Vieques. It was not until a few years later that their work became known in the 
island by newspaper articles of their exhibition in New York’s MOMA. I had a similar 
experience when I went searching in Lima, Perú for people who had participated in 
or remembered Francis Alÿs’s work. Even though it was by then 10 years after the 
project, I could not find anybody who knew of it. These experiences made me think 
of the word intervention, which is often used to describe these works of socio-
spatial practice that some artists and architects do. Intervention describes an action 
that it is deemed necessary to fix, resolve or heal a negative situation, like an illness 
or addiction. Intervention denotes a quick action and a prompt withdraw. Thus, it 
seems proper to call the practices from these artists’ interventions; although they 
did not leave any lasting effect on the site, these works did contribute to the long 
list of literature produced to reify art’s socially engaged spatial practices as 
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colonizing instruments for epistemic extractivism. (Chapter 6).  
The question that remains is whether these social-spatial practices and the 
temporal nature of their social engagement remain a revolutionary practice of 
selfless humanistic idealism, or should be seen as an opportunistic endeavour of 
professional gain. 
*** 
The political theorist Chantal Mouffe (2007) raised the question: “Can artistic 
practices still play a critical role in a society where the difference between art and 
advertising has become blurred and where artists and cultural workers have 
become a necessary part of capitalist production?” (Mouffe, 2006; 1). The direct 
and simple answer is no. If we step away from our “experience error” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962) and take a bit of “critical distance” (Jameson, 1991), it is clear that art 
has never played a critical role for the whole of society beyond the small circles of 
culture and bourgeois legitimizing spectacle for a trained audience.  
Architecture on the other hand appears to have had a larger perceptual role in 
society. Architecture has been tasked since antiquity with the behavioural design of 
society through the design of the structures in which we dwell, and the city spaces 
where we conduct our everyday life. The first question to contrapuntally (Said, 1993) 
clarify is of whose society was Chantal Mouffe speaking. Society is not a single 
homogenous block; it is composed of many “worlds” (Lugones, 1987). Feminist 
philosopher María Lugones spoke of “traveling to other people’s worlds” (Lugones, 
1987, p. 18), as an action of self-awareness to our own small, localized and 
prejudicial perception of our society as a unitary form, and the world around us. Our 
   
 339 
own societies are composed of a multiplicity and plurality of “worlds”, divided and 
inhabited by distinct peoples we have come to call the “others”. The ones that have 
a different way of life from ourselves, but also a distinct affective, emotional and 
ideological construction of what the world is from their own perspective –“from a 
world their own” (Lugones, 1987). Hence, when the social purposes and functions 
of art and architecture are stated, it should first be clearly stated who the audience, 
user, and receptor of these practices are. 
*** 
Art and architecture as disciplines are posteriori externalizations that legitimize with 
their practices the society of the political ruling power of the day. Neither art nor 
architecture has a protagonist role in determining the fundamental relationships and 
hierarchies of social and political reproduction that structure the socio-economic 
and political development of a society. Both disciplines only reproduce the 
authoritative signs of epistemic legitimacy – museums, court houses, mansions, 
skyscrapers, paintings, sculpture, and others – but not the social and political 
meaning of the signs. 
Art remains the perennial Barbara Kruger euphemism of the “garnish” on the “slab 
of meat” of architecture. If art is the “garnish” that adorns the legitimacy of the 
bourgeois ruling class, as the elite taste and the locus of epistemic authority, then 
architecture might be the main dish, representing the unmistakably triumphant 
crown bestowed upon the advanced society of epistemic superiority. Nevertheless, 
in this metaphor, the kitchen should be represented by society, thus neither the 
garnish nor the main dish has any long-term transformative role to play there. Art 
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and architecture do have their moments when the ruling class of society – political, 
economic, and cultural hegemony – calls on them to perform as reflexive symbols 
of their achievements. 
The largest percentage of the population does not belong to the privileged centre of 
the educated middle and upper classes, for them art and architecture are foreign 
artefacts. Although the poor and disfranchised populations do not have access to 
the formal epistemic tools of education and identity empowerment, that will allow 
them the critical empowerment for a judgement of taste and purpose. The epistemic 
authorities of culture repeatedly tell them that these artefacts are important. Thus, 
art and architecture mostly continue to act as instruments in the accumulation of 
social capital to reaffirm the epistemic superiority of the upper classes.  
Periodically, art is used as backdrops to temporary fulfil romantic exaltations of 
revolution, which have in turn been appropriated into the social reproduction of the 
same system. 
Art and architecture have always been reflexive practices, which are more or less 
detached from the everyday life of the common people. Hence, the question should 
not be: Does art still play a critical role in a society? The question to address instead 
should be: To what part of society is art still relevant? The answer then would be: Art 
remains instrumental for a particular section of educated society. This question 
should be followed by another: Can art still claim to be relevant beyond the creed of 
art’s autonomy of art for art’s sake? 
Neither art nor architecture can claim the romanticized “autonomy” of a delinked 
subject away from societies’ prejudices, desires and fashions. Art and architecture, 
   
 341 
the artist and architect, are inevitably intertwined with politics, ecology and 
philosophy where action and theory become inseparable from each other. It is from 
the entanglement of knowledge and actions that the questioning of the purpose of 
art and architecture’s social-spatial practices should be started. 
*** 
Art and architecture are clear commodities as object and as epistemological forces. 
Artists, architects, museums, and art institutions have all embraced the self-
representation of “cultural-workers”, naively joining into the discourse of the culture 
industry (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1947). Adorno by 1936 had already stated his 
suspicion in letters to Walter Benjamin of what he saw High Art as well as 
“industrially produced consumer art” that “bear the stigma of capitalism”. The 
uncritical embrace of art institutions, artists and architects to the image of cultural 
workers as painted by the neoliberal discourse of labour has legitimized the 
instrumental commodification of their practices into the service of a market 
economy where precariousness is the permanent condition that speaks about the 
separation between work and labour (Szaniecki and Coco, 2015). Thus condemning 
the artists’ and architects’ practices to the precariat condition of producers of 
artefacts of consumption. 
The apparent lack of “critical distance” (Jameson, 1991) displayed by artists, 
architects and institutions has contributed to the colonization of all things 
considered the domain of art – architecture falls into this domain – into the global 
capitalism’s commodities discourse. The baleful consequence of impeding a critical 
positioning of art outside its dependency on commodification as market 
   
 342 
legitimization has resulted into the indifference to differentiate between art making, 
advertisement, and other forms of capitalist production. Clearly art and 
advertisement belong together as products of the same culture industry. Mouffe 
argued “art has been subsumed by the aesthetics of biopolitical capitalism and 
autonomous production is no longer possible” (Mouffe, 2013; 92). 
Without the ability for critical distancing, it is not possible to have an overview of 
these displacements. How art has slipped quietly into the self-congratulatory 
complacency of thinking itself as countercultural or cultural resistance by “inclusive” 
discourses of race, class and gender into its aesthetic paradigms, while they 
themselves have been “secretly disarmed and reabsorbed by a system of which 
they themselves might well be considered a part, since they can achieve no 
distance from it” (Jameson, 1991; 49). Thus, art and also architecture remain in the 
comfort zone of their own cognitive trap of delusional effective social contribution. 
Artist Jeanne van Heeswijk (2012) argued that art could be an epistemological force, 
with the potential to transcend mere representation or “fashionably uncritical cliché 
of art as knowledge” (Van Heeswijk, 2012; 78). Van Heeswijk posited that art could 
be instrumental in creating “new spaces of transformation”. The feminist social 
activist bell hooks called these spaces of counter-hegemonic cultural practice 
(hooks, 1991). These constitute new spaces of resistance, to dominant discourses 
of power (Keith and Pile, 1993). Nevertheless, before the artist and architect can 
claim this responsibility, Van Heeswijk exhorts, “the artist has to decide whom they 
serve” (Van Heeswijk, 2012). The “service” of artist and architects has always been 
a matter of critical question. This matter is concerned with issues of autonomy and 
the self-serving reflexive practice of the artist and architect.  
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What it is clear is that artists and architects are not needed in the sites of the 
marginalized poor. The story that has been fabricated from within the imaginaries of 
art and architecture, where the needs of the marginalized poor correspond more to 
the needs of artist and architects, whereby these communities serve as sites for 
their practices, rather than corresponding to the needs these communities have for 
expert legal guidance, technical infrastructure, education and medical facilities or 
political validation of their way of living. 
This story is enshrined in art and architecture’s disciplinary epistemic ignorance, 
devaluation, and identity denial of the vernacular forms of architecture, informal 
service infrastructure and local art forms that have existed within these communities 
well before any artist or architect arrived. 
For any project that had a consequential impact on the community where it was 
constructed, there have been countless others that remain in existence only in the 
pages of the official archive of museums, galleries and online sites of art and 
architecture social practices. 
Art and architecture’s social practices in the sites of marginalized communities 
remain palliative practices, which serve to reify the reflexive nature of these two 
disciplines, rather than having any long-lasting social effect on the people who 
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8.3.1 Limitations and further research.  
The research closely centred on the effects, relationships and practices that artists 
and architects’ socio-spatial practices have had when applied in the sites of poor 
marginalized communities in Latin American cities. The thesis limited the case 
analysis to only two sites, in San Juan, Puerto Rico and in Bogotá, Colombia. 
Although the thesis was also informed by the author’s interactions with many other 
works in Lima, Perú, the time frame and context of the thesis did not allow for a 
more expansive look at these other projects. 
Further research could be contextualized into a more wide-ranging study of the 
effects of socio-spatial practices in Latin America on local artists and architects and 
on the pedagogy of future artists and architects in Latin America. 
There is still an open field of theory and practice to be study in context of Latin 
America and the particularities of new homegrown socio-spatial practices. 
It was evident in this research that the influence of foreign artists and architects in 
the sites of marginalized communities had had the effect of inspiring local practices 
that further and more incisively developed these projects into practices of socio-
political resistance in these communities. These new practices included elements 
that are present only in the everyday lives of the inhabitants of these informal 
settlements, and are not openly evident for artist and architects coming from 
outside. Occupation and citizenship occupied the central axis in these new 
homegrown socio-spatial practices of resistance. Alternative forms of occupation 
and citizenship frame the temporality of informality and exclusion in the lives of the 
marginalized community. Therefore, it is not surprising that a homegrown practice 
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would pivot around this central axis that defines all other aspects of their social 
experience. The prospect of expulsion looms ever present in the everyday-life 
experience of the marginalized. Thus, these new practices explore novel tactics of 
insurgent occupation and insurgent citizenship (Holsten, 1998; Schalk, 2018) that 
only the local, native inhabitant of abject poverty and marginalization can somatize. 
Hence, maybe this is a closed proposition to foreign actors, and can only be 
attained by a native researcher. 
It must be clear that any research into these communities must work towards an 
ethics of encounter (Frichot, 2019), where the positionality of the socially engaged 
spatial agent has to be disclosed as part of a situated responsibility (Altés Arlandis, 
2018). Nonetheless, the turn towards colonialism and extractivism remains 
prevalent in these socio-spatial practices. The transnational postcolonial 
feminist theorist Chandra Talpade Mohandy (1984) has warned us that colonization 
has come to denote certain modes of appropriation and codification of knowledge, 
especially in the case of marginalized and oppressed groups, particularly for women 
in the Global South. Colonialism has been used by “feminist women of color in the 
U.S. to describe the appropriation of their experiences and struggles by hegemonic 
white women's movement.” (Mohandy, 1984; 333). Thus, we must remain vigilant 
that our encounters with other groups should remain free of professional 
opportunism. Rather, we should aim towards becoming “transformative learning 
experiences.” (Altés Arlandis, 2018; 277). 
The developing of local socio-spatial practices is a phenomenon in process. Many 
of them are coming from native informal artists and architects. Their informality 
exists in the sense that they are not schooled in the traditional academy, but are 
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instead coming from autodidactic imperatives from people who do not have access 
to the epistemic tools of higher education. Nevertheless, in countries such as 
Colombia, Perú, Chile, and Argentina new spaces of knowledge are continuously 
being created outside the traditional academy of universities and institutes. This is 
where further research into local tactics for socio-spatial practices of resistance and 
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